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PREFACE
Psk.ist3.il stepped into 1970 with renewed hope 3nd
vi-Cfouir. Democratic political processes which had remained
suspended since Ayub Khan's military coup in 1958 were re-
stored on New Year's Day. The country witnessed an eleven
month period of hectic political activity and campaigning
by the aspirants to political power. On December 7, 1970,
for the first time since independence in 1947, direct
elections were held on a national scale. For the first
time on the basis of universal adult franchise, and one
man one vote, Pakistans set out to vote in a National
Assembly entrusted with the task of framing a new constitu-
tion. Ten days later they trekked to the polling stations
again to elect members of provincial assemblies, for each
of the five provinces of East Pakistan (now Bangla Desh)
,
Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Pro-
vince ( NWFP ) . Even on a provincial scale they were the
first direct elections since 1954 in East Pakistan, the
first ever in Baluchistan, the first since 1951 in Punjab
and NWFP, and the first since 1953 in Sind.
The results of the election at both the national and
provincial levels showed a sweeping victory for the Awami
League in East Pakistan, and a substantial majority for
the People's Party in West Pakistan. The elections demon-
strated that the East voted for an inward looking Bangali
nationalism. It was both a protest vote against the hege-
IV
mony of West Pakistan, and. a positive vote for an autono-
mous Bangla Desh.
While the AL victory (given the emotion charged
climate of the East) was not surprizing except perhaps in
magnitude, the emergence of the People's Party of Pakistan
(given its Socialistic platform) indicated an exciting,
albeit unexpected direction in voting behaviour.
Subsequent events in 1971 focussed world attention on
the seccession of East Pakistan. The result was a fund of
literature on the Bangla Desh crisis, and the relegation to
the background of the elections themselves, especially in
West Pakistan. The dearth of literature in this area is
regrettable in that the elections themselves were a most
significant manifestation of the process of political de-
velopment that is underway in Pakistan, and the direction
in which modernization had brought about the aligning of
the electorate.
In this thesis, we shall attempt to evaluate the
economic, political and psycho-social causes for the PPP
popularity using the elections as a case study. We shall
stress the significant correllation between the PPP success,
the political development of Pakistan and the process of
modernization.
Our further concern would be the role assumed by the
PPP and the mediating situational inputs which fashion the
role or roles — as the case may be. Another goal would be
v
to examine the nature of the contribution of the party role
to the process of political development.
Political parties are products of their environment,
but may also be instrumental in generating new environments.
Our further concern would lie in the fact that party roles
and role perceptions may vary from time to time; according
to socio-political conditions as generated by the process
of modernization — the success of a party ultimately being
contingent upon its ability to accomodate change.
Various data sources have been employed. They in-
clude primarily newspapers, government and research publi-
cations. Pakistani newspapers covering the election period,
have been a most valuable source of information in the ab-
sence of personal interviews and questionnaires. The method
employed involves primarily an interpretive analysis of
narrative and some statistical data from library sources
and newspapers.
The PPP being a West-based party, our primary area
of concern would be West Pakistan. The outcome of the
election here is more complex than that of East Pakistan.
This would however, not preclude all comparisons between
the East based Awami League and the PPP.
vi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
From the standpoint of political development, party
rol©s and configurations can be viewed as the outgrowth of
the development process — the culmination, as it were, of
processes of social, economic and political change — and
also as institutionalized forces affecting political change,
whether it be progressive or retrogressive.
Any discussion of the role of the Pakistan People's
Party as a political phenomenon within the context of the
elections of 1970, will entail an understanding of it as a
dependent variable, influenced by interacting societal
variables
.
In developing areas, parties have been major instru-
ments for political socialization, especially during the
early phases of development, when they are among the few
institutions concerned with affecting political attitudes.
In more developed systems other institutions like the
press, the educational system, assume this role. In the
case of Pakistan, we found that the PPP was not the prin-
cipal generator of the attitudinal change that ensured its
victory. What then were the operating factors? We posit
that, before the emergence of the PPP, the political system
of Pakistan was faced with a series of crises (an elabora-
tion of the concept and nature of crises will appear later
in the chapter) which contributed to the attitudinal change
2from which the PPP benefitted. In other words, political
socialization was already underway in Pakistan. Social
change and mobility is taking place much faster in Pakistan
than most realize. Social stratification on the basis of
class, caste and clans is breaking down.
A revolution of expectation sweeps the land. People
at all levels are seeking material gratification — comforts,
better jobs, better standards of living. The advent of
technology and the effects of modernization have given
people the vision that they can, according to their will,
change the circumstances of their lives. This has happened
with rather explosive suddenness in Pakistan, as in other
developing countries. The traditional attitude of resigna-
tion to conditions is changing to hope, and attendant dis-
content. However, out of this discontent and frustration
are emerging creative factors resulting in a new view of
man's potency for change.
The PPP's sensitivity to the intertwined political,
social, economic and psychological components of the pro-
cess and direction of change, contributed to its success.
The theme has been developed throughout this work, that the
party did not undertake an "educating" function. It's role
was essentially an adaptive one, with mass aspirations
forming the inputs that determined the nature and scope of
its operation. There is an implicit argument in our
analysis, that the other parties that contested elections
3in West Pakistan, either failed totally to understand mass
aspirations against the canvas of systemic change, or if
they did, failed to incorporate and internalize them effec-
tively enough.
The attitudinal change among the masses is, in itself,
a consequence of the output of modernization. The very
process of modernization has made obvious the discrepancy
between the fulfillment of socially induced economic (and
to some extent political) expectations, and a blind accep-
tance of an authority committed to an unfulfilling status
quo. The socialist platform of the PPP was in harmony with
the direction of changes in the mass perceptions.
Definition of Basic Concepts
Before we proceed any further, a clarification of
basic concepts used in this study becomes necessary.
1. Political Party . A political party is seen in the
popular mind as a symbol of political modernity, just as
power dams or steel mills are conceived of by political
elites in the developing areas as a symbol of economic
modernity. Parties emerge whenever the activities of a
political system reach a certain degree of complexity, or
whenever the notion of political power comes to include
the idea that the mass public must participate or be con-
trolled. Using Weiner and LaPalombara 1 s explanation,
parties should be distinguished from cliques, clubs and
4small groups of notables that can be identified as the ante-
cedents of the modern political party in most Western
countries. It is also important to distinguish parties
from purely national "movements" and factions. The defini-
tion we adopt requires (1) continuity in organization —
that is, an organization whose expected life span is not
dependent on the life span of current leaders; (2) manifest
and presumably permanent organization at the local level,
with regularized communications and other relationships,
between local and national units; (3) self-conscious deter-
mination of leaders at both national and local levels to
capture and hold decision-making power alone or in coali-
tion with others, not simply to influence the exercise of
power ; and (4) a concern on the part of the organization
for seeking followers at the polls or in some manner
striving for popular support. 1
2. Modernity/Tradition . Modernity entails a rationali-
zation of ends. It does not involve a total rejection of
traditional customs and values, but involves carrying out
new roles and discarding purely inherited roles. In most
developing countries (in the absence of an ideologically
motivated revolution) the transition from tradition to
modernity is a gradual continuous process. The develop-
1 See Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds .
,
Political Parties and Political Development , Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 6-7.
5mental process, then, involves, in a sense, an interplay
between the "modernization of tradition" and the "tradition-
alization of modernity."
The elections of 1970 demonstrated an unexpected
direction in voting behaviour. "Baradari" or clan affili-
ations did not play a predominent role in determining the
voting pattern. If this trend is reinforced in the elec-
tions of 1975, we can assume that the rationalization pro-
cess is evolving in Pakistan.
3. Social Mobility . As countries move towards greater
industrialization, changes occur in the system of strati-
fication. With industrialization and the spread of educa-
tion, stratification in Pakistan is now not so much on the
basis of caste or clan and feudal relationships but on the
basis of wealth and education. As education, which was
once the privelege of a small elite, becomes available to a
wider section of society, social mobility results. Then
modes of obedience and loyalty, functional to a vertical
hierarchical society, become unacceptable to those moving
in a competitive, horizontal society. Freedom of thought
instilled by the secularizing of education and consequent
broadening of action is now provided. A change of values
is brought about by social mobility. A most important
value which may in turn be subsumed by all other values is
what is identified in the West as humanitarianism , and
which involves active concern for the welfare of all human
6beings, irrespective of economic position, caste, color or
creed, or inherited social roles. Egalitarianism, which
is an essential element of humanitarianism
,
is seemingly
becoming the most coveted value of the Pakistani masses.
4 * Political Development
. Considering the surfeit of
definitions that have been attributed to the concept of
political development, it seems desirable to elucidate,
what we consider would be a valuable approach in understand-
ing developing societies.
Political development has been identified as (a) the
political prerequisite of economic development, (b) as the
politics typical of industrial societies, (c) as political
modernization, (d) as the operation of a nation-state, (e)
as Administrative and Regal development, (f) as mass mobili-
zation and participation, (g) as the building of democracy,
(h) as functional specificity within a polity (i) as stabil-
ity and orderly change (j) as mobilization and power and so
2
on. These definitions of absolute goals reflect an over
simplified view of political development and are indifferent
to the complexity and multiplicity of determinants that
fashion it. We understand political development as process
oriented as opposed to a value laden or goal oriented con-
cept .
2For an elaboration of the varying definitions attri-
buted to political development and further references, see
Lucian W. Pye
,
Aspects of Political Development , Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1966, pp. 33-45.
7Both the historical and typological perspectives of
political development imply or specify a beginning and end
state of affairs, the latter characteristically being
what purports to be a "developed" or "modern" polity. This
approach seems to preclude any form of cultural relativism.
It is also insensitive to the fact that the time span for
development in the "Third World" as compared to the West
has shrunk considerably, resulting in a "skipping of stages."
These perspectives do not allow for political "breakdowns"
and "decay" and imply that the movement between the two
poles of traditionality and modernity is and must be irre-
versible and unilinear. At the "developed" or "modern"
extreme there is the image of termination and the end of
the line. It is virtually impossible to eliminate the
suggestion — to use a phrase from James Coleman — of an
ethnocentric, Western parochial normative bias.
The advantage of an evolutionary perspective is that
it views political development as a continuous process, and
views change as multilinear. Hence our preference for this
approach
.
From the evolutionary perspective one views
the political development process as that open-
ended increase in the capacity of political man
to initiate and institutionalize new structures,
and supporting cultures to cope with or resolve
problems, to absorb and adapt to continuous
change, and to strive purposively and creatively
8for the attainment of new societal goals. 3
Coleman's concept of "development" as a syndrome of
summatory dimensions ( "dif ferentation , " "equality" and
"capacity") provides certain a priori premises to channelize
the scope of the phenomena. His conception of the politi-
cal development process is a continuous interaction among
the processes of structural differentiation
.
the impera-
tives of equality
.
and the integrative responsive and adap-
4tive capacity of a political system. Basic to the develop-
ment syndrome are the contradictions amont the rising demand
for equality, which involves popular participation adherence
to universalistic laws, and respect for achievement-perfor-
mance; a greater need for capacity and for a more efficient
and far ranging governmental system; and a tendency toward
greater differentiation as the divisions of labor and speci-
alization of tasks becomes more widespread. The very
essence of modernization, thus may be viewed as a dynamic
state based on the need to manage and ameliorate the ten-
sions inherent in the development syndrome. In tracing the
pressures basic to the development syndrome, some political
3 See James S. Coleman, "The Development Syndrome:
Dif ferentation — Equality — Capacity," in Leonard Binder,
James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye , Sidney
Verba and Myron Weiner, eds., Crises and Sequences in_
Political Development , Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1971, p. 73.
^Ibid
. ,
pp. 73-100.
9theorists, have arrived at five "crises" that have arisen
in the process of political development. These are the
crises of identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration
and distribution.
Methodology
We have used the crisis model as one approach in
explaining the PPP emergence and success, at the same time
taking into consideration the variable of modernization.
Our theoretical approach regards conflict as an essen-
tial ingredient of social existence. A theoretical approach
that regards conflict as an index of decay, or invests equi-
librium with any special value, can prove a handicap in
studying developing societies. The several efforts to in-
troduce dynamic elements into some models of general theory
of politics never went further than implicit or explicit
equilibrium. To mention a few, the input-output models of
7David Easton, the structural-functional analyses of Parsons
c
Of those who subscribe to this school are members
of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social
Science Research Council — Pye, Binder, Weiner, LaPalombara,
Verba, Coleman.
6 See for example David B. Truman, The Governmental
Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion , New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951 and David Easton, The Political System ,
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953.
7
See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of
Political Systems," World Politics IX (1957), p. 383-400.
Another example of the model is that by G. Almond in the
10
0and Smelser
,
and to some extent the "cybernetics model"
9
of Deutsch. These models have assumed, more or less, har-
mony in the social system. Consequently they are greatly
prejudiced in favor of societies that manifest "functional-
integration," "structural equilibrium," "social solidarity"
and so on.
We have kept in mind that in the course of political
development there are three possible process sequences:
new processes are initiated; old processes are modified;
or old processes continue unchanged.
We have avoided making our approach too rigid, and
thus pushing the argument to any one extreme. The role of
the PPP in the elections of 1970 is a role that demanded
the management of conflict that presented itself in the
electoral environment. One such manifestation was the
handling of the pulls between modernity and tradition —
more specifically between the requirements of Islam on the
one hand, and socialism, on the other.
As indicated earlier, our attention will be focussed
introductory chapter of The Politics of the Developing
Areas
,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
8 See Talcott Parsons and Neil E. Smelser, Economy and
the Society
,
Glencoe: The Fress Press, 1956, and Talcott
Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies , New
York: The Free Press, 1960.
9Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government : Models of
Political Communication and Control , New York: The Free
Press, 1963.
11
on the West (in other words, what now remains of Pakistan)
since this was the PPP's area of operation. Where the roles
of other parties are discussed, it would be mainly as a
comparison with the PPP
,
or to illustrate the implications
they held for the PPP. This study does not provide an ex-
haustive account of the activities of other parties, rather
they have been viewed from the interrelated, concurrent
perspective
.
The political path to modernity involves critical
changes of identity from the parochial to the societal. It
involves critical changes in legitimacy from transcendental
to immanent sources. It involves critical changes of dis-
tribution from status and privelege to ability, achievement,
and the control or management of capital. And it involves
critical changes in the degree of administrative and legal
penetration into social structure, and out to the remote
regions of the country. We have said earlier that these
crises have contributed to the political development of
Pakistan, and brought about an attitudinal change among
large sections of the citizenry, and this in turn has made
possible the PPP success.
An understanding of the backdrop — political, social,
economic and psychological — would thus entail a discussion
of the crises that appeared in Pakistan's political history.
We are not attempting here, a chronological narrative, but
rather an analysis of the interplay of political forces that
constituted the "crises."
12
Crises in the Political History of Pakistan
Identity Crisis
. In the process of political develop-
ment, an identity crisis occurs, when a community finds
that what it had once unquestionably accepted as the physi-
cal and psychological definitions of its collective self
are no longer acceptable or operative in the same form,
under new historic conditions, and need further elucidation.
One form of identity crisis generally takes the form of
deeply mixed feelings about the modern world, and one's
own historical traditions.
In Pakistan, since its inception, the question of the
place of Islam in politics has remained an unresolved issue. 10
The Pakistan movement was a product of nationalism. At
the very least, it required the acceptance of a clear dis-
tinction between the Hindu and Muslim communities of pre-
independence India. This patriotism is felt most strongly
when looking over the fence to India. Internally the force
of nationalism is less clear and strong. Islam was con-
sidered the focal point of the nationalism of Pakistan. It
was often claimed to be the "ideology" (variously alluded
10We touch upon this controversy to show that it con-
tributed to a crisis. For detailed analyses of the place
of Islam in the politics of Pakistan, see Khalid B. Sayeed,
The Political System of Paki stan , Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1967, pp. 159-184 and Keith Callard, Pakistan : A
Political Study, London: George Allen and Urwin Ltd., 1968,
(3rd imp.) pp. 194-231. There is a fund of literature on
this issue.
13
to as the Islamic ideology or the Pakistan ideology etc.
)
of the state.
Much of Pakistan's early history, and much of its
attempts at constitution making, consisted of demands for
the orientation of political, social and economic institu-
tions in the light of Islamic doctrines, particularly the
Quran and the Sunnah.
The struggle for Pakistan was led by men of politics,
rather than by men of religion. The leaders of Pakistan —
Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, Ghulam Mohammed, Suhrawardy,
Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan — have been men of Western educa-
tion and a secular outlook. This elite chose a secular
state without renouncing religion. The orthodox "ulema"
(men of spiritual learning) on the other hand, preferred
to start from the opposite direction and to attempt to recon-
cile some of the aspects of cabinet government with the in-
junctions of Islam.
One of the great weapons that the ulema have is the
influence they wield, through the institutions of the
mosque and madrasahs (where education with a heavy religious
emphasis is imparted) on the Pakistani masses, especially
the people in the rural areas, and among the poorer sections
of the urban areas. Thus no public figure, including those
of the Westernized elite has ventured to suggest that
Pakistan should discard Islam as the basis of its policy.
Consequently they tried, in the constitution of 1956, to
14
build an Islamic facade on to the structure of cabinet and
parliamentary government. 11
The difficult task, was to get scholars to agree on
what constitutes an "Islamic" state. Even on the guestion
of ideology, no clear cut understanding was arrived at as
to whether Islam did constitute the ideology of Pakistan or
whether it ought to do so. The differences were more than
questions of semantics — rather they arose from the vary-
ing interpretations even among the Ulema, as to the content
and spirit of Islam in relation to the political sphere.
Pakistan's modernist leaders have been on the horns
of a dilemma which is both political and psychological.
They knew that the great majority of Muslims supported the
Pakistan Movement in the hope that Pakistan would bring
into being an Islamic society. But they feel that the kind
of Islamic state that the orthodox ulema recommend cannot
and should not be established; yet they do not know how to
modernize Islam without stretching the meaning and inter-
pretation of some injunctions laid down in the Qur'an.
The "crisis" becomes apparant because Pakistani
leaders had not (up until the period of our analysis) been
able to construct an Islamic ideology which gives clear
answers on problems like secular democracy, socialism, and
11The Ayub Constitution of 1962, and the Constitution
of Pakistan adopted in 1973, also declare Pakistan to be
an "Islamic" Republic.
15
the rights of property. This gave them sufficient flexi-
bility to cope with such problems in a pragmatic manner.
In addition, there developed a cynicism on the part of the
masses about the political elite, who, although they pro-
fessed adherance to the spirit of Islam, and its "egalitar-
ianism," adopted "Westernized" or what the masses viewed
as essentially "un—Islamic" life styles. Bhutto's program
of Islamic socialism, and the bridging of the gap between
tradition and modernity, could be viewed as a starter in
the direction of solving the discrepancies that contributed
to the crisis.
It must be kept in mind that the formation of Bangla
Desh has raised legitimate questions on the building and
sustenance of a nationalism based on religion alone without
deference to ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences.
2 . The Crises of Penetration and Integration . The con-
cept of integration involves the amalgamation of disparate
social, economic, ethnic and geographic elements into a
single nation-state. This kind of national integration
implies both the capacity of a government to control and
penetrate the territory under its jurisdiction, as well as
a set of popular attitudes towards the nation generally
described as loyalty, allegience and a willingness to place
national above local concerns. From another point of view —
and one that is more crucial for our analysis — integration
means the regularization of structures and processes wherby
16
the discrete elements in a given national territory are
brought into meaningful participation in the political
®Y®tem. Whether these processes are regularized and under-
stood by participants to be legitimate, can be defined as
"process integration."
Pakistan's political history is the history of rela-
tive failure in achieving this kind of integration. Be-
sides the issue of Islam, the relationship between the
Centre and Provinces, that is the nature of Federalism, had
plagued constitution makers between 1950-56. Pakistan's
constituent Assembly met with no success for many years,
mainly because most West Pakistan deputies were unwilling
to live permanently under an East wing majority. The search
was for a formula that would prevent the "domination" of
West Pakistan, especially of the Punjab by the East.
The Constituent Assembly (which functioned as a cen-
1
2
tral legislative) became the main arena of conflict. The
East was further chagrined because of the initial reluctance
of the West to concede to Bengali (the language spoken by
the East and hence the majority) the status of the National
Language, which was initially accorded to Urdu. Later this
adherence to Urdu alone was abandoned and Bengali too was
1 ?
For detailed analyses of Pakistan's attempt at
constitution making see Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit . , pp.
65-100 and K. P. Misra, M. V. Lakhi and V. Narain, Pakistan '
s
Search for Constitutional Consensus , New Delhi: Impex
India, 1967, Chapter I.
17
recognized us the National Language, following agitation
in East Pakistan in 1954.
The first attempt to coin an acceptable formula was
made by the Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent
Assembly in Sept. 1950. It envisaged a bicameral legisla-
ture. The lower house was to be elected on the basis of
population. In the upper house, the existing provinces of
East Bangal
,
West Punjab, the North West Frontier Province,
Sind and Baluchistan, were given equal representation. The
two houses were given equal powers in all matters including
the budget and money bills. In cases of dispute, decisions
were to be taken by joint sessions of both houses. This
meant that even though East Bengal representation would be
higher in the lower house, West Pakistan would be four times
that of East Bengal in the upper house, if the four pro-
vinces of the West decided to vote as one bloc. The report
met with considerable opposition from the Bengali group.
The Second Report of the Basic Principles Committee
in 1952, in which parity was the principal feature, was
abandoned because it was opposed by the Punjabes on the
grounds that it was designed to establish Bengali domina-
1
3
tion over the whole of the country. The argument was
13Under this proposal, the Upper House of the federal
legislative was to have 60 members from East Bengal and 60
from West Pakistan, distributed among the various units.
The lower house would have 200 members from each of the
two wings.
18
that the Bengalis would come as a united group* by winning
support from the smaller West Pakistan provinces of Sind
and the NWFP and by isolating Punjab, they would have suffi-
cient majority to rule the country.
The constitutional proposals that the new Prime
Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra, announced in the Constituent
Assembly in 1953, tried to meet most of the objections of
the Punjabi group had brought against the Basic Principles
14Committee. The mood in the Constituent Assembly seemed
more conciliatory, and the formula was agreed to in principle.
However, the crushing defeat of the Muslim League in the
elections of East Pakistan in 1954, caused considerable
alarm among the West Pakistani leaders, who saw it as a
. . . 15
move toward "disintegration." The Constituent Assembly
became the venue of bitterness and controversy, and was
dissolved in 1954 by the then governor-general, Ghulam
Mohammed. This act, euphemistically called reconstitution,
was accompanied by dismissal of a government headed by an
East Bengali premier, who enjoyed the confidence of the
sovereigh assembly, by a West Pakistani dominated civil
service
.
14See Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit ., pp. 72-74.
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In addition anti Urdu riots in East Bengal, and the
consequent breakdown of law and order resulted in clamping
of Governor's rule in the Province and the dismissal of the
United Front Ministry by the central Government.
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The next attempt at constitution making was success-
ful. The result was the constitution of 1956, and it was
hurriedly adopted and passed. By now the politicians
felt that any constitution was better than no constitution,
for subordinating the power hungry governors-general (Ghulam
Mohammad had yielded power to Iskander Mirza) and the
steadily growing influence of the army. The country and
its political leaders looked forward to direct elections
under universal franchise to be held soon.
The constitution of 1956, in its desire to circum-
scribe the power of the President, spelled out the mech-
anics of parliamentary government in all its essential
details
In its attempt to accomodate the Bengali demand
for autonomy and parity and the demands of the
orthodox elements for an Islamic state, it came
halfway-^n making concessions to both these
groups
.
This move threatened Iskander Mirza' s position of
supreme political power. He fell back on his modus operandi
of setting one group against another in the Constituent
Assembly. After 1956, when there was no stable majority
party in the Centre, Mirza sought supporters from several
parties, and the conflict between the Governor-General and
the Prime Minister continued. By 1958, there was total
16A new Constituent Assembly was convened, under the
order of the Federal Court of Pakistan.
1
7
Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit ., p. 81.
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collapse of the Parliament ary system owing to internal dis-
sension and largely Mirza's machinations. The expected
elections were never held. On October 7, 1958, Iskander
Mirza dismissed the Prime Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, dis-
solved parliament and proclaimed Marshial Law, with the
Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, as chief M.L. Admin-
istrator. On October 27, Ayub, in a bid to become undis-
puted sovereign, ousted Mirza and began more than ten years
of authoritarian rule.
Processes of integration were thus not institution-
alized. The East was becoming increasingly resentful of
what it considered to be "internal colonialism" by the
West, and the Punjab in particular. The Armed Services and
the bureacracy, two formidable power centres, continued to
be dominated by West Pakistans till 1964, and this further
alienated the East.
There were other factors too that contributed to the
crisis of integration. The East and the West being geo-
graphically divided and culturally so different, the heavy
reliance on Islam alone as a binding force, by the leader-
ship to foster integration, was naive and shortsighted.
For instance, had Bengali been taught compulsarily in
schools in the West and Urdu in the East, a process of
bridging the linguistic gap could have conceivably been
initiated, leading to greater cultural interchanges, and
psychological bonds.
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Why then was the West unwilling to initiate such
processes? An answer could be sought in the realms of
psychology. The Western attitude was probably prompted by
a feeling of racial and cultural superiority. The West
identified with the Turko-Afghan-Iranian tradition, and
viewed the East Pakistanis as the progeny of a less pure,
"Hinduized" Muslim culture. They were consequently un-
willing to be directed and influenced by Bengalis.
Another question surfaces. Why did East Pakistan
allow itself to be exploited? The logic of Bengali majority
would have meant that the Bengali elite would preside over
the distribution of resources. Conceivably, during the
first two or three years of Pakistan's history, the Ben-
galis in the Constituent Assembly, could have taken charge,
and threatened the West with "expulsion" if it did not
concede to majority claims. But this did not happen be-
cause a strong dynamic Bengali elite with a Bengali con-
sciousness was still to develop. The Bengali leadership
in the initial years had been weak and conciliatory, or
identified with the leaders of the West, more than they
did with their constituents.
In addition, programs to forge integration can be
expensive. Governments of the day never invested the kind
of resources in East Pakistan that would be commensurate
with the job.
The smaller provinces of West Pakistan, too, were
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becoming uncomfortable over "Punjabi domination." The
crisis of penetration became most manifest in the operation
of the One Unit Scheme of 1955. This scheme had integrated
all the provinces in the West into a single province of
West Pakistan. Provincial legislatures had been cajoled,
threatened and steam rollered into accepting One Unit. It
had resulted in removing geographically the centre of power
(the legislature was then located in Lahore) from the access
of the people. It had reduced even more, the contact be-
tween local politicians and the district administration,
and grass roots contacts were next to nill. The overwhelm-
ing unpopularity of the One Unit Scheme became most apparant
when it became a crucial issue in the anti-Ayub movement
of 1968-69.
3. Crisis of Participation . Modernization often gen-
erates pressures for political participation. A participa-
tion crisis can be defined as a conflict that occurs when
the governing elite views the demands or behaviour of indi-
viduals and groups seeking to participate in the political
1
8
system as illegitimate.
The crisis of participation in Pakistan manifested
itself most overtly during the Ayab Khan era. Ayub dis-
18The socio-political concommitants that contribute
toward participatory urges, are brilliantly discussed by
Myron Weiner in "Political Participation: Crises of the
Political Process," in Crises and Seguences in Political
Development
,
op. cit
.
,
pp. 165-186.
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played a soldier's characteristic distaste for politics in
general and parliamentary democracy in particular. His
remedy for Pakistan, placed primary emphasis on a unity of
command, imported from his military background. Further-
more, he consistently argued that parliamentary democracy
is not likely to work in Pakistan where literacy was low,
and where the people are not informed or mature enough to
use their votes to support certain national policies and
programs. He displayed an elitist's abhorrence for the
"crude masses" and for the politicians who were their rep-
resentatives. (His predecessors, Mirza and Ghulam Mohammed,
held the same views.)
Ayub proscribed political activity and moved against
many of the country's prominent political figures (many of
whom he kept in jail) with the Elective Bodies Disqualifying
Ordinance (EBDO) banning them from politics until January
19
1, 1967.
Again, the system of Basic Democracies formulated in
1959, (in which was rooted Ayub's view of electoral activity
for Pakistan) heightened the participation crisis.
The BD system stipulated a hierarchical pyramidal
structure of indirect representation consisting of four
tiers of authority. Local representatives called Basic
Democrats
,
were to be chosen by direct elections roughly
19The ban on political parties was lifted in late
1962 by Ayub Khan.
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at the rate of one for every thousand of the population
(80,000 in all — 40,000 from each wing) and were to form
the lowest tier, and were responsible for local administra-
tion. The next three tiers comprised selected basic demo-
crats, and an equal number of nominated civil servants.
A unity of command was ensured, and the nominated civil
servants, by virtue of the power and prestige they wielded,
often intimidated the "elected" BDs into subservience.
The Basic Democrats collectively were to form an Electoral
College to chose the President and the members of national
and legislatures. Martial law continued and the only elec-
toral function of the BDs was to confirm the continued rule
of the President by an overwhelming majority in 1960.
The constitution promulgated by Ayub Khan in 1962,
institutionalized his ideas of controlled democracy, and
further precipitated the participation crisis. According
to this document, all power revolved around the President,
and everything was subordinate to his authority. Other im-
portant features were the election of the President and the
National and Provincial Assemblies by an electoral college
consisting of Basic Democrats, the absence of justiciable,
fundamental rights and the inferior position of the judiciary
20A critique of the BD system is offered by K. J.
Newman in "The Constitutional Evolution in Pakistan,"
International Affairs
,
July 1962, p. 359. See also chapter
entitled "Basic Democracies and Development in the Rural
Sector," in Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit ., pp. 244-260, for
details on the workings of Basic Democracies.
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vis a vis the legislature. Polling for Basic Democrats
was held in 1964, and followed by Presidential elections in
1965.
In addition to repressing the participatory urges of
the masses, Ayub also freely employed the Defence of
Pakistan Rules to subjugate his critics and potential
opponents. The freedom of the Press was severely curtailed.
The crisis of participation became even more crucial
because governmental output did not satisfy the people's
expectations
.
pi
4. Crisis of Distribution
. The crisis of distribution
has received considerable mention in subsequent chapters.
However, it must be stressed that the crisis of distribu-
tion highlighted all the other crises, making the masses
increasingly impatient with the status quo.
In East Pakistan, there was much bitterness about the
economic disparities between the two wings. The eastern
region had lagged far behind in the private sector, and had
a lower per capita income as compared with West Pakistan.
In addition, the East felt that the allocation of resources
by the centre was unbalanced and unfair. A major source of
grievance of East Pakistani industrialists and political
leaders has been the way the Pakistan Industrial Develop-
^See conclusive chapter for a more detailed analysis
of this crisis.
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ment Corporation (PIDC) has disinvested certain big com-
panies in East Pakistan. The PIDC took the initiative in
floating certain big industries in West and East Pakistan,
when private capital was reluctant to embark on such ven-
tures. As soon as these ventures became profitable the
PIDC sold them to few big industrialists from West Pakistan.
In addition, the Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
was dominated by West Pakistan's big industrialists. Later
attempts on the part of the Ayub government to remedy the
situation did not allay the resentment in East Pakistan
which had been building up over the years.
The crisis of distribution did not stem from inter-
wing economic (and political) disparities alone. Even
within separate wings the gap between the "haves" and the
"have nots" seemed to widen. It had been one of the car-
dinal policies of the Government of Pakistan to allow free
enterprise full play in the development of Pakistan. The
Ayub government too, was perceived to be the ally of big
capitalists and landowners. Ayub's land reforms too went
only a short way in arresting the evils of landlordism.
The ceiling imposed on land was so high — in some cases
even this was evaded by powerful landlords bribing local
officials — that the political power of landlords remained
intact. This was amply demonstrated by the fact that in
the New National Assembly elected after the promulgation of
the Constitution in 1962, landlords constituted the single
27
22largest group. Although there was a good deal of propa-
ganda effort on the part of the Ayub regime concerning its
economic achievment, there was a difference between the
government's and people's interpretation of economic improve-
ment. The officials spoke in aggregate terms — GNP
f
structural changes within and between the productive sectors
of the economy, trade balance etc. The people viewed it
in more disaggregate terms — purchasing power of the
rupee, spatial income differences, personal income dis-
parities. A Pakistani economist commented:
The rising prices of 1965-68 reduced the pur-
chasing power of rupee; rapid strides in agricul-
ture and some sectors of industry increased inter-
personal and inter-regional income disparities.
Therefore, the government's view of economic de-
velopment was not only misunderstood by the
people, it was treated as a fraud that a hand-
ful of vested interests were perpetrating on the
society. The people's reaction was accordingly
sharp and violent.
The dissatisfaction on the part of the people, con-
cerning governmental output, (in terms of its effect on the
masses) accentuated the desire for political participation,
and when this was denied, it precipitated a serious legiti-
macy crisis.
220f the Assembly's total strength of 156, their num-
ber was 70 out of which 58 were from West Pakistan alone.
This proportion was not different from that of the first and
second constituent Assemblies, where the landlords accounted
for 27 out of 79, and 28 out of 80 seats respectively.
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S. J. Burki
,
"Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explana-
" Asian Survey
,
March 1972, p. 202.tion
,
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5 . The crisis of legitimacy
.
The basic cause of the legitimacy crisis is the fact
that the development syndrome always produces a widening of
perceptions on the part of ever larger numbers of people,
and therefore, an increase in sensitivities about the pos-
sibilities of alternative ways of doing things. Psycholo-
gically, the development process is thus a broadening one
in which people steadily learn that there are fewer and
fewer absolute limits of life. Lucian Pye has elucidated
the legitimacy crisis as follows:
Often in the development process we find that
after a people have achieved a greater sense of
common identity, the resulting spirit of greater
equality may leave them less prepared to accept
the apparantly arbitrary distinctions associated.
....(T)he legitimacy crisis is peculiarly linked
to the stresses between ecf^ality and capacity in
the development syndrome.
Since legitimacy is an attribute of the political
system, it is associated particularly with the performance
of the governmental structure, and hence it is fundamental
in determining the capacity of the system. On the other
hand, the acknowledgement of legitimacy resides with the
people, and it is only likely to be given when those in
authority seem to appreciate the principles of equality and
distinctions as being only the realities of appropriate
24See Lucian Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in Crises
and Sequences in Political Development , op. cit . , p. 35.
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forms of differentiation.
The legitimacy crisis in Pakistan was built up, partly
because of the polity's inability to handle the identity
crisis, and its failure at institutionalizing and legiti-
mizing processes in the form of a constitution.
In addition, government began to be viewed by the
people as the ally of vested interests, an excuse for hold-
ing power, and a method of self aggrandizement. In other
words, the governments in Pakistan, and the Ayub government
in particular, failed to invest itself with a legitimate
national purpose; it was government for its own sake. In
addition, corruption in the higher and middle echelons of
society became widespread resulting in increased depriva-
tion of the poorer masses.
After 1950, the Civil Service of Pakistan and the
Army, became the defacto power centres in Pakistan. Until
1958, they functioned behind the facade of parliamentary
and cabinet rule. In this context, the political instabil-
ity that is often attributed to Pakistan's early years
(50-56) needs qualification. There was probably a high
degree of ministerial instability at the centre (Pakistan
had six Prime Ministers in a period of three years) but in
the Provinces there was relative stability. The dismissal
of cabinets and ministers by the Governor Generals, drawn
from the higher bureacracy, was merely an instrument to
consolidate the power of the Civil Service.
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^lsct©d representatives of the people were relegated
to the background, and people's participation in politics
was nonexistant. Professional politics was thwarted, while
the bureacracy and the army became formidable power centres.
The cohesiveness and the discipline and the unity of com-
mand of these establishments made it impossible for indi-
vidual or groups of politicians to challenge their power
or weaken them. The principle of public accountability
was steadily on the wane. While becoming more powerful,
the army and the bureacracy became increasingly aloof
from the people. The bureacracy in particular resisted
functional deconcentration of authority, while continuing
25
to be an elite service.
All these factors contributed to a serious legitimacy
crisis in Pakistan. Masses questioned the validity of the
political system operative in Pakistan and the legitimacy
of regimes that had used religious symbols and the crutch
of Islam to pacify them and perpetuate power. Resignation
changed to indignation and later to violent action.
By 1968, the fires of resentment had grown into a
nation wide movement, absorbing various interest groups,
particularly students and labor. Strong anti-Ayub rioting
25The role of the bureacracy in Pakistan has received
a great deal of attention. See Chapter 6, Khalid B. Sayeed,
op. cit ., pp. 127-158, and Ralph Braibanti ' s "Public
Bureacracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in Joseph LaPalombara
ed.
,
Bureacracy and Political Development , Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967 (2nd ed. ) pp. 360-440.
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grew and by early 1969, there was a near collapse of the
law and order situation. After the failure of initial con-
ciliatory gestures, Ayub succumbed to the storm. On March
25th, 1969, he stepped down in favor of Yahya Khan, the
then Commander in Chief of the army.
Yahya' s Promise
Upon assuming office, Yahya Khan pledged to restore
democratic political processes, and the creation of con-
ditions conducive to the establishment of constitutional
government. He promised a smooth transfer of power to the
representatives of the people, elected "freely and impar-
tially on the basis of adult franchise."
The Legal Framework Order (LFO), provided the general
pattern within which the elections were to be contested.
The order stipulated that the elections would be held on
the "new" basis of one man one vote, giving East Pakistan
169 seats in the contemplated National Assembly of 313.
The National Assembly (NA) was to provide the country with
a constitution within 120 days and was to draft a constitu-
^ 26tion in accordance with the principles m the LFO.
26The LFO declared that the future constitution of
Pakistan must preserve 5 fundamental principles: an Islamic
ideology; territorial integrity; free elections and the in-
dependence of the judiciary; a federal system ensuring
autonomy of the provinces as well as adequate legislative,
administrative and financial powers for the Central Govern-
ment; and full opportunities to the people of all regions
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By announcing the break up of the One Unit System in
July 1970, Yahya Khan went one step further in demonstrating
his deference to public sentiments. The nature of Federa-
lism however, was to be deliberated and decided upon by
the NA. The stage was thus set for the elections of 1970,
against which framework our study is conducted.
Direction of Chapters
Chapter two will deal with the Genesis of the People's
Party of Pakistan, its objectives, its election Manifesto
and configuration. All these factors will be analyzed
against the theoretical concepts of the role of political
parties in the process of political development. Chapter
Three, will be primarily a narrative account of the PPP
Election Campaign, its strengths and weaknesses, in rela-
tion to the other political "actors." Chapter Four will
evaluate the election results and PPP victory in the con-
text of the modernizing political culture of Pakistan. In
our concluding chapter, we shall engage in speculation
about the possible future role of the PPP, in the light of
our earlier findings. The party's interrelationship with
the process of political development will receive attention.
In addition, we shall evaluate the "crises" mentioned in
to participate in national affairs. Ultimate power to
authenticate or reject the Constitution was to rest with
the President.
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this chapter, and their implications for the PPP
,
and the
political development of Pakistan.
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CHAPTER II
THE PEOPLE'S PARTY OF PAKISTAN:
AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ORIGIN, MANIFESTO AND FORM
The emergence of mass political parties is a useful
institutional index of a level of political development
attained in a given developing polity. Political devel-
opment implies, among other things, a high degree of organ-
ization. Political parties emerge wherever the activities
of a political system reach a certain degree of complexity,
or wherever the notion of political power comes to include
the idea that the mass public must participate or be con-
trolled. Nonetheless, the circumstances under which par-
ties first arise in a developing political system — to-
gether with their tone and configuration — have an impor-
tant effect on the kinds of parties that are shaped. The
relative success and failure of these parties, similarly,
will depend on the manner in which they assess, manipulate
or suit these circumstances.
Political theorists 1 have suggested the concept of
crises as historical — situational developments that
1 The concept of crises has received substantial atten-
tion. See, for example, Leonard Binder, James Coleman, J.
LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye
,
Sidney Verba, Myron Weiner,
Crises and Seguences in Political Development , Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971 and Joseph LaPalombara and
Myron Weiner, eds
. ,
Political P art ies and Political Develop-
ment
,
Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966, pp. 3-42 and
pp. 399-435.
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political systems typically experience when they move
towards more developed forms. We subscribe to Weiner's
and LaPalombara 1 s thesis, that such historical crises not
only often provide the context in which political parties
first emerge, but also tend to be a critical factor in
determining the pattern of evolution parties later take.
These internal crises may be precipitated by a wide var-
iety of parametric changes.
We have seen in the previous chapter how Pakistan was
increasingly beset by crises of participation, integration
and distribution which combined to erupt in the form of a
legitimacy crisis in the Ayub Khan period. The People's
Party of Pakistan — which is the chief subject of our in-
vestigations — was a product of that environment of crises.
Hence its existence and future growth would depend upon
its ability to demonstrate that it is capable of handling
the "loads" on the political system, and move the system
from one stage of development to the other with minimal
"strain.
"
The Genesis of the PPP
(a) Bhutto's disenchantment with Ayub . The Pakistan
People's Party was launched at the end of November, 1967.
Its primary architect was Mr. Zulfikar. Ali Bhutto, who had
^Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, op. cit . , pp« 14 19.
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held many important portfolios in Ayub Khan's cabinets from
1958 to 1966. He grew to be one of Ayub's most trusted
lieutenants, and was often referred to as "Ayub's protege."
Bhutto established himself in Ayub Khan's favour by volun-
teering for difficult and unpleasant chores at home.
Bhutto's unchallenged gift of oration and rhetoric paid
good dividends at home and abroad. His brilliance was
recognized, his popularity mounted, whetting his vaulting
political ambition. It was, however, as Foreign Minister
that Bhutto enjoyed the greatest prominence. The departure
from an unpopular pro-Western orientation in foreign policy
became associated with him in the public mind, adding to
his popularity. He became simultaneously a symbol of re-
surgent nationalism and anti-Indian sentiments. His youth
and dynamism enhanced his charismatic appeal. Pakistan's
consolidation of relations with Peking owed a great deal
to Bhutto's single minded efforts.
After the 1965 war with India, the first manifesta-
tions of the growing disenchantment with Ayub Khan's leader-
ship were to be seen in the student demonstrations in the
West Wing that rocked Lahore and Karachi immediately after
Ayub Khan's announcement of September 22, 1965, that
Pakistan had agreed to a ceasefire as urged by the UN
Security Council. The events that followed in its wake
demonstrated clearly to Bhutto that the Ayub era was in its
last days. Simultaneously, there was a growing divergence
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between Ayub and Bhutto over foreign policy, and over the
Tashkent Declaration in particular. 3 During a visit to
East Pakistan in November, 1966, Bhutto openly attacked
Ayub's policies and expressed his support of the Six Point
Program of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. Only a few months before,
as Foreign Minister, Bhutto had condemned Mu jib and volun-
teered to debate the Six Point program with him. Bhutto
was to claim later that he had offered his resignation on
three occasions following Tashkent, but was told not to
desert Pakistan at a time of serious crisis. In any event,
whether by choice or forcibly, Bhutto's assignment as For-
eign Minister came to an end on the 30th of November, 1966.
(b) Bhutto mobilizes. During the years that he
served on Ayub's cabinet, Bhutto's support for Ayub's poli-
tical system and its machinations seemed unequivocal, and
he played a major part in strengthening Ayub's position.
Among various manifestations of this support was Bhutto's
upholding of the Presidential system in 1961, and his vehe-
ment support for Ayub's candidacy during the 1965 presi-
dential election, when he publicly castigated the combined
opposition parties. Curiously, in spite of his close asso-
3The deterioration of Bhutto—Khan relations and the
subsequent break has been discussed by Dilip Mukherjee,
Z. A. Bhutto, Quest for Power , New Delhi: Vikas, 1972, pp.
"50-66. See also Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era :
Politics in Pakistan , 1958-69, Syracuse: Syracuse Univ.
Press, 1971, Chapters IV and V.
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ciation with Ayub, Bhutto was able to maintain an identity
of his own. He had made quite an impression on the people
and his ability and flamboyance had a great deal to do with
it. This was to tilt the scales in his favour in his mobil-
izing a movement against Ayub.
After his dissociation from Ayub's cabinet, Bhutto
roamed the political wilderness. He first engaged in a
number of low-key manoeuvres; wanting to set up a forward
bloc within the ruling party — Ayub's Convention Muslim
League. The move was not welcomed by stalwarts of the
party, who viewed it as nothing more than rebellion against
Ayub Khan. Malik Khuda Buksh Bucha, the then President
of the West Pakistan Convention Muslim League remarked
that "there was no place for any Forward or Backward bloc
4in the Muslim League."
When, on January 1, 1967, the period of ban on a
number of politicians under the Election Bodies Disquali-
fying Order ( EBDO ) came to an end, most of them joined the
anti-Ayub ranks. The Awami League, the Council Muslim
League, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Nizam i Islam — par-
ties that had existed on the scene — formed the Pakistan
Democratic Movement. However, Bhutto did not join any one
of these parties for many reasons. As a close associate of
Ayub's, he had in the past condemned the opposition parties,
4
L. Ziring, op. cit . , pp. 94-95.
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and while they would have now welcomed him in their ranks,
they could not accept him as their leader. Moreover, the
opposition parties had demonstrated their inability to
break away from the past. Few of them recognized the
gravity of the deprivation that the masses had suffered.
They continued to cling to abstractions of ideology and
persisted in invoking Islam as the only panacea of all
ills. After the "restoration" of constitutional life in
1962, internal dissensions and constant bickering had
characterized their politics. Bhutto did not want to
identify himself with any of them.
Bhutto realized that a new generation had come of
age in Pakistan — a generation that had not witnessed the
atrocities of foreign rule. They were the product of an
era when fellow citizens exploited one another, economic
disparities widened, and political freedom had become a
mockery. Later events were to demonstrate that this "de-
prived" generation (the students in particular) was Bhutto's
strongest power base. The time was indeed ripe for an
entirely different approach to the problems that faced
Pakistan
.
Underlying the need for a new political party, it was
pointed out at its foundation meeting:
A growing and powerful body of the people, spear-
headed by the younger generation, firmly be-
lieves that the old ways and the traditional
methods are not sufficient to surmount the colos-
sal problems of Pakistan. Each epoch has its
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own seismic pattern. This epoch, which is both
so exciting and full of challenge, requires a
new party with a new face and vitality to build
the new society sought with passionate zeal by
the entire population of Pakistan.
Until late in 1967, with this realization in mind,
Bhutto travelled around the country trying to build up
political contacts at the grass roots level with the aim
of launching a party of his own. He moved gradually —
sensing the responses of the people — from discreet and
indirect criticism of Ayub Khan to harsh and direct attacks.
In the meantime his following grew. By November, 1967,
Bhutto was ready to form the Pakistan People's Party. It
was formally inaugurated in Lahore, which proclaimed its
political credo in the form of four slogans — Islam is our
Faith, Democracy is our Polity, Socialism is our Economy,
and All Power to the People.
By 1968, when the anti Ayub uprising in Pakistan
assumed the dimension of a public cause, several groups,
students and workers, rallied behind the PPP flag for sup-
port and strength. Luckily for Bhutto, the students had,
6
from the very beginning, involved him in the events.
Bhutto's subsequent arrest by Ayub Khan was the final
flourish needed to establish his bonafides as a dedicated
5Quoted in Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan People '
s
Party — The First Phase, Lahore: Progressive Publishers,
1973, p. 6.
6Dilip Mukherjee, op. cit ., pp. 58-63.
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crusader against Ayub Khan. The public sympathy for Bhutto,
simultaneously enhanced the status of the People's Party of
Pakistan ( PPP ) .
( c ) The PPP origin — a theoretical explanation
.
7Maurice Duverger has classified parties on the basis
of the source of the impetus provided for their creation.
He is of the view that it is of great importance to ascer-
tain whether parties are created "internally" or "exter-
nally" for, according to him, this provides a useful indi-
cator for determining the trends that might determine their
future working. An internally created party, he defines as
one that emerges gradually from the activities of the legis-
lators themselves. Duverger observes that such local level
organization may be simply the result of the fact that
certain legislative blocs or factions share nothing more
than origins in the same geographic section. Another
potent force for the creation of such parties was the ex-
tension of suffrage. Externally created parties are those
that emerge outside the legislature and invariably involve
some challenge to the ruling group and a demand for repre-
sentation. Such parties may receive their original organi-
zational impetus from such varied sources as trade unions,
cooperatives, university students, intellectuals, religious
organizations and so on.
^ See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties , New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955.
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Duverger s cl3.ssific9.tion is not useful for our
analysis, since it assumes the existence of a kind of Par-
liamentary circumstance, which was not operative in Pakistan.
There being situations in which mass parties materialize
where there is neither a purely colonial regime, nor a
Parliamentary one, Duverger's classification can hardly be
applied to most developing areas.
As indicated earlier, the concept of "crises" can be
adopted for our analysis. However, an additional variable
was at work in Pakistan, which is worthy of consideration
and which we shall attempt to discuss. This was the vari-
able of modernization. Parties emerge in political systems
when those who seek to win or maintain political power are
required to seek support from the larger public. There
are at least two circumstances under which such a develop-
ment occurs; 1) a change may already have taken place in
the attitudes of subjects or citizens toward authority;
individuals in society believing that they have a right to
influence the exercise of power, and 2) a section of the
dominant political elite or aspiring elite may seek to win
public support. A non-participant population may thus be
aroused into politics. These circumstances cannot exist
without a process of change that has been at work which
propels and even compels the public to participate or helps
politicians to arouse the public. However, it is still
important to ascertain which of these circumstances precedes
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the other in a given polity.
In colonial India, the process of awakening first
affected the elite and through them was generated to the
public. The Indian National Congress, which spearheaded
the independence movement, initially comprised a section
of the Indian elite. For the first forty years of its
history, the Congress elite operated as an interest group
seeking access to power, for their upper class and upper
middle class constituents. In the perceptions of the elite,
there existed crises of participation and legitimacy. How-
ever, it was only after the advent of Gandhi, that these
perceptions were generated to the public and the Congress
began to work as an integrationist party with a view to
mobilizing the masses.
The people of what is now Pakistan had been at least
initiated into this politicization process before 1947, as
a result of the nationalist movement on the subcontinent.
It is therefore not necessary to argue that politicization
began in Pakistan only after 1947. At the time of Pakistan's
creation, the ground had been ready for mass politics, and
the people had been expecting this to happen. However, in
the two decades between independence and 1969, the people
were being constantly pacified by promises, and pleadings
for more time on the part of the politicians and their ex-
pectations of the political system were not fulfilled. The
final upsurge in 1969 was an overt manifestation of an in—
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creasingly politicized public's resentment for a political
system which to them was illegitimate.
Thus, in Pakistan, preceeding the formation of the
PPP, a change was already underway in the public attitude
toward the existing power alignment. Unlike the Indian
National Congress, the PPP did not generate this awareness*
rather it rode on its crest. The crises that have been
mentioned in the previous chapter were being increasingly
recognized. This was the result of a variety of other
changes that brought in its wake greater aspirations on
the part of the people. A growing sense of occupational
independence, brought on a realization of the capacity of
different social strata to participate in politics. The
role of students as a group (with little regard for social
or caste cleavages) during the anti-Ayub movement, was to
demonstrate that the traditional boundaries of social
stratification had begun to break down and a greater degree
3
of class and caste mobility had occured.
The appearance of labor unions on the scene, albeit
limited in power, and the awareness on the part of peasants
of their role in production, demonstrates this change.
8The student demonstrations drew its forces from such
diverse institutions like the "elitist" Gordon College in
Rawalpindi, and less reputed and less affluent colleges all
over the country. This idea of student solidarity is
brought out in Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People '
s
Power, London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1970. Chapters 5 and 6.
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False consciousness 11 was giving way. Increases in the
flow of information, a growth in technology, the expansion
of transportation networks and above all, increases in
social mobility have profound effects upon the individual's
perception of himself in relation to authority.
One might argue that in the Pakistani context, the
absence of universal literacy did not act as a deterrent.
The transistor revolution had brought politicization to
the masses faster than programs of literacy would have done.
With roads and electricity coming to remote parts of Paki-
stan, public broadcasting reached more people. The homo-
genizing effects often associated with urbanization lent a
helping hand. One may cite the example of students of
Punjab University, who are not all residents of urban Lahore,
(where the University is located) but of outlying areas.
These students, on visits back home, provide the links be-
tween the city and the village or town, and right there a
process has begun.
A certain amount of secularizing was underway, by
which individuals were increasingly coming to believe that
through their actions they were capable of affecting the
political process in ways which are favourable to their in-
terests and sentiments. This could account for the slow
waning of traditional loyalties as those to the baradari
or clan, in more developed parts of Pakistan. We are in-
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dined to accept the view of Weiner and LaPalombara9 that
the origin of political parties, while deeply associated
historically, with what we identify as "crises," is also
closely bound up with the process of modernization.
The birth, and to a large extent, the success of the
PPP has a causal relationship to the above set of develop-
ments in Pakistan. The PPP sensitivity to the prevailing
discontent, prompted its articulation of aspirations that
had hitherto existed in a rather diffused manner in the
minds of the masses. The PPP did not initiate the process
of change, but came into being as a function of it. The
nature of this role will be modified considerably now that
the PPP is the party in power, and this will be discussed
in our concluding chapter. It will suffice at this junc-
ture to say that the PPP emerged in response to or as a
result of an awareness of the socio-political and economic
climate of Pakistan. The place of Bhutto's political am-
bition, in the formation of the PPP, cannot be undermined
when discussing the formation of the PPP. However, it is
our contention that although it might have provided a
potent motive, it could not, in isolation, have facilitated
the successful formation of the PPP.
9
M. Weiner and J. LaPalombara, op. cit . , pp« 21.
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Declared Objectives of the PPP 10
During the spring and summer of 1968, when the PPP
was gradually building its base, Bhutto toured the West
extensively and addressed numerous public meetings. Three
themes dominated his speeches. First, a criticism of
Ayub's rule and the various methods adopted by the regime
to control government's opponents and dissidents. Second,
a condemnation of the government's policy of providing a
maximum protection to private enterprise at the expense
of other groups, the growing economic disparity between
various classes of the people and the different regions of
Pakistan; and the exploitation of the "have-nots" by the
"haves." Third, a plea to introduce socialism to create
an egalitarian structure of society and rehabilitate the
dignity of labor, peasants and workers.
The PPP aims and objectives were outlined in its
first convention, and can be summarized as follows:
1. The transformation of Pakistan into a socialist
society. (A fuller explanation of this aspect
appears later in the chapter.)
2. Egalitarian democracy, or a classless society,
and the application of socialist ideas to realize
economic and social justice.
10Quoted in Hasan Askari Rizvi, Lahore: Progressive
Publishers, 1973, p. 21.
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3. A Republican pattern of government, responsible
to a directly elected legislature.
4. Universal adult suffrage to both sexes.
5. Full protection of civil liberties, particularly
freedom of conscience, freedom of expression,
freedom of the press, rights of assembly and
right of free association.
6. The peasants and working class must, as producers
of the National Income, enjoy the full fruits of
their labor. All agrarian and industrial pro-
grams must be directed towards the welfare of the
laboring masses.
7. Nationalization of finance and key industry in
order to promote rapid industrial progress, to
eliminate the exploitation of the people by the
privileged few and to eradicate foreign inter-
ference in the internal affairs of Pakistan.
8. Agrarian measures to abolish exploitation of cul-
tivators by the remnants of feudal practices.
Positive steps to organize the peasantry in self-
help groups and cooperatives.
9. Strengthening of trade unions. Recognition of
the right to strike as inalienable. Implementa-
tion of the IL.O principles.
10.
Fixation of minimum wages.
National health service for peasants and workers11 .
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and progressively for all sections of the popu-
lation.
12. Mobilization of the masses.
13. Abolition of illiteracy. Direction of Education
to the formation of a classless society.
14. Promotion of the cultural life of the people.
15. Rapid Development of the state languages to
replace the employment of an alien tongue (namely
English) in the conduct of the affairs of the
country. Full opportunity for the cultivation
of all regional languages.
16. Equal rights to women.
17. Independence of the judiciary.
18. Annulment of archaic laws.
19. Academic freedom, and autonomy of the University.
20. Mobilization of the youth for nation building
purposes
.
21. Right of the people to participate in national
defense. The formation of a People's Militia in
both wings and in all regions of the country.
These aims and objectives captured the aspirations of
the deprived sections of Pakistani society that were be-
coming increasingly aware of their exploitation at the hands
of a few. The objectives said nothing about Foreign Policy
or confrontation with India, for example. These were to be
highlighted later in the PPP election manifesto. At this
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juncture, the party was primarily concerned with setting
the internal house in order, the essence of which it felt
lay in removing the economic disparities through Socialism.
It is interesting to note that the word "Islamic
Socialism," that is identified with the PPP
,
is nowhere
appearing in the official documents of its first convention.
It only emphasized Socialism and a classless society. It
was changed to Islamic Socialism and subsequently the term
"Musawaat-i-Mohammadi" was employed by the PPP leadership
to counter the propoganda of the right wing political par-
ties, that Socialism as pleaded by the PPP was the negation
of Islam. (Bhutto's election speech on television and
radio in November mentioned the term Islamic Socialism in
8 places.
)
The PPP commitment to Socialism, and its references
to a classless society probably attracted to the party the
radical and ideologically motivated elements who would go
out and campaign for the party and build a mass base for it.
On the other hand, it provided room for the more conserva-
tive sections of society to read all kinds of alarming con-
notations into the term, and they did. It was then that
the need was felt within the PPP to allay the fears that
such interpretations might evoke.
Socialism Explained
Soon after the PPP was launched, Bhutto in a dis-
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cussion of the "Political structure of Pakistan" 11 described
socialism as the highest expression of democracy and its
logical fulfillment. He added:
The range of socialism is as wide as conceivable...
The socialism applicable to Pakistan would be in
conformity with its ideology and remain democra-
tic in nature. If there can be a Scandinavian
form of Socialism, why cannot there be a Pakistani
form of Socialism suitable to our genius... 12
Bhutto gave assurance that a socialist government
would not compromise the supremacy of Islam. On the con-
trary, he indicated that the socialism he advocated would
make the whole population the custodian of Islamic values.
In this document, Bhutto also highlighted the danger
to national unity posed by crass exploitation. While empha-
sizing that Pakistan could not be preserved merely by ex-
hortations of presidential orders, he pointed out that the
solution to the critical relations that existed between
East and West Pakistan lay in giving the people their poli-
tical rights, including their economic equality. The politi-
cal argument in favor of more balanced regional development
was one manifestation of what Bhutto's socialism was to
mean
.
He also formulated that "all enterprises that con-
stitute the infra-structure of the national economy must be
in public ownership." This was qualified by the assurance:
11Quoted in Dilip Mukherjee, op. cit. , p. 179.
1 ^Ibid
. ,
pp. 179-180.
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The control of the essential means of production
and of the medium of exchange by the people does
not mean the private sector will be eliminated.
Private entrepreneurs will be permitted to play
their own useful role but will not be able to
create monopolistic preserves. The private sec-
tor must flourish under conditions appropriate
to private enterprise, namely those of competi-
tion and not under the shield of the state pro-
tection such as at present. 1J
It is clear that whatever the extent of Bhutto's commitment
to socialism, he was not willing to incur the wrath of any
section of Pakistani society by extreme stances. He dis-
played remarkable prudence in making his moves after care-
fully assessing the situation. He was still a long way from
power, and it would not have been to the advantage of either
socialism or the PPP to lay all his cards on the table.
When the storm broke against the Ayub regime towards
the end of 1968, there was no denying the part played by
the longstanding economic (and resulting social) grievances
of industrial workers who had suffered a decline in real
incomes, the indignation of peasants at their perennial ex-
ploitation, and the frustrations of the middle class stu-
dents and their families over the shrinking employment
opportunities. Bhutto wisely guaged that the time had come
for him to adopt a more pronounced radical posture espec-
ially towards economic matters.
13Ibid
.
,
pp. 179-180.
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The PPP Election Manifesto (1970) 14
The manifesto that the PPP drew up during the elec-
tion period amply demonstrates this move towards a more
"radical, 11 a more emphatic and a more specific stance on
matters that had hitherto been dealt with amorphously.
A "manifesto" outlines the measures that a party
pledges to adopt if returned to power. Party manifestos
are usually published during an election campaign period,
and in Pakistan they appeared in all prominent newspapers
as well. A manifesto provides a point of reference pri-
marily to those who wish to read beyond the promises that
are made by candidates vying for votes. It is also a frame-
work that prescribes the limits within which party notables
and workers may operate. Care is taken to maintain a con-
sistency between verbal pronouncements and the party man-
ifesto .
Although the masses seldom concern themselves with
the formalities of election manifestos during elections,
it is invoked as the "directive principle" that theoreti-
cally holds a candidate accountable for his election pro-
mises. It is interesting to note that during the election
14Four committees (Steering, Constitution, Resolution
and Draft Declaration) were instituted during the first
convention of the PPP, with Mr. Bhutto as the Chairman of
each committee. The manifesto probably grew out of the
deliberations of these committees. Their primary purpose
was to outline the aims and objectives of the PPP.
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campaign, Bhutto accused some rival parties of "stealing
clauses" from his party's election manifesto.
The PPP manifesto is rather a lengthy document and
has been divided into six chapters. It begins with the
fourfold motto outlined earlier in this chapter, and
affirms its faith in the teachings of Islam.
It provides a sharp criticism of the prevailing
socio-economic and political system of Pakistan. Its main
thrust is towards matters economic. Running right through
it is the theme that all the maladies of Pakistan are a
direct or indirect consequence of the system of economic
inequities, manifested in the exploitative Capitalistic
structure that had prevailed.
The manifesto decried the subservience of Pakistani
rulers to the "neocolonialist powers" which had led to the
economic exploitation of Pakistan as a country. It condemned
what it called the "internal colonial structure" as a result
of which East Pakistan was submitted to "ruthless exploita-
tion : "
The decline of East Pakistan began during the
lifetime of the first National Assembly, and the
farce of the last one under the dictatorship of
a military usurper failed even to disguise the
brutal facts It is no remedy to brand the
victims of exploitation as traitors because they
are driv^ji to protest against the treatment they
receive
.
15Election Manifesto of the Pakistan People's Party,
1970, p. 9.
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This stand is interesting in view of the fact that
the People's Party had initially toyed with the idea of
contesting from the Eastern wing and having abandoned the
idea, had not openly sympathized with the grievances of
the people there. The manifesto went on to add that the
ruling clique supporting the vested interests of banking,
industry, and commerce had nothing to offer to save the
situation except the same old magical incantations of
budgetary formulas and development plans. It posited that
the PPP programme would abolish the system of "wholesale
expropriation of the underprivileged people of Pakistan"
by seizing the means of production, which in the hands of
the privileged few were the means of exploitation.
The ultimate objective of the PPP, the Manifesto
said, was the attainment of a classless society, which was
possible only through socialism,
This means true equality of the citizens, frater-
nity under the rule of democracy in an order
based on economic and social justice. The aims
follow from the political and social ethics of
Islam. The Party thus strives to put in practice
the noble ideals of the Muslim faith. ...The
party's endeavour is to bring about peacefully
early changes in the economic structure, legging
logically to a juster socio-economic order.
Having enumerated these broad principles, the manifesto
then moved to specifics, which we shall now enumerate.
16Ibid
.
,
p. 13.
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(a) Foreign policy
. It was proposed that Pakistan
should follow an independent foreign policy. The first
step in this direction was to be achieved by getting out
of entanglements with "imperialist-neocolonialist powers."
This would involve withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan
would also quit the Commonwealth, as it had been "serving
the neocolonialist interest of its white members." The
manifesto accused the United States of interference in the
internal affairs of Pakistan and referred to the dispute
with the Soviet Union over the U-2 American spy plane in
1960. The manifesto stated that Pakistan would support the
"oppressed" peoples of Asia in their struggle against im-
perialist powers and in "particular, the cause of the
heroic people of Vietnam who have for long years held the
imperialist aggressors at bay." Voicing the then preve-
lant and wide spread anti-American sentiment existing in
the country, the manifesto said:
We shall join hands with other nations in an
effort to bring about the evacuation of Asian
soil occupied by the military forces of the
United ^ates and other Western Colonialist
powers
.
The manifesto advocated a policy of confrontation
with India until the question of Kashmir, Farakka, Berubari
and other pending disputes were settled. Entirely in con-
sonance with the principle of supporting liberation move-
17Ibid
.
,
p. 15
.
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merits, it said Pakistan would uphold the cause of the
people of Assam (in India) who were "fighting for their
independence." The Tashkent Declaration was to be repudi-
ated, being a treaty extorted under duress. Pakistan would
follow a positive policy to promote solidarity among Muslim
peoples
.
The manifesto recorded "complete and unreserved sup-
port to Arab states and the Palestinian movement in their
fight against Israel." It stressed solidarity with oppressed
peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The party pledged
to protect the rights of all nationals living abroad whose
labour was "adding wealth to the employing country," but
were being "rewarded with ingratitude."
(b) Economic policy . The manifesto said that while
the party accepted the possibility of a mixed economy, "all
major sources of the production of wealth" would be placed
in the public sector. The document then listed 12 sectors
of industry which qualified for nationalization under the
category of "basic and key industries." These identified
industries were: iron and steel; non-ferrous metals; heavy
engineering; machine tools, chemicals; shipbuilding; motor
car assembly and manufacture; equipment for electrical
power production, distribution and use; electronics; pro-
duction of arms, ammunition and armaments for defense;
cement; and paper. To these were to be added "new indus-
tries which must be established to enable the autonomous
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growth of the national economy." Textile and jute mills
over a certain production capacity were to be nationalized.
In the public sector were also to be included nuclear
material, gas, oil and coal. All exploitation of mineral
wealth both mining and ore-processing were to be in the
public sector. The public sector would completely control
major means of public transportation, namely railways,
shipping and airways. A special concern would be conveyance
of workers and employees between their homes and their
places of work. Large scale export trading, such as jute
and cotton, would be conducted by state corporations.
Retail and distribution was to be left in private
hands. Cooperatives would be encouraged and all manufac-
ture would be strictly regulated according to quality norms.
In the financial sector there was an unequivocal com-
mitment to nationalize "forthwith" all banks and insurance
companies. A system of public investment corporations was
to be established to attract savings. In the "interim
period before large scale socialist reforms are effected"
tax reforms would be introducted to eliminate the "iniqui-
tous and inefficient" taxation system. The system which
enables executives of companies to live in extravagance
was to be drastically ammended, with the state prescribing
the norms for housing, transport and other facilities for
them. Competition through unfair advertising was to be
disallowed. Strict norms would be laid down for the adver-
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1 Rtising of medicines and drugs.
(c) Agrarian measures
. The party would set out to
destroy the power of the feudal landlords who constituted
a "formidable obstacle to progress." The manifesto com-
mitted the party to breaking up the largest estates through
legislation and other measures like setting a ceiling on
the size of holdings. The ownership of a maximum of 50-150
acres of irrigated land, the maximum varying from tract to
tract on the basis of productivity was set as the norm.
In relation to the rural sector, the PPP was only a
few steps ahead of its rivals in pleading for this ceiling
of irrigated acres in West Pakistan. The council Muslim
League was setting the limit at 250 acres of optimum land,
while the Jamaat-i-Islami promised to limit holdings to
less than 150 acres.
The manifesto prescribed that all those surrending
land over and above the established limit will be compen-
sated "in the form of a terminable life annuity with a
maximum duration of twenty five years heritable and nego-
tiable within this period." Landless peasants and peasants
holding land below the level of subsistence will be given
land and cooperative farming will be encouraged to improve
"^During early 1973, Bhutto managed to get a bill
passed that would require drugs to be known by their
generic rather than trade names. This was expected to lower
the prices of drugs that have big company trade names. It
was later modified by introducing a list of exemptions.
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agriculture and animal husbandry. To spread urbanization,
totally self sufficient units of urban settlements linked
functionally with rural areas and called " agrovilles " 19
will be founded.
(d) People's rights
. Every able bodied person would
be provided work according to his abilities and qualifica-
tion irrespective of class or social origin.
The growth of trade unionism and the rights of trade
unions were to be promoted in all sectors of industry. A
system of minimum wages was to be enforced in both the
private and public sectors of industry. The manifesto
decried the system of Basic Democracies that had served to
"bolster up the edifice of the corrupt dictatorship."
The socialist regime of the PPP was to replace it by local
self government, comprising urban municipalities and agglom-
erations in convenient sizes of rural areas corresponding
somewhat to district councils. Even before the goal of
socialism is attained the party would have measures of re-
forms carried through in the existing local self government
bodies
.
The administrative machinery of the state which
Pakistan inherited from the British will be overnauled
keeping in view the requirements of the socialist order.
19The " aggrovilles" were to have hospitals, dispen-
saries, markets and civic centres and offices and provide
all services to surrounding rural areas.
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It will be made responsible for its dealings with the pub-
lic. In order to protect the rights of citizens, vis-a-vis
the administration, a system of administrative courts will
be set up and the office of ombudsmen will be created. It
is significant that the PPP had taken in its manifesto,
the first step in challenging the uncurtailed powers ex-
ercised by the bureacracy in the Pakistani polity. The
extent to which the PPP has gone in diminishing the supre-
macy of the bureaucracy as a formidable power centre will
be discussed in the concluding chapter.
The manifesto also specified that the minorities will
enjoy equal political rights, protection before the law,
access to occupation of public office and shall not be dis-
criminated against.
The manifesto proposed a number of jail reforms. The
20
"jirga" trials were to be abolished and the normal system
of criminal and civil courts were to be introduced. The
manifesto spelt out the abolition of all honors and decora-
tions of a civilian nature awarded to Pakistani citizens
by all previous regimes. There was to be no room for the
existence of Princely states.
(e) Education and culture . The PPP manifesto de-
clared that education would be free up to matriculation and
^Jirga trials were conducted by village headmen who
were in charge of dispensing justice.
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that primary education would be compulsory and free. The
manifesto promised reforms in the institutions of higher
learning to enable students and teachers full academic
freedom.
University students were a strong power base of the
PPP
,
and care was taken in the manifesto to register their
disenchantment with the existing educational system.
The universities of today are the image of the
despotic rule of the Ayub Khan regime... The
vice chancellors advised by foreign 'experts,'
assisted by rubber stamping syndicates, aided by
educational bureacracy and blue eyed favorites,
helped by police, is on the rampage to exploit
the students by awarding them worthless degrees
and diplomas and impoverishing their parents.
All this must change...
The manifesto advocated full freedom of conscience,
thought and expression to apply to literature and the news
media.
(f) National health . The manifesto spelled out a
detailed program to tackle the various aspects of the prob-
lem of National Health in Pakistan. It registered that
"diseases, malnutrition, environmental insanitations and
squalor" were widespread in the society and took a heavy
toll of human life. The PPP recognized the right of every
citizen to enjoy good life and its health program was to
include
:
the provision and improvement of hospitals, the
21Election Manifesto of the PPP, 1970, p. 44.
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enforcement of measures to improve sanitation in
towns and villages, the local manufacture of as
many essential drugs as possible, health care of
school children and where malnutrition is present,
the supply of a balancing diet for children.
(g) National defense
. The manifesto set out to rec-
tify the shortcomings of the Pakistani system of military
defense. The defense industries comprising iron and steel,
and the manufacture of machine tools were to be set up in
Pakistan to reduce her dependence on foreign countries for
the import of various types of weapons and military equip-
ment. Pakistan would also develop her nuclear capability
to prepare for all eventualities. The defense of East
Pakistan was to be strengthened by the establishment there
of adequate military installations for ground forces, the
air forces and the navy. The PPP upheld in its manifesto
the right of every man to bear arms to protect his own life
and the life and honor of his family and the right to de-
fend his home and people against foreign aggression. A
"People's Army" was to be created in all regions of the
country to strengthen defense.
(h) The Constitution . The manifesto records that
the "legal framework of a constitution can guarantee no
progress if it is made in the interest of the ruling class . 1
The PPP believed that under any constitution, the unity of
the country can be preserved only on the condition that the
economy of the country is not fragmented. The PPP ' s con-
ception of a progressive constitution, included full democ-
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racy, parliamentary government, a federal system, the exten-
sion of local self government and a guarantee of the freedom
of conscience. The minimum voting age for both sexes was
to be reduced to 18 years.
The electoral system was to be ammended to allow them
to minimize the influence of money so that poorer candidates
would not be eliminated from contesting elections. The
manifesto pointed out that the greatest defect of the system
inherited from the British lay in the emphasis on the in-
fluence and power the candidate personally wielded in his
constituency and the relegation to the background of the
political ideas he is supposed to be holding.
The "list system" would be introduced for elections.
The voters would cast their votes to political party.
Every party will get seats in Parliament in proportion to
votes cast to its list. In order to discourage the pre-
sence of splinter groups, any party securing less than 5%
of the total votes cast will not be allocated a seat.
The PPP manifesto concludes on the note:
The Pakistan People's Party came into being in
the hour of need and has performed its duty un-
flinchingly to overthrow a corrupt dictatorship
and awaken the people to the consciousness of
their own power. It... proposes radical change
of the social, economic and political structure.
The people of Pakistan will themselves bring
this revolution to pass. Hence the party says
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
The manifesto of the People's Party, as we have seen,
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held out the promise of a new era in Pakistan. By and
large
,
most other parties promised the same. But the PPP
steered clear of old cliches and worn out symbols. It
did not talk in terms of abstractions like the ideology of
Pakistan, for instance. The "setting of standards," and
"educating the masses," the PPP realized, were a spent
role in the Pakistan of the 60s and 70s. These proprieties
had been a relic of the British tradition in Pakistani
politics and it had suited the "drawing room" politicians
of yesteryears to adopt it. The PPP manifesto, on the
other hand, had set out with the purpose of assimilating
the aspirations of the masses. That was the standard it
had followed in outlining the specific measures the Party
would employ.
Mr. Bhutto's Radio and Television Broadcast
When Bhutto took the opportunity offered by the gov-
ernment to all party leaders to make a nationwide TV and
radio broadcast just before the election, he reiterated the
major themes outlined in the manifesto.
We do not accept Mukherjee's argument that Bhutto
probably had second thoughts about his manifesto, since in
his broadcast he "slurred over the commitments to social
22
and economic changes incorporated in the manifesto."
22Dilip Mukherjee, op. cit . , p. 183.
66
In the broadcast
,
there was an unequivocal plea for
fundamental changes in the economic structure to stem the
rising tide of discontent and disaffection. Mukherjee
suggests that Bhutto had modified his stance in order to
appease industry, but nowhere in the speech does this be-
come apparent. In fact, Bhutto had commented:
The real reason for the spiritual trepidation of
Big Business and its hirelings is the prospect
of nationalization of industries and banks.
In fact, the only significant modification to the
manifesto was in Bhutto's constant emphasis on the Islamic
character of his socialism and his protestation that he
was next to none in upholding Islam. Bhutto had said:
This intolerable state of affairs has to be
brought to an end. It is our moral duty to lift
the people of Pakistan from the Quagmire of
poverty. There was a time in the history of Islam
when the Great Umar declared that if along the
banks of the Euphrates should a dog die of starva-
tion, the Khalifa of Islam would be answerable
before Almighty Allah. Here in Pakistan — in
the largest Islamic State — men and women die of
starvation by the thousand. Our children sleep
in the streets without shelter. Our toiling
masses lj,^e an appalling life. This has to be
changed.
This change in emphasis was essential to give a boost to
the PPP which was a perennial target of attack by the right
wing anti-socialists (discussed in a subsequent chapter).
Bhutto was also speaking on the basis of some of the responses
22For a full text of the speech, see Pakistan Review ,
December, 1970, Vol . XVIII, No. 12, pp. 57-61.
9 A^
Ibid
.
,
p. 57
.
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he had received during campaigning. The success of the
elite of a party depends in the final analysis on its sen-
sitivity to the feedback from the bulk of the populace.
The Power Configuration Within the PPP
The reader might sense in our descriptions a tendency
to use the People's Party and Mr. Bhutto almost inter-
changably. This stems from the fact that at the stage of
the PPP 1 s evolution under consideration here, Mr. Bhutto is
the indispensible element. The fortunes of the Party are
inextricably linked to the success of Mr. Bhutto's political
career. The party in itself is his brain child, and its
manifesto the product of his political beliefs. While Mr.
Bhutto does not owe his political prominence to the People's
Party alone, its success and popularity are to a large
measure the outcome of his charisma and political doctrines.
The PPP has not yet evolved into an independent entity
recognizable by virtue of its platform and party members
alone. (While party leaders play an important role, the
Muslim Leagues and the Jamaat-i-Islami have, to some extent,
assumed a personality of their own.
)
The PPP, moreover, is linked in the public mind with
Mr. Bhutto. Secondary leadership is in the process of
evolving. Mr. Bhutto provides the nucleus around which the
PPP revolves. This awareness of Bhutto's primacy exists
all the members of the party. While, within the PPP,among
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some members are more prominent than others, even this
elite does not have the power to question Mr. Bhutto's
actions by and large.
The only registered opposition from within the ranks
before and during the campaign came from Maulana Nuruzzaman
of the PPP, on February 1, at Dacca. He accused Mr. Bhutto
of "running the party on a purely dictatorial basis." 25
Mr. Nuruzzaman' s only option was to dissociate himself from
Mr. Bhutto's party. By and large, it has been surmised
that Mr. Bhutto does not accomodate criticism from within
the party ranks.
Most of the important PPP party members have had
little or no political experience before their association
with the PPP. Many of the candidates who contested on the
PPP ticket (and with success) were relative newcomers to
politics. Most of the PPP dignitaries had gained promin-
ence as lawyers, engineers, or were known as landlords.
Mustapha Jatoi and Mustapha Khar belong to the latter class.
Khar was a constant companion of Bhutto during his politi-
cal wilderness. His loyalty to Mr. Bhutto has remained un-
questionable. It is said that he risked his life to save
Bhutto's when the latter was shot at in Multan. This
loyalty has won him Bhutto's confidence and the governor-
ship of Punjab where he exercises a greater amount of power
25 See Dawn
,
February 2, 1970.
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than the present Chief Minister. Jatoi had limited experi-
ence as a Sindi politician. He was a member of the National
Assembly during the Ayub era, but had remained an incon-
spicuous backbencher.
Another political adviser is Calcutta born J. A.
Rahim, whose connections with the Bengalis are as slender
as those of Iskandar Mirza were. Rahim, now 65, is reputed
to be one of the PPP '
s
ideologues. A retired member of the
Pakistan Foreign Service, his calibre as a decision maker
has been recognized by Bhutto. It is said that of all his
party subjects, Mr. Rahim enjoys the sole privilege of ex-
erting a considerable amount of influence over Mr. Bhutto.
He is respected by the PPP leader for his sagacity and
scruples. Mr. Rahim, also now holds a cabinet portfolio.
Another member of the inner clique is Abdul Habuz
Pirzada, a 37 year old barrister who is the youngest Minis-
ter in Islamabad and served Bhutto as a trouble shooter.
A fluent speaker, he was the PPP chairman of the Karachi
Zone. Mubashir Hasan (now Finance Minister) functioned as
a close associate of Mr. Bhutto, from the inception of the
PPP. A man with no political experience, he had distin-
guished himself as an engineer and architect. He owes his
political fortunes to his friendship with Mr. Bhutto.
Another important personality within the PPP "inner
crust" was Mahmud Ali Kasuri, a renowned jurist who had
established a reputation as a radical. Kasuri and Bhutto
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fell out over the formation of the constitution in February,
1973. (Kasuri, who had enjoyed one of the longest associa-
tions with the PPP
,
was expelled from the party, but this
was a post election development.)
The inner circle of the PPP consists of half a dozen
persons whose relationship with Mr. Bhutto (with the ex-
ception of Rahim) is essentially a combination of friend-
ship, loyalty, obligation, subservience and dependency.
In the past few pages, we have described the PPP as
a progressive party that stands for a change in the socio-
economic and political structure of Pakistan. We have
suggested that its relative popularity incurred the wrath
of the right wing parties. No such explanation can be
comprehensive unless we examine the nature and political
leadership of the other major parties that contested the
elections in Pakistan. Distinctions of degree or kind
cannot be made without comparison. Hence, we felt that
a brief description of the other parties is imperative
for our purpose.
2 6
Rival Parties — Described and Explained
The decline and disintegration of the once comprehen-
26Analysis of other political parties appear in Craig
Baxter , "Pakistan Votes — 1970," Asian Survey , Vol. XI, No. 3,
pp. 203-209, from whom I have borrowed heavily. Also see
Political Parties
,
Their Policies and Programmes , Karachi:
Ferozesons Limited, 1971.
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sive independence party, the Muslim League, in the early
fifties, led to the rise of splinter groups around dissident
and disgruntled leaders. This in turn initiated a trend
towards launching parties purely on the basis of personal
popularity thereby to advance their claims at times of
political crises. The factions of the Muslim League and
the National Awami Party emerged as a result of this.
With the passage of the political parties act in 1967,
Ayub Khan tried to seize control of the League as a vehicle
for his regime and his supporters, and he called it the Con-
vention Muslim League. Other Leaguers saw Ayub as the anti-
thesis of the program of Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan and
under the inspiration of Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana, formed
the Council Muslim League.
Council Muslim League (CML)
The CML claimed to be the true successor of the party
of Jinnah. Many of the older CML members had been Leaguers
since the mid forties. The principal area of strength
appeared to be the Punjab, from which both Daultana and
provincial president Shaukat Hayat Khan came. The party
could justifiably claim that unlike other factions, it had
not cooperated with Ayub Khan because one of its leaders,
Sardar Bahadur Khan, had led the opposition against Ayub in
the 1962-64 assembly. It appeared that the CML gained
ground in Sindh when M. A. Khuhro, a former Chief Minister
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and Defense Minister, joined the party. The party was
weak in East Pakistan, but a number of politicians who had
achieved a certain level of prominence, like Khairuddin,
joined it. The CML stood for the unity of Pakistan, but
had adjusted itself to recognizing the claim of East Pakistan
for greater autonomy and the greater share of the economic
development funds of the country.
The Pakistani Muslim League (Convention)
Following his ouster, Ayub yielded his Presidentship
to A. K. M. Fazlul Quader Choudhury of East Pakistan. The
party ammassed a considerable treasury and set about using
it. Litigation began and government froze the assets of
the party. In addition, the opponents of the PML (c)
depicted it as a party of "collaborators" of Ayub. Many
members left the party, but the stigma remained with the
party. Those who stayed, presumably, felt that their local
influence was sufficient to overcome such charges and en-
sure their election, and they were sorely disappointed.
The Party program looked toward a unified Pakistan
with less concessions to provincial autonomy than espoused
by the CML, toward a continuation of "free enterprise"
economy of the Ayub period, (This was the chief cause of
its downfall.) and toward a firm rooting of the society in
Islam. In the last two, the differences with the CML were
minimal, but the PML ' s association with Ayub prompted the
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Council League to view any electoral alliance with disdain.
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum) (QML)
Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan former chief minister of the
MWFP and central minister was president of the Muslim
League in 1958 when Ayub took over. After release from the
EBDO restrictions, he joined the PML
,
supported a candidate
against Daultana and eventually split with the party. He
then became a rallying point for dissidents of both CML
and PML (c). In the East, Qayyum attracted such former
Ayub associates as Khan Abdus Sobur and Wariduzzaman; while
in the West, he brought together a number of important
Punjabi landed families of conservative political background,
such as the Noons of Sargodha, the Gilanis of Multan. In
Sindh, he won over old Leaguers and in the Frontier, he
reconstructed the local party structure which kept him in
office as Chief Minister.
Qayyum' s party stands for a strong central government
and less provincial autonomy than would be acceptable to
the PML and CML. It advocated some kind of a confederate
arrangement with Islamic countries to the West, especially
Afganistan and Iran.
The term Islam Pasand (Islam loving) was used speci-
fically by Pakistani press and the public to describe a
group of political parties which, in varying degrees, were
seen as religious oriented. In general terms, all these
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parties stood for a social, economic and political struc-
ture rooted in Islam, but there were sharp differences in
the interpretation of "Islamic system," especially in the
economic field.
The Jamaat-e-Islami (J.I.)
This is the best known of the group and one of the
best organized parties in Pakistan, led by Maulana Sayed
Abul Ala Maudoodi
. It was accused by Muslim Leaguers and
the PPP as opposing the partition of India. It reflected
an overly rigid adherence to Islamic ideology. Its appeal
lay with the middle class in larger cities and small towns,
particularly with refugees from India who clung to their
Islamic culture and values more devoutly. The Jamaat in-
fluence is much less in the rural areas. Karachi, with its
greater refugee population supported the Jamaat more during
the election than Lahore, its headquarters. The Jamaat
has developed effective secondary leadership and responsi-
bility was delegated to other members, unlike the PPP
situation. The Jamaat enlisted the support of some promi-
nent pre Ayub politicians and retired military generals.
The Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)
This party was put together from a group of disparate
elements. Former East Bengal Chief Minister, Nurul Amin,
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brought his National Democratic Front to the PDP and be-
came the all Pakistan leader of the party. A group of dis-
sident Awami Leaguers who opposed the Six Point autonomist
program of the party came into the PDP led by Nawabzada
Nasrullah Khan. Former Prime Minister, Choudhury Mohammad
Ali, brought in a major segment of the Nizam i Islam party.
The Justice party, the political vehicle of a prominent
Ayub counter poise, Asghar Khan also merged into the PDP,
but eventually left to follow an independent court — the
"non-party" Tehrik-i-Isliqlal movement. These groups and
some independents make up the PDP and organization was
loose and disjointed. The party stood for autonomy, but
not to the degree advocated by the Awami League, for a
strong Islamic base to the country and a general commit-
ment to social justice falling far short of the Islamic
Socialism of the People's Party. The PDP was essentially
an eastern based party.
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam
The Deobandi school of "nationalist" Muslims is one
of the ancestors of the Jamiat—ul—Ulema , another is the
Ma j 1 is—i—Ahrar
,
an Islamic political party that cooperated
with the Indian National Congress before independence.
The principal leader of the stronger and leftist faction,
the JU ( H ) was Ghulam Ghauz Hazarvi which tried to form an
electoral alliance with the PPP, favors labor participation
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in the ownership of industry and abolition of "landlordism."
The more conservative faction, the JU(T), is led by Ehtesha-
mu l Haq Thanvi. It associated with the Jamaat Islami and
other Islam Pasands in a loose, almost ineffective electoral
alliance. The JU(H) drew its support from the frontier and
Balchistan
,
while the Thanvi faction had a following in
Sindh and Punjab.
Markazi Jamiat Ulema i Pakistan
This party was created at a rally of Sunni theologians
rather late in the election game, June, 1970. The leader
is Khwaja Qummaruddin Sialvi, a Sunni divine. Its party
platform on political and economic issues was not well de-
fined. Its priorities lay in the advocacy of an "Islamic
system" that rejected both capitalism and socialism.
Strength was found in areas where associated pirs (Islamic
divines) had a following, i.e., in Jhang district in Punjab
and among refugee groups in Karachi.
The National Awami Party (NAP)
The "old Guard" Left is represented by the NAP, now
divided into three factions. The unified party was too
diverse in its range of political views for the party to
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27continue as one unit. Besides, personalities and regional
pulls within the party too contributed to its division. A
split occurred in December 1967 with the NAP(W) representing
the "pro Moscow" and NAP (B) representing the "pro Chinese"
segments. The NAP (W) split further when a group from
Baluchistan under the leadership of Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai
withdrew when the campaign opened.
The NAP (W) is led by Wali Khan, son of Abdul Gaffar
Khan and is identified with the Pathan claim for autonomy.
Its principal demand was the break up of One Unit, a general
demand met by Yahya Khan before the campaigning began. It
supported maximum regional autonomy and its differences
with the Awami League were in the economic field where it
advocated a more strongly socialist program. The party had
little following in Punjab and Sindh. Its strength lay in
the Peshawar plain of the Frontier and to some degree in
Baluchistan where it was the arch enemy of the QML. It was
charged by Qayyum as favoring separation of the Pathan
areas of Pakistan and collaborating with India.
The other faction, the NAP (B) , was led by Hamid Khan
Bhashani
,
an octogenarian belonging to the farthest left.
It comprised a dissident faction of the Awami League that
27For a detailed discussion of the NAP, see M.
Rashiduzzaman, "The National Awami Party of Pakistan,
Leftist Politics in Crisis," Pacific Affairs , Vol XLII , No.
3, Fall 1970, pp. 394-409. This article, however, does not
deal in depth with the party in the West Wing.
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split with it in December 1957. The program of the NAP (B)
supported provincial autonomy to the same degree as the
Awami League, extreme measures in the nationalization of
the economy and closer relations with China. The thrust
of the program was the emancipation of peasants. In the
West, the party had almost disappeared and lacked organiza-
tional structure. Bhashani had vaccilated about participa-
tion in the election, but had finally asked his party can-
didates to retire from the contest.
The Awami League
As the campaigning progressed, the Awami League be-
came exclusively a party of the East. The party in the
West was quite insignificant. In this sense, the Awami
League did not function as a contender to the PPP in the
elections in West Pakistan. It did, however, have a tremen-
dous impact on the political development of Pakistan and
the formation of Bangla Desh. In the period following the
election, the Awami League was to become the most serious
opponent to the People's Party. Its massive victory in
the East was to indicate that it had internalized the grow-
ing Bengali nationalism and the aspirations of the people
there. During the election period, however, it operated
primarily in the East wing and there was no conflict of
spheres with the PPP. The majority it received in the
elections, however, entitled it to the position of the
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party of Pakistan
( for it had won 167 out of a total
of 330 seats alloted to the National Assembly. The PPP
was determined not to be relegated to second place, and
there began the momentum to the eventual bifurcation of
Pakistan. The basic platform of the Awami League is the
28Six Point Program which may be summarized as: a federal
parliamentary government for the country; transfer of all
subjects except defense and foreign affairs to the pro-
vinces; separate but convertible currencies for each wing;
and a separate militia for East Pakistan. (It had been
charged by opponents of the AL that the party's autonomist
program implied separation.) Mujibur Rahman, the leader
of the AL draws his support from virtually all areas of
East Pakistan and the student community in particular. The
membership of the party is drawn from the Bengali petty
beourgeoise. The party favors a moderately socialist pro-
gram, but its chief platform was the articulation of Bengali
grievances. Thus, in contrast to the clearcut alternatives
presented in the 1965 presidential elections, there were
similarities in the manifestoes of the various parties. The
differences were in the measure of emphasis they place on
various points and the priorities they assigned.
28A detailed study of the East Pakistan wing of the
A . L . is embodied in M. Rashiduzzaman , "The Awami League
in the Political Development of Pakistan," Asian Survey ,
Vol . X, No. 7, July, 1970, pp. 578087.
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Almost all parties, including the socialist oriented
ones, pledged not to make any law repugnant to the injuc-
tions of the Quaran and the Sunnah. Second, there was a
general consensus for an independent foreign policy and for
the resolution of basic disputes between India and Pakistan
as a prerequisite to normalizing relations. Third, all
parties stood for resolving interregional disparities and
economic inequities, offering a fair deal to industrial
workers and tillers by fixing a ceiling on land holdings,
distribution of excess land to landless peasants and giving
industrial workers a share of industries profits. Most of
them also stood for placing heavy industry in the public
sector, nationalizing banks and companies, or at least sub-
jecting them to social control.
On the most controversial issue — regional autonomy
of the provinces, the parties may be classified in three
broad categories. Most of the rightist and centrist par-
ties like the Jamaat Islami, the Qayyum Muslim League,
Pakistan Muslim League ( Conventionist ) stood for a reason-
ably strong and viable centre; the two leftist NAPs would
concede the centre only foreign affairs and defense and
currency, while remaining silent on the centre s powers to
tax the provinces; some parties, like the Awami League
would concede the centre only foreign affairs and defense
and claim for the provinces a separate currency, the right
to a provincial militia control over the provinces' foreign
trade and taxation rights.
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Conclusion
The primary distinction that can be made between the
PPP and other contenders is that it was a newly formed party.
Unlike the Muslim Leagues, the Islam Pasands or the NAPs,
the PPP did not emerge as an offshoot or as a product of
factionalism. Initially, its members and supporters came,
not from EBDOed politicians or Ayub dissidents, but from
the student groups. The PPP put together a completely new
coalition of forces. The "inner core" of the PPP were sup-
porters and friends of Bhutto who had little connections
with the Ayub regime or other parties. Later, however, and
especially close to the 1970 elections, dissidents from
other parties did join. However, in the initial phases of
the party, Bhutto was the only dissident. Bhutto was the
only opposition leader who publicly opposed the regime when
it was not yet fashionable to do so and his stand won the
PPP a certain amount of support, particularly among the
students and also among the masses. Many political acti-
vists who had been repelled by the pro-Ayub or passive role
of other parties also joined Bhutto. The party began to
establish its identity as a mass party and not as a dissident
group or faction. Certain convention Muslim Leaguers de-
serted Ayub and joined Bhutto when they discerned that Bhutto
n •
29
was a potential winner.
29 See Tariq Ali, op. cit .
,
pp. 190-95.
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The People's Party had emerged apparently to uphold
a certain ideology on which there existed consederable
agreement by the members. Personality conflicts, which
promote factions within parties and blur and distort the
program, had not yet surfaced. The party thus retained a
distinctive appearance.
Most other parties, with the exception of the Awami
League, had developed a system where leadership was either
shared or delegated. The PPP leadership configuration
differed markedly.
Another distinction is that many of the other major
parties, with the exception of the Jamaat i Islami, had
held power at one time or another, and had accomplished
little or nothing. Bhutto had also held power, but in a
subordinate role. He was now appearing in a role which
repudiated his earlier connections. Thus, only the PPP,
being new, was without a credibility gap to contend with.
We will see, in the following chapter, the extent to
which the PPP manifesto was incorporated in the intrica-
cies of campaigning.
It becomes apparent that to the mechanics of election
strategy, the PPP approach was essentially pragmatic. It
must be kept in mind, however, that the electorate voted
it into power, not for its pragmatism, but for its pro-
fessed ideology.
Two different inferences can be drawn from its prag—
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matic role. first, that the PPP despite its protestations,
is not really a "revolutionary" party, but merely a pro-
gressive one, sympathetic to the condition of the masses.
Second, that, like most ideological parties (working within
the system) it was forced under the duress of the elections
to adopt, merely as strategy necessary for survival, the
"pragmatic" or "brokerage" role. Time alone can define the
future direction of the PPP.
We wish to emphasize, however, that all predominantly
"ideological" parties (including the CPSU under Lenin) are
pragmatic to a degree and pure "ideological — pragmatic"
dichotomy may be an oversimplification. While it may well
be that the PPP might turn out to be a predominantly
"brokerage" type party, it was not on this basis that it
won the people's confidence and later the election.
The future role of the PPP can only be speculated, not
definitely prophesied. We have engaged in such a specula-
tion in our conclusive chapter.
84
CHAPTER III
THE PPP AND THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The wide spectrum of political contestants that
faced the election displayed a striking similarity. They
were all virtual amatuers to a campaign that appealed to
and realigned a universally enfranchized electorate in a
nation wide poll.
The political institutions that existed in Pakistan
before January 1, 1970 had precluded any intensive activity
in this direction. The country had never before witnessed
direct elections on a national scale. The "Old Guard""'
politicians had managed a limited exposure to campaigning
2for provincial elections, but in terms of the electorate
which confronted them in 1970, that experience was paltry
and meaningless. Here was an electorate that could not be
pacified by mere promises of an Islamic Utopia, where the
spiritual welfare of Muslims would be safeguarded, or by
abstractions like the "Ideology of Pakistan." The new
electorate that emerged — increasingly politicized — pre-
ferred that its earthly aspirations be translated into
policy.
1 The "Old Guard" in this election would comprise
politicians like Qayyum Khan, Daultana, Maulana Maudoodi
,
Nurul Amin, Nasrullah Khan, Fazlul Quader Chowdhury.
2The last provincial elections were held in 1954 in
East Pakistan. See Abstract.
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The contestants were confronted with the syndrome of
rising expectations. This being present in a rather dif-
fused form, they had to articulate effectively, these ex-
pectations, within the context of their perception of the
same. Their campaigns, in addition, had to seek to acti-
vate the indifferent and uninterested, re-enforce the par-
tisan, and convert the doubtful. The time provided for
this activity was ample. The campaign lasted over eleven
months
.
The resumption of unobstructed political activity
witnessed rallies, processions and public meetings all
over the country. The People's Party, threw itself into
the fray with the utmost fervour right from the start. The
PPP organized various rallies and processions, and was the
3
only party, for instance, to observe a "Tashkent Day" early
in January in all important cities in the country. It was
a spectacular affair, where party dignitaries spoke, and
several resolutions were passed demanding that the Govern-
ment renounce the declaration signed by India, Pakistan and
the Soviet Union, after the 1965 conflict with India. It
was a wise and opportune move by the PPP to exploit the
anti-Tashkent feeling in the West, before other parties had
a chance to cash in on the same issue.
^Tashkent Day was January 11. See Dawn, January
12, 1970.
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Of all the parties in the West
4
the PPP was most
militant and vociferous, indulging in rather indiscriminate
name calling and mudslinging at their opponents. Of all
important campaigners, Bhutto was the youngest, " the most
energetic, agile, and the most indefatigable, conducting a
gruelling campaign and drawing the largest crowds." Bhutto
made the most violent speeches, and PPP party workers mostly
figured prominently in inter party clashes. Whether the
PPP legions confronted the Pir of Pagaro's followers during
the infamous Sanghar incident, ^ or when they threatened
7Qayyum's supporters in Peshawar, Bhutto's rhetoric al-
ways succeeded in projecting these clashes to the advantage
of the People's Party. This will be discussed in greater
detail later in the chapter.
Owing to the multitude of parties that had appeared
on the scene in 1970, almost every party tried to identify
itself with at least one well known party member with
national prominence. Thus, the "personality angle" figured
as prominently in campaign strategies as did party manifestoes,
4In the East, Mujibur Rehman ' s Awami League conducted
a campaign equally, if not more vociferous than that of the
PPP.
5 See Sharif A1 Mujahid, "Pakistan: First General
Elections," Asian Survey , Vol. XI, Feb. 1971, p. 166.
^One person was killed in an attack on a PPP proces-
sion in Sanghar (Sindh). See Dawn, March 31, 1970.
7 See Dawn
,
April 2, 1970.
87
issues or style. In this the PPP had an edge over all other
parties. Bhutto had been in the political limelight far
more than any other party leader. His political activities,
having been more recent than that of a Daultana or a
Qayyum Khan, were still fresh in the public memory. The
struggles and sacrifices of the Independence workers and
those who fought for Pakistan had faded into the background.
Twenty years had taken care of that. The memory of the
anti Ayub uprisings and the ouster of Ayub, stirred up
greater fervour in the minds of the masses. The bulk of
the new electorate had lived through the Ayub era, and a
great many of them had identified with the forces that had
evicted Ayub from office in 1968. Bhutto had cast himself
in the role of a crusader and liberator in 1968, becoming
the symbol of a resurgent nationalism. In 1970, the People's
Party was careful to play up the Bhuttoian element in its
election strategy. This image association was particularly
helpful since a great many PPP candidates were relative
novices in politics. That this strategy worked to the PPP '
s
advantage is demonstrated by the fact that relatively un-
known PPP candidates were able to defeat stalwarts of other
parties. A classic case in point is the defeat of Mian
Tufail Mohammed (a strong arm of the Jamaat-e-Islami ) at
the hands of one Sheikh Rashid of the PPP in the National
Assembly election from Lahore constituency NW61.
In this chapter we shall discuss different aspects of
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the PPP campaign. The Election Strategy of the People's
Party, the Image that it wished to project of itself, its
campaign Style
,
the Issues and Themes that its candidates
projected, the kinds of Slogans that were employed by it,
will all be considered as different elements that made up
the campaign. Finally, we shall try to register the kinds
of reactions that the PPP campaign evoked from other parties
and the effect that it had on their campaigns. There is an
underlying assumption in this chapter that the PPP held a
pivotal position in the 1970 elections in West Pakistan,
perhaps the most important one. As a generator of issues,
its role was central.
Election Strategy
The PPP campaign followed a well planned strategy.
There was hardly any tactical blunder worth the mention, ex-
cept perhaps Bhutto's repeated chastizing of the Press —
his constant allegation that the National Press Trust was
0
a capitalistic oriented organization.
One of the principal elements of the PPP ' s modus
operandi
,
was the maximum exploitation of Bhutto's charisma.
For instance, in the West, the only meetings and processions
to display huge portraits of their leaders were those of
8As President, Bhutto is encouraging increased parti-
cipation of journalists and editors in the management and
policy decision of respective newspapers and other publica-
tions .
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the PPP. Bhutto was presented as the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader
of the masses) and his election symbol, the sword, was
represented as the Zulf iqar-i-Ali
.
10
Since Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Bhutto was the only poli-
tician in Pakistan who was also a charismatic leader. The
kind of charisma Bhutto generated however, differed markedly
from that of Jinnah. The Quaid-i-Azam11 (the Great Leader)
was deeply revered and inspired awe in his masses. He stood
on an elevated pedestal in the eyes of his followers. He
1
2
addressed himself to the elite, spoke their language, and
it was only through the elite that the masses understood
him. His personal life was scrupulously austere and exem-
plary.
Bhutto's appeal, on the other hand, lay primarily in
his ability to project himself as a man of the people, in
his youth and in his flamboyance. His remarkable fluency
in English and Sindhi, and a growing fluency in Urdu and
Punjabi, enabled him to sway a wider range of the electorate
— an advantage none of his political rivals possessed. He
^ See Sharif A1 Mujahid, op. cit . , p. 166.
^The famous sword of Ali the fourth Caliph which had,
it is believed, significantly contributed to Islam's glory
during its early and critical years.
^A name reverently attributed to Mohammed Ali Jinnah
in Pakistan.
12Jinnah's upbringing was in the classic style of con-
temporary Indian elite in that it was British oriented.
Almost all Jinnah' s political speeches were in English, not
Urdu.
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could speak the language of the elite when he chose to,
but was equally comfortable speaking the language of the
masses. However, early enough in his political career, he
had learned that the key to success in post-independence
Pakistan was the ability to mobilize the "common people."
An extemporaneous speaker with oratorical overtones, his
speeches were noted for their emotional outbursts. (It has
been reported that Bhutto could summon tears whensoever he
wished.) A section of the elite, notably the lawyers,
viewed what they considered to be Bhutto's "critics" with
disdain, and at times alarm. The masses however flocked
to hear him and the public meetings that Bhutto addressed
were the best attended, with the exception of those addressed
by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in East Pakistan.
With improved systems of communication, the speeches
of political campaigners were relayed over government owned
radio and television for equally alloted time periods, but
the public meeting proved the most popular tool of cam-
paigning. It enabled access to a varied spectrum of people,
and also gave the satisfaction of maintaining direct contact
with the masses. Such conditions were necessary for the
Bhuttoian charisma to thrive.
Table I is a schedule of important public meetings
addressed by prominent members of the PPP in West Pakistan.
Table II deals similarly with the Council Muslim League.
The CML was chosen here because it polled the largest number
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of votes next to the PPP in the National Assembly elections
in West Pakistan [see Table VI[]
. We accept the responsi-
bility for a small percentage of error.
The PPP addressed roughly 88 to 90 prominent public
meetings in West Pakistan, the CML roughly 79, the QML
(Qayyum) around 60. The Convention Muslim League spent a
good bit of their time campaigning in East Pakistan and as
a result could address only around 30 public meetings in
the West. The NAP (Wali) addressed around 80 public meetings
The Jamaat Islami probably did the best among the religious-
oriented parties, addressing around 56 public meetings. A
comparison between Table I and Table II will reveal that
while Daultana delegated responsibilities to other CML party
leaders. Bhutto took on the personal responsibility of
steering the PPP campaign. Bhutto himself addressed more
than 90% of the total PPP public meetings. This was partly
due to the fact that most PPP contestants were newcomers to
politics. The fact that Bhutto himself contested from 6
constituencies simultaneously also required such intensive
campaigning on his part. His most concentrated campaigning
was in areas where a degree of industrial development had
taken place, resulting in social mobility and where strati-
fication was being redefined on the basis of status, wealth
and education rather than on caste, and traditional factors.
Bhutto did not expend much energy campaigning in Baluchistan
or the area along the Indus river, which continued as strong
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holds of "Islam Pasands." However in the midst of his
whirlwind tours in West Pakistan Bhutto made time to visit
shrines to show deference to the religious sentiments of
the people. [^As late as Nov. 8, Bhutto went in a big pro-
cession to Noorpurshahan near Rawalpindi to visit the mazar
of Barri Shah Lateef, one of the most revered shrines in
West Pakistan.]
But Bhutto was not relying on charisma alone. His
speeches at public meetings stressed the priorities of the
people in the region. He was the only political campaigner
who did this successfully. For instance, in the Punjab he
stressed his confrontation stance vis-a-vis India. In the
NWFP
,
he wooed the Pathans and recalled the glorious history
of "his brave brethren," whom he claimed to love like his
Sindhi people. At public meetings in and around Peshawer,
he promised prosperity. In Sindh he promised to curb the
power of the Waderas (landlords) to improve living standards
of the toiling masses. It was in Sindh (more than in Pun-
jab) that he stressed the evils of the One Unit System, for
Sindh had been traditionally opposed to it. It was in the
Karachi industrial belt that he spoke the most about Islamic
Socialism. At Lahore he reiterated that he stood for the
merger of Bhawalpur with Punjab.
The success of these meetings lay in the fact that
Bhutto was the first to give vent to the economic frustra-
tions of the people and articulate effectively their aspira-
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tions. In addition he showed greater deference to the set
of proprieties (as to what determines the rules of the game
in campaigning) of the masses, rather than those embedded
in perceptions of the Western educated elite. His campaign
style reflected this. For instance, his personal assaults
on his political rivals, while it may not be considered
M good form" among the Westernized elite, does certainly
constitute an integral component of the bravado and excite-
ment that campaigning is supposed to generate in the mass
perceptions of the same. In a polity where the traditional
elite is being challenged, and a new and different elite is
emerging, reflecting the political culture of the old order,
would be (for a politician aspiring for power) tantamount
to political suicide.
Another aspect of the PPP election strategy was to
project absolute confidence of the party's popularity and
certainty of its success in the approaching elections.
For instance, at a Press conference at his Karachi resi-
dence as early as January 17, 1970, Bhutto declared that
his party was fully geared towards election. He had re-
ceived a great response from the people during recent visits
13
to Rawalpindi and parts of Sindh.
Later14 addressing the Peshawar District Bar Associa-
13 See Dawn
,
January 18, 1970.
14 See Dawn
,
January 20, 1970, p. 1.
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tion, he claimed that the PPP enjoyed great support "from
Karachi to Torkam." "Every meeting of the party was an eye
opener to those who doubted our popularity." He had no
doubt that his party would "emerge most successful in the
forthcoming elections in West Pakistan."
The PPP was presented as a party which was the van-
guard of students and the youth and the ally of the deprived
people of the nation. The image projected was that of a
party which was sympathetic to the demands of young people,
and which encouraged young blood within its ranks. Bhutto
addressed student federations in Punjab, Sindh and the
15 ...NWFP . He alluded to old politicians as the "relics of
Mohenjodaro civilization." At a reception hosted by stu-
dents in Nawabshah, Sindh, for instance, he advised "poli-
ticians who exploited the country and the nation for the
last twenty years, to retire, and vacate the place for
the youth of the country." He regretted that the "old
politicians had exploited students in the past and hoped
that they (the students) would now never become tools of
such politicians." 16
Yet at the same time, the PPP worked behind the scenes
to find allies among the disgruntled veteran politicians.
The PPP backed several Independent candidates in the Provin-
16 See Table I.
16Quoted in Dawn
,
January 15, 1970.
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cial Assembly elections in Sindh. Nine of the PPP ' s 18
candidates elected to the National Assembly from Sind are
former conventionist leaders. Pir Ilahi Bux, a former
Chief Minister of Sindh, and Sadiq Ali Memon, a former
member of the earlier National Assembly joined the PPP.
While including young blood like Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, a
36 year old barrister, the PPP prudently retained experienced
politicians like Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri
,
61 and J. A.
Rahim, now 64 who is reputed to be the PPP ' s idealogue, and
1
7
has been the party's Secretary General since 1967.
A closely related strategy was the game of keeping
"all options open." It was a step toward consensus poli-
ticking. This might seem incongruous to the many who view
the PPP stance essentially as one of confrontation. Al-
though this might apply to the PPP position vis-a-vis India,
it certainly did not hold true for its election strategy in
West Pakistan. The stance of confrontation was part and
parcel of the image that the PPP projected of itself to the
electorate; and this it did with remarkable success.
All the trimmings of the PPP image and all its idea-
listic slogans not withstanding, reading between the lines,
it becomes apparant that the party strategy in terms of
cold behind-the-scenes politics was tied up with aggrega-
ting the diverse interests within the West. An analytical
^See Illustrated Weekly of India , April 9, 1972, p. 13.
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study of the PPP campaign would demonstrate that Bhutto
displayed a Bismarkian sense of the art of politics by
promising something or another to everyone. Sharif al
Mujahid, an analyst of Pakistani politics, comments:
He promised an economic nirvana to peasants,
workers and underpriveleged through Socialism,
while adopting landlords and moneyed people as
candidates for the most part. He exploited the
lack of leadership among leftists in the West
after the NAP's fragmentation to win their support,
by calling for a socialist revolution, but at
the same time, he dispelled the Islamist mis-
givings by interpreting his Islamic socialism in
terms of Islamic Masawat (egalitarianism) and
Masawat-i-Mohammadi
,
by dangling before them the
prospect of Shaukat-i-Islam (vjgtory of Islam)
day in Delhi and Shrinagar
. . .
.
We are disinclined to accept the confrontation theory,
since, as a result of Bhutto's campaign style, no single
group felt directly threatened by his protestations. He
enlisted the support of different socio-economic groups and
was careful not to alienate any one group or power centre.
We shall now attempt to demonstrate this.
The most important of the existing power centres —
the Army — felt the least threatened by Bhutto. The entire
elections were being conducted, presumably, with the blessings
of Yahya Khan and the ruling junta. Bhutto did allege in
some campaign speeches that certain cabinet members were
dabbling in politics, and that Sher Ali, the Minister for
Information was working toward the detriment of the People's
18Sharif Al Mujahid, op. cit ., p. 168.
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However, he was careful not to antagonize Yahya,
and often credited the President with a great deal of sin-
cerity. (Poste election events indicate that Bhutto en-
joyed the favor of Yahya Khan.
)
In addition, the Army knew that it had the trump card
in the whole gambit. The Legal Framework Order invested
the President with the final power of approving or rejecting
the constitution that would be drafted by the future Con-
stituent Assembly. Later events demonstrated that Yahya
19Khan had never intended to abrogate all his power.
The bureacracy in Pakistan enjoyed powers infinite.
The security it enjoyed was so tremendous that it seemed
virtually impossible to dislodge it as a formidable power
centre. Bhutto has attempted, as President, the Herculean
task of limiting the powers of the bureacracy and with con-
20
siderable success, it seems at present. In early and mid
1970, many bureacrats of the higher and middle echelons
were dismissed on charges of corruption and nepotism. All
this happened only after Bhutto was secure in office. No
indication of any intention in this direction was given
during his campaign. Bhutto had promised to eradicate cor-
ruption and nepotism, but like the Garibi Hatao slogans of
Mrs. Gandhi, was not definite enough to send the bureacratic
^See Dilip Mukherjee, Zulf igah Ali Bhutto - Quest for
Power
,
New Delhi: Vikas, 1972, p. 2-3.
^This will receive attention in our concluding chapter.
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juggernaut into a panic.
It was only after he took over as President that
Bhutto, in his inaugural address on December 20, 1971,
declared:
I warn the bureacracy to do its job, its duty
— the tea parties must come to a stop — and when
I talk of the bureacracy, I do not mean only the
Secretariat at Islamabad. I mean each and every
bureacrat wherever he is.... If the common man
had not been humiliated for 24 years Pakistan as
a nation would not have been humiliated today.
I want each and every individual to be regarded
as important. I do not want him to get his jus-
tice through Sifarish [recommendation]
. Nobody
will do sifarish through my relations or my party.
To the large crowds that flocked to his public meetings
Bhutto symbolized a changing order. He was the first poli-
tician that had articulated the common man's yearning for
social and economic justice in a country where wealth re-
sided in the hands of a priveleged few. Bhutto's fervernt
cries held out promise of a day of redemption and recompence.
But Bhutto was not relying on crowds alone. He took care
to enlist the support of religious divines ( a force to be
contended with in the Pakistan polity), political notables
and local worthies who for one reason or another were not
joining other parties. He particularly needed the blessings
of the divines because the Islam Pasands had, in a bid to
damn him, mobilized 133 Ulema to issue an edict declaring
socialism as anti-Islam. Makhdoom Sahib of Hala, was one
21Quoted in Dilip Mukherjee, op. cit ., p. 73.
99
such divine that he roped on his side. He was a pir of some
consequence in the Hyderabad and Nawabshah districts. This
enabled him to counter in some measure the influence of an
adversary, the Pir of Paqaro, a divine with a considerable
following.
Bhutto brought in radicals too from the other end of
the political spectrum. Miraj Mohammad Khan was a fire-
brand student leader of Karachi in the 1950's and later a
trade unionist. Bhutto recruited him to break into the
Karachi industrial belt where the PPP faced formidable com-
petition from the Jamaat-e-Islami on the one hand and from
Bhashani 1 s lieutenants on the other.
On the other hand, Bhutto enlisted the support of
local landlords to swing the vote for him in some rural
areas where the influence of the baradari or clan was still
a major factor and landlords could capitalize on feudal
loyalties. The men in this category included Ghulam
Mustafa Jatoi, a scion of a family of Sindh landlords that
had dominated the politics of Nawabshah district for three
generations. Ghulam Mustapha Khar, a member of a family
of large landlords settled in Muzaffargarh near Multan,
was a staunch companion when Bhutto was in political wilder-
ness. The chief of the NWFP wing of the People's Party,
Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, comes from a wealthy landed
family of Peshawar. These recruits served Bhutto well, and
earned for themselves the rewards Bhutto handed out after
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assuming office. The presence of these wealthy members in
a party committed to radical economic reforms elicited
caustic comments from Bhutto's rivals. Bhutto however was
not perturbed, but claimed, on the other hand, at a public
meeting in Multan on September 24:
Some capitalists and feudals have joined my party,
but it does not at all mean that the PPP has been*
converted into a party of jagirdars to suck the
blood of the poor people. The capitalists and
feudal lords who joined the party have already
taken an oath before me to abide by al^the
conditions laid down in the manifesto.
Bhutto met as many different occupational groups as
possible. This was usually accomplished in small informal
receptions, where he could conveniently trim his public
stance to suit the occasion. For instance, when he addressed
the Karachi Press club, on January 2, 1970, he spoke garrul-
ously on economic disparity, on the ills of the system of
monopolies, on Islamic Socialism, on the urgency of Demo-
cratic rule and on the tyranny of the Ayubian era. However
when, on February 23, he addressed persons belonging to
various trades who were comfortable with the economic status
quo, he was silent about nationalization. He spoke at
length on matters of national security, the position of
Muslims in India, and dwelt on the evils of regional preju-
dices. The Bhuttonian charisma which stirred crowds at
public meetings also worked toward dispelling the fears of
22 See Dawn
,
January 1, 1970, p. 1.
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smaller groups.
The above examples are ample proof of the fact that
the PPP strategy was geared towards a policy of aggregating
interests, in spite of the associations in people's mind
of the PPP with confrontation policies. This strategy
helped Bhutto cut across not only geographical and provin-
cial boundaries, but enabled him to direct his appeal to
every important tier of the socio economic hierarchy.
The PPP strategy also involved concentrated campaign-
ing in areas where success was anticipated. Unlike some
other parties, notably the Convention Muslim League, the
Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tehri'k-i-Istiqlal movement which
dispersed a lot of their energy and time campaigning in
East Pakistan, the PPP realized early enough in the game
that the East did not provide a fertile ground where the
party platform could flourish. Catering to this region
would mean a serious setback to the strategy of consensus
politicking in the West.
Bhutto made an overture to Bhashani early in January
by declaring that his party stands committed to having a
working alliance with the two leftist NAPs and the Jamiatul
23
Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi group). This was probably done
with the intention of undermining Mujib's popularity in the
23 See Dawn
,
Jan. 21, 1970. This stance is interes
tingly astute, keeping in view that the NWFP , of all pro-
vinces in the West was favorably disposed to the Awami League
and did not feel threatened by its popularity in the East.
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East, and also to test the ground. A short visit to Dacca
(the Eastern capital) from March 13 to March 16, 1970, and
an announcement that he would attend Bhashani ' s proposed
peasant rally at Toba Tek Singh in Multan (Punjab) on
February 10, failed to elicit a favorable response. Bhutto
reconciled soon enough to the realities of the Eastern
situation, declaring at a meeting of students in Peshawar
that "like Sheikh Mujib's party in the East, the PPP was
most popular in the West."
In the West too, the party contested more seats in
24
states where the "transistor revolution" had more or less
set in, and where the newly literate were influenced and
prompted by rising expectations. [See Table 1] Within
the Frontier, the largest number of public meetings addressed
by the PPP were in the relatively progressive Peshawar re-
gion. On a state basis, Baluchistan which was a reputed
stronghold of the NAP (Wali) was given low priority in the
PPP campaign. Bhutto addressed only one public meeting in
Quetta and virtually paid no heed to Kalat. Not having
too many irons in the fire, paid the PPP good dividends.
As a corrollary of PPP ' s attempt to aggregate diverse
interests was its simultaneous adoption of candor on issues
that would work to its advantage, and discretion on highly
24
A term synonymous with increasing urbanization.
See M.B. Naqvi
,
"West Pakistan's Struggle for Power,"
South Asian Review
,
Vol 4, No. 3, April 1971, p. 221.
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explosive issues. Bhutto's announcement^ that he stood
for the merger of Bhawalpur with Punjab improved his party's
standing in the state.
This ambiguity regarding the powers of the Centre,
kept the provinces in West Pakistan guessing, and they gave
him the benefit of the doubt. A stand in favor of a strong
centre would have provoked the ire of Sindh, Baluchistan
and NWFP, feeling increasingly threatened by the prospect
of Punjabi domination. The Baluchi, Pathan and Sindi min-
orities have always been apprehensive of the Punjabis who
are numerically superior, economically stronger, hardworking,
aggressive and more prosperous. On the other hand, an
opposite stance by the PPP would have seriously undermined
its popularity in Punjab. A strong centre, would have meant
in effect, Punjab enjoying commensurate power, being the
most prosperous and progressive state. When asked by a
press reporter whether he was in favor of a strong centre,
Bhutto quipped:
. . .
Unfortunately the word strong centre or weak
has caused misgivings in the minds of the people.
There are very good reasons for it also. In the
name of strong centre many arbitrary and dictator-
ial violations have been made in the past. How-
ever, I think that an efficient, efficacious and
viable centre having a harmonious relationship
with the provinces would not be grudged. But there
should not be any confrontation between cent^g and
the provinces. In the past this was not so.
25This announcement was made on January 1, 1970.
^Dawn, Jan. 2, 1970.
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While to many contestants notably Qayyum Khan and G.M.
Syed
,
the quantum of autonomy was a burning issue (some even
demanded a settlement before the election). Bhutto dis-
missed it as a matter that could not be settled "arbitrarily"
before going to the polls. It was a matter that had to be
deliberated upon and decided by the future Constituent Assem-
bly working as one body. Bhutto's platform being broad-
based and anti-regional, he could not risk the fanning of
regionalistic jingoism that a settlement of the autonomy
question would ignite. Furthermore, any politician that
wished to carry Punjab in terms of votes would have had to
de-emphasize regionalism. Punjab accounts for 65% of the
population of West Pakistan and has been traditionally anti-
regional. Being the most prosperous state, it had a pivotal
role in the control of the economy. Regional autonomy would
entail a reduction of Punjabi control over national policy.
The dominant position it enjoyed in the political and admin-
istrative spheres, would also be severely curtailed. Bhutto
could not afford to alienate the Punjab at any cost. Stra-
tegically the anti-regional platform of the PPP catered to
Punjab. On face value it seemed to embody a nationalist's
commitment to the interests of the country as a whole, and
an abhorrence for parochialism of any kind. It worked to
the PPP '
s
advantage that Yahya Khan chose not to settle
the issue of autonomy before the nation went to the polls.
The PPP was also careful not to get enmeshed in any
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formal alliances or Fronts, like the short-lived CML-Sindh
United Front Pact, or the chaotic Islamic United Front.
Since the PPP wished to represent itself as a new and dif-
ferent party, formal alliances would have proved more a
liability that an asset. In terms of the time dispensed
for negotiations, they would prove an encumbrance and above
all, they would have bound the party to pledges compromising
the freedom of promising something to everyone. Where an
understanding was arrived at, it was with the "leftist"
Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi) and the NAP (Wali), for
specific constituencies and particular contests. On January
20, 1970, speaking to students in Peshawar, Bhutto declared
that he had
no plan to merge or make alliances with other
parties, especially small parties or splinter
parties... However, there could always be an
understanding with such parties that stand for
economic emancipation of the downtrodden masses,
subject to tfc^ condition that those parties are
broad based.
The PPP Image
The image that the PPP projected was that of an organ-
ization which exhuded youthful vigor, enthusiasm, dynamism
and modernity. It sought to link itself in the minds of
the electorate as the ally of the underpriveleged and
oppressed* a staunch crusader for the rights of the people.
21 See Dawn
,
January 1, 1971.
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At a packed public meeting in Mirpurkhas, on March 27, 1970,
Bhutto said that his party stood for a people's constitu-
tion, people's democracy and an end to economic exploita-
tion in the country. "Our party program," he said, "is
the voice of the people." His party was ready to cooperate
with other parties in making a constitution in accordance
with people's wishes
...but at the same time, we will not allow any-
body to betray the people... Today's fight is
not between Muhajirs and Sindi ' s or Punjabis but
it is the fight of the oppressed and exploited
peoples of all nationalities for rights^— a
fight between oppressor and oppressed.
On January 7, speaking to the Karachi Bar Association, Mr.
Bhutto reiterated that the party stood for the elimination
of expolitation under capitalism, and the revival of human
dignity and honor, as preached by Islam.
Bhutto promised that through the efforts of the PPP
,
"revolutionary changes" would come to the economic and social
structure of Pakistan. The party would augment a new dyna-
mism in which the masses would break loose from the shakles
of stagnation of the old order.
At one of the best attended public meetings in Mardan,
Bhutto told a crowd on Feb. 25, 1970, that with the help of
students and workers and the common man, the PPP had over-
thrown the Ayub regime and now it would bring an industrial
28 See Dawn
,
March 28, 1970.
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and economic revolution to the country. ^ On June 12, in
Quetta he elaborated the same essential idea:
The party, through selfless service, has been
able to gain ground to a considerable extent
with people and is pursuing a revolutionary pro-
gram, despite innumerable difficulties and hard-
ships, with a view
3
jto achieving the basic rights
of the common man.
He stressed that his party could meet the demands of time,
and render service in improving the economic condition of
the people.
In terms of image the PPP
,
despite its socialist
slogans, did not make a clear break with the traditional
proprieties of using Islam as a political talisman. Its
cry of Musawaat-e-Mohammadi (Islamic equality) was, if any-
thing louder than that of most other parties.
During a one hour address on January 4, 1970, in a
conservative section of Karachi, Bhutto stressed the party's
deference to Islam. "Islam our faith, democracy our policy,
Socialism our economy, and all power to the people." Elab-
orating these three principles he proclaimed that the
"workers of the People's Party will sacrifice their lives
31for the sake of Islam."
29
Dawn
,
Feb. 26, 1970.
^Dawn
,
June 13, 1970.
31 Pakistan Times, January 5, 1970.
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While projecting itself as a party that stood for
revolutionary change, the PPP vindicated its image of ex-
treme patriotism. The oft heard PPP cry, during the campaign,
was that no sacrifice was considered too great by it for
the honour and integrity of Pakistan. It boasted that the
party workers were willing, if the need arose, to shed the
last drop of blood for their country. (Such dramatic
slogans during election time are characteristic of politics
in South Asia.
)
The PPP also projected itself as the pioneer in Pakis-
tan's long desired march toward democracy — persevering
through trials and tribulations to realize (in its own poli-
tical jargon) the "Dream of the Quaid i Azam." Mr. Bhutto
spoke of democracy, as he did of socialism, in the Islamic
context and tried to link the two concepts. At a public
meeting in Karachi, on Jan. 4, 1970, he said that his party
had always championed the cause of democracy. The struggle
for democracy was not averse to Islam. If there is no con-
flict between democracy and Islam, there should be no clash
between Islam and Musawaat (equality). Since Musawaat was
one of the cardinal principles of Islam, therefore, Pakis-
tan's economy should be based on socialism.
"^Public meetings addressed by Bhutto, especially in
September, were colored by such dramatic claims.
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Integral to the party image was its anti—regional
,
ant i~Parochial character. This was carefully worked into
the PPP strategy primarily because in the West Bhutto's
appeal could reach a wide range of people-regional and pro-
vincial differences notwithstanding. When speaking on the
subject, Bhutto's favorite refrain was:
To me every region and province of Pakistan is
equally dear and I will pay equal attention to
the development of all parts of the country and
prosperity of the people belonging to all classes
and sections in case my party comes to power.
Prominent leaders of the party often displayed disdain
for the various Fronts and alliances that emerged during the
campaign period. This was done to elevate the party image,
and claim that it was untarnished by smears of inter party
skirmishes and intrigues.
Bhutto often decried and denounced, what he called
"drawingroom" politics, and in speeches impregnated with
sarcasm, lashed out at politicians like G.M. Syed and their
"contrived alliances and Fronts." Bhutto's boast was that
he was not intimidated by such Fronts, and said that his
Front — the students — would inflict a crushing defeat
on all "anti people" alliances. He also alleged that the
parties forming such alliances were being financed by cap-
italists. Throughout the campaing, it was being stressed
by the PPP, that its success was certain because "nothing
^At a public meeting on Oct. 31, at Larkana.
but peoples' politics would triumph in Pakistan" — and
the PPP was the most sincere ally of the people.
An attempt was also made by the PPP officials to give
to the party, the distinction of a socio-political movement,
prompted by altruistic motives and sublime ideals. It must
be noted that all parties during an election aim at present-
ing a similar image. The strength of the PPP lay in Bhutto's
brilliant rhetoric which could be relied on to give an ele-
ment of substantiveness to election promises and infuse it
with an element of apparent sincerity. The PPP, so it was
claimed had no craving for power; the PPP decided to fight
elections only because it was determined to fight for the
people's rights. Dubious logic, though it might seem,
34
this was one of the key slogans of the party. At a public
meeting inKhairpur on May 18, 1970, Bhutto made the follow-
ing dramatic statement:
... the PPP is not here to beg you for votes.
Mere elections and votes will not build up a
strong and prosperous nation. If we had any
lust for power, we would not have quit the gov-
ernment. I did so when Ayub belayed the in-
terest of Pakistan at Tashkent.
The PPP ' s increasing threat to rightists, capitalists
and imperialists was often played up at public meetings.
Party leaders claimed that because its programme instilled
34Bhutto made this claim often. See "Details of
Bhutto's public meeting at Kahuta," in Dawn, July 6, 1970.
33 See Dawn
,
May 19, 1970.
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a feeling of fear and insecurity in all self seekers, many
PPP supporters were being persecuted. In public meetings
throughout September, Bhutto, complained that most people
serving political sentences belonged to the People's Party.
In the Pakistani mind, Bhutto is linked as the one
man who can stand up to India. This association was ex-
ploited to the maximum in the PPP campaign. Bhutto claimed
that India and Mrs. Gandhi felt threatened by the PPP popu-
larity. India had tried all kinds of maneuvers to deter
Bhutto from going to the United Nations when Kashmir was
being debated. At public meetings and press conferences,
Bhutto vowed that if his party came to power, he would make
India resolve outstanding disputes including Kashmir and
Farraka. He would not tolerate submission and humiliation
3 6
at the hands of India.
Issues and Themes of the PPP Election Campaign
The entire election campaign of 1970 was threatening
to spill over into left-right confrontation, with the ideo-
logy and Islam lovers and the "socialistic" parties on
opposite ends of a spectrum. In our reading, it was to
capitalize on this state of affairs that the PPP emphasized
Islamic Socialism as the pivot of its campaign, by providing
"^See public meetings addressed by Bhutto on March 8,
November 7.
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a compromise formula to the apparant priorities of both
kinds of voters — those preoccupied with earthly comforts
and those concerned with celestial salvation.
Islamic socialism was presented as the translation
of the egalitarian principles of Islam to the economic
realm. Only by this indigenous system, it was claimed,
could Pakistan banish poverty and the hated capitalism which
was eating up the vitals of society. Fearing that he would
be branded as the preacher of violent and radical doctrines,
Bhutto took the stand that he was not the innovator of the
concept. He was merely elaborating the doctrines of Quaid-
i-Azam, Jinnah, and following the dictates of his con-
science in preaching Islamic Socialism. To substantiate
his contention, he quoted from speeches made by Jinnah on
March 26, 1948, and his principal lieutenant, the late
Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan, on August 25,
1949 where they recommended the system of Islamic Socialism
.
37
in no unsure terms.
Bhutto offered Islamic Socialism to the people of
Pakistan, as the panaacea of all ills and the very elixir
of "democracy." It was the only effective tool through
which the exploitation by the hated capitalists — espec-
ially the 22 families could be terminated.
"Islam", juxterposed with Socialism, had the effect
^In Bhutto's TV broadcast, outlining the program of
his party, in November 1970.
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of rendering the anti Socialist and anti Bhutto outbursts
of the rightists rather effete. At almost every major pub-
lic meeting Bhutto took pains to impress on his audiences
that Socialism was a pristine principle embedded in the
of Islam. For the benefit of the masses, who were
wary of Western concepts like Socialism, Bhutto used in-
telligible similies. Thus simplified. Socialism seemed
more palatable to the masses, who failed to read the less
desirable implications in the concept.
Addressing a public meeting at Jhelum on January 21,
1970, Bhutto analogized:
Just as democracy is the English word for Jumhuriet,
similarly Socialism, means nothing but Musawat.
Islam is the greatest champion of Musawat, and
this equality my party wants to establish.
Bhutto reiterated that Socialism was an economic
method and that Islamic Socialism was essential for the
"glory" of Pakistan. His logic worked something like this:
Pakistan will not be able to play its rightful
role as the biggest Islamic republic unless its
people were relieved of economic misery. Our
party is advocating Islamic Musawat because it
wants the country to be strong and prosperous.
Our country cannot secure the right of self de-
termination for our oppressed Kashmiri brethren
or protect suffering Muslims in India, if it
was not strong internally. This is possible
only when fundamental changes have been made in
the economy to bai^sh feudalism and capitalism
from the society.
The ideology mongers had, during the campaign, alleged
O O
Bhutto addressing a public meeting at Jhelum on
January 21, 1970.
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that the PPP program threatened the sanctity of the ideo-
logy of Pakistan. Bhutto reacted, claiming that his party
was the "real protagonist of the ideology of Pakistan which
stood for complete social and economic justice for all and
39the sovereignty of the people" In the absence of any
clear cut definition of the oft invoked abstraction — the
ideology of Pakistan — every politician interpreted it
as profitably as he could. Bhutto's brand of ideology made
Islamic Socialism coterminous with it.
As a corrollary to Islamic socialism, Bhutto at
various public meetings promised a new era for the common
man where there would be land reforms, nationalization of
insurance companies and big industries, and equitable re-
40distribution of the resources of the land. Bhutto was
the first man who went further than anyone before him, or
any of his contemporaries, in registering his commitment
to improving the lot of the deprived and underprivileged
of Pakistan. In other words, through Islamic Socialism,
he claimed that he had a workable system to alleviate the
sufferings of the economic underdog.
It must be kept in mind that the "revolutionary"
changes he advocated were geared to the economic aspect of
39Bhutto speaking at a mamoth public meeting at
Lahore on March 8, 1970.
40Notably at public meetings on Jan. 4, Mar. 8, and
Nov. 4, 1970.
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life. His main target was not the (purely) social ethos of
Pakistan. Bhutto would preserve a substantial area of
social norms, from which derive certain beliefs and pre-
judices of the people. Not once in his campaign did Bhutto
think it wise or proper to speak up against the caste system
or Purdah (the custom of wearing a veil by Moslem women)
nor did he question the economic drain caused by thousands
of Pakistanis, going to Mecca for pilgrimages every year.
Aside from Islamic Socialism, there were other issues
and themes in the PPP agenda. In fact, during the entire
campaign period, Bhutto's role as an issue generator was
pivotal. A great many PPP contentions were challenged,
(or endorsed) by other political parties. Some of the
reactions that the PPP evoked will be registered later in
the chapter.
In East Pakistan, Mujibur Rehman ' s campaigning had
• 4. 41turned the election into a referendum on his six points.
This had its repercussions in the Western wing. Parties
with a regional character like the NAP (Wali) and Syed's
SUF
,
supported the demand for autonomy. Bhutto denounced
these West wing parties, which were thought to be taking a
soft line on the Six Points, and claimed that such divisive
forces threatened the integrity of Pakistan. Bhutto, a
^For a full discussion on the Six Points, see M.
Rashiduzzaman
,
"The Awami League in the Political Develop-
ment of Pakistan," Asian Survey , Berkeley, July 1970.
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Sindi had to retain the confidence of the Punjab, which
viewed with extreme suspicion, the East Pakistani bid for
autonomy. Bhutto, however, was extremely reluctant to be
dragged into a debate with Mujibur Rahman,
A leading Pakistani journal. Holiday
.
observed:
...significant in the present political context
is the Mujib - Bhutto relationship. Whatever
they may say in private neither Mujib nor Bhutto
has yet publicly criticized each other... They
have been maintaining a correct relationship.
Both of them it seems now realize that alone,
they can at best carry a region with them, but
would need each other to decide national issues. 4 ^
As has been discussed in the introduction chapter, the
three other issues that fomented constant controversy and
frequent agitations were the One Unit question, universal
adult franchize and the place of Islam in the Pakistan
polity. Yahya Khan eliminated the first two issues before
the campaign began by announcing his intentions to disband
the One Unit (a relic of the pre Ayub era) and by enfran-
43
chising the people of Pakistan. The Islam issue remained
tentatively "unsolved." Since the inception of Pakistan
the Islam controversy occupied, perhaps excessively, poli-
ticians and jurists within the country. Contending points
A ?Quoted in Dilip Mukherjee, Z. A. Bhutto , Quest for
Power
,
New Delhi: Vikas, 1972, p. 86.
4
^At zero hour on the morning of July 1, 1970, the
old provinces of Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan officially
reappeared on the Pakistan map, as West Pakistan said good-
bye to One Unit, an administrative cum political system,
which failed to withstand the test of time and never gained
the support and confidence of the people.
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of view were expressed and no satisfactory "solution" had
been reached. Each view had supporters to endorse it. No
referendum had been conducted to obtain a consensus of the
masses on the question of the influence that Islam should
exert on decision making in Pakistan politics. It is diffi-
cult to say whether such a referendum would have been
feasible if not practicable. At any rate, an abstract
assumption pervaded politics, that Pakistan being an Islamic
state would not pass any laws inimical to the "spirit of
Islam." That a variety of interpretations was possible had
a great deal to do with the demand for a more explicit and
tangible commitment incorporated into a constitution. [I
have discussed this in greater detail in the introductory
chapter.]
As was expected, the Islam question figured promin-
ently during the campaign of 1970. Most Pakistani politi-
cians had not yet outgrown the habit of using Islam as a
crutch to gain credibility. The greatest miscalculation
on their part was the failure to recognize, that (except
in extremely rural and relatively underdeveloped areas)
the market of 1970 did not demand such an emphasis on Islam.
The priorities had shifted to economic ones, and people
were more concerned with the requisites for staying alive
than a life hereafter. Credit should go to Bhutto for
correctly guaging the public mood. He never discredited
Islam, but he stressed the priorities in the same order
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that the masses would havs liked them to be strssssd.
Giving Islam constitutional sanctity was of little meaning
to a peasant who tilled the soil all day for a square meal.
In 1970, as the election results demonstrated, Islam had
ceased to be the "opiate of the people."
The right wing political parties^ seemed either ob-
livious to this fact or unwilling to accept it. Their
failure in 1970 was a clear pointer to their inability to
identify themselves with the hankering for change. How-
ever, by June, the rightist parties sensed the serious
challenge that the PPP platform presented. An effort was
made to work together to undermine Bhutto's strength, but
failed. By mid August, the prospects of forming a formid-
able United Front of all the Islamic parties, seemed in-
creasingly elusive. After a great deal of negotiations,
45
on Sept. 25, a semblance of a United Front was set up,
but by mid December, the wastefulness of the entire under-
taking was demonstrated, when efforts to put up a joint
4These include the Three Leagues and three of the
religion-oriented groups i.e., Pakistan Jamiat Ulema-e-
Islam and Nizam-e-Islam
,
Jamaat-e-Islami
,
Markazi Jamaat
i Ahle Hadith. The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, although a group
of Ulema, was left of centre orv economic matters, and coop-
erated with Bhutto's PPP and more so with Wali Khan's NAP
in Baluchistan and NWFP
.
A R
The Front comprised PDP
,
the Jamaat-e-Islami,
Markaze i Jamiat Ahle Hadith and splinter groups like
Maul ana Gulzar Ahmad Muzhari
,
Jamiat Ittehadul Ulema,
Pakistan Sunni Tanzeem, Jamiat Ihya i Millat and Jamaat
Ghurabea Ahle i Hadith.
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candidate by the Islam loving political parties against the
PPP in Lahore constituency No. 1 failed. 46 The Ulema (reli-
gious leaders) however, did succeed in passing a fatwa
(decree) against Bhutto, declaring Socialism unlslamic.
This undoubtedly elicited angered responses from Bhutto.
While the Islam Pasands expended much energy negotiating,
Bhutto was busy consolidating and clarifying his stand
vis a vis Islam.
The performance of the Islam pasands became an issue
in the PPP campaign. Many rightist parties sought to dis-
credit Socialism, with the battle cry of "Islam in Danger."
The PPP, on the other hand, argued that it was not Islam
that faced a threat of anihilation; rather it was capitalism
and the system of monopolies that would be threatened if
the PPP should succeed.
Addressing a mamoth public meeting at Larkana on Feb.
23, 1970, Bhutto emphasized just this theme and went on to
say that the PPP wanted to establish a democratic social
order. Those who said that Islam was in danger lacked faith
in the promise and authority of the Almighty. He condemned
those who frequently levelled shameful charges of "kafir"
(infidel) against Muslims. The same class of Maulanas
(religious leaders) who were accusing him (Bhutto) of being
46Two candidates, Mian Abdul Khaliq (CML) and Mian
Mohammed Farooq (Ind.) were contacted; but no one acceptable
compromise could be reached. Bhutto later referred to this
division in ranks, various times with pungent sarcasm.
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a kafir had said the same about Sir Syed Ahmad Khan,
Iqbal
,
and the Quaid—e—Azam. He went on to clarify
that the socialism pleaded by his party differed from
Russian and Chinese communism. The socialism of Islam meant
equality, and in Pakistan, socialism could be practiced in
accordance with the basic tenets of Islam. Pakistan, Mr.
Bhutto went on to claim, was not achieved for the well
being of the few, but for the benefit of all living there.
While the right wing parties rallied together against
the PPP
,
Bhutto went all out to challenge the image of
patriotic fervour that they wished to build for themselves.
He mounted all kinds of attacks and systematically went
about casting doubts about his opponents' devotion and sin-
cerity to Pakistan. He claimed a host of things, including
that some (rightist) parties were the agents of Imperialist
powers and were working toward keeping Pakistan at a de-
grading level of development. He also alleged that some
of the religious oriented parties had vehemently opposed
the creation of Pakistan. These elements, Mr. Bhutto
claimed, were working toward the detriment of Pakistan.
The campaign in the West also focussed on demands for
social justice which had brought students and workers into
the streets in the upsurge against Ayub Khan not surprisingly.
Ayub Khan figured prominently in the election campaign of
most parties. In him they found a convenient scapegoat, and
chose to blame all the ills of the system on him. His con-
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ifout i ons to Pakistan (few though they were) never received
mention. Qayyum Khan, an inveterate foe, demanded the
freezing of Ayub Khan's family bank account, charging that
the money was being used to influence the compaign. Others
like Asghar Khan alleged that Ayub was trying to get his
sycophants elected. All parties tilted their lances against
the old "tyrant," who according to them had reduced the
country to shambles. Bhutto and the PPP went one step
further. Bhutto claimed sole credit for spearheading the
anti Ayub movement, and focussed on the risks he ran in the
undertaking.
Bhutto's role in the upsurge against Ayub cannot be
underestimated. During those days of resentment and un-
certainty, it was to Bhutto that the students and workers
flocked for leadership and direction. Bhutto's subsequent
arrest by Ayub only enhanced his value in the minds of the
people. In 1970, this was an issue that the PPP could ex-
ploit to the maximum, since it was not likely to be dis-
missed as a dubious claim. Bhutto at a public meeting in
Quetta on June 15, 1970 remarked that Ayub Khan had made
attempts to end his life, and had ultimately put him behind
bars. These were the kind of speeches that dramatized the
PPP campaign, and ornamented it with that extra sensation-
alism which attracts extra large crowds.
An often stressed theme of the PPP campaign was the
dependence of workable political institutions on the con—
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sent of the people. The Pakistani voter, deprived so long
of political rights was attracted to this idea like a nomad
to an oasis. Bhutto played on this theme at many well
attended public meetings. A classic example was one he
addressed at Kahuta, near Rawalpindi on July 8, 1970 where
Bhutto said that the constitution to be a success has to
be an Awami Constitution. Previous constitutions had
foundered because they lacked the people's consent. His
party had decided to fight the coming elections because it
was determined to fight for the people's cause. 47 At Lahore
on February 14, he declared, "let it be made clear that the
will of the people will prevail."
The economic program of the PPP was highlighted at
various public meetings and the party's commitment to the
uplift of the masses registered. During the campaign it
pledged to continue its struggle against feudalism and cap-
italism, and to establish a democratic rule which benefitted
the peasants, workers and other suffering sections of the
country. Bhutto reiterated at various public meetings that
while people had been groaning under the shakles of capita-
lism for twenty three years, only 22 families in Pakistan
had ammassed wealth and had deprived the toiling masses of
the basic necessities of life. While all parties, had
during the campaign tilted their lances against the so-called
47Dawn
,
Karachi, July 9, 1970.
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forces of capitalism and exploitation, the PPP was the only
party that projected an underlying commitment of taking
from the rich to give to the poor. Bhutto's "Robin Hood"
image was gratifying to those who had ceased to view their
condition as the "will of the Almighty," and who recognized
the causes of their deprivation. At a public meeting at
Rawalpindi on Sept. 1, the PPP chief claimed:
We would ensure that those rolling in wealth are
brought down to a reasonable level and the poor
lifted up.
The PPP promised better working conditions for labor
and claimed that it would make the workers and peasants
"owners of mills and lands." Bhutto gave assurance that
his party would make education up to matric — free, pro-
vide free medical aid to farmers and laborers and increase
the salaries of the low paid employees of the government.
All these would be achieved with the introduction of Isla-
mic socialism.
At a meeting at Quetta on June 12, Bhutto reiterated
that elections alone could not provide a solution to the
problems faced by millions who were subjected to what he
called economic exploitation at the hands of the capitalists.
"Unless people were happy and contented," he said, at Lyalpur
on January 31, "raising of slogans, elections and the writing
of constitutions would be of little use."
A West wing PPP leader, Mubashir Hasan, called for
scrapping the Fourth Five Year Plan (introduced in 1970).
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He protested that there was a direct confrontation between
the wishes of the planners and the aspirations of the people.
It was aimed at producing a super class of capitalists that
could control the country politically. Hasan demanded a
total break from the imperialist yoke of economic exploita-
tion of the economy from monopoly capitalism and feudalism,
and finally a total mobilization of the masses and basing
the plan on manpower instead of capital. Bhutto was pru-
dent enough to direct such explicit attacks on the Estab-
lishment through other party leaders, refraining from open
personal involvement in these matters. Should the need
arise he could easily dissociate himself from the acts and
comments of other PPP workers. The PPP image was so closely
allied in the minds of the electorate with Bhutto, that an
unsavoury incident involving him directly would have affected
the party adversely.
The PPP pioneered the demand for the release of all
political prisoners. Often, Bhutto went so far as claiming
that the PPP decision to contest the election was condi-
tional upon the release of political prisoners. He also
made the assertion that most of those held were active
workers and supporters of the People's Party. Bhutto held
out the threat of launching a mass movement if release were
denied.
As has been mentioned earlier, in addition to claiming
that certain ministers were aiding and abetting the oppo-
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nents of the PPP
,
Bhutto carried on a running war with the
National Press Trust. His protestations were woven into
the campaign, and sometimes took the dimensions of a theme.
In fact, this war continued, and one of Bhutto's first acts
as President was to terminate the appointment of Habibullah,
Chief of the NPT, and L. A. Suleri
,
Chief editor of Pakis-
tan Times
,
and Ghauri, Resident editor of the Morning News.
Many a party like the Awami League and the NAP(Wali)
expressed serious misgivings about the authentication
clause of the LFO — enough to include it as an issue in
their campaigns. Bhutto made only nominal references to
it. On April 12, 1970 at a public meeting in Karachi, he
alluded to the LFO and politely reminded the President that
should he refuse to authenticate the constitution placed
before him by the elected representatives of the people,
he would be violating the democratic principles which he
himself had enunciated in the LFO. A month later on May 9,
when asked about his views on the LFO at a Press conference,
Bhutto brushed it aside saying that his party was still dis-
cussing the question of authentication and sovereignty.
While the Jamaat-e-Islami
,
and PDP campaigned in favor
of the restoration of the constitution of 1956, Bhutto re-
jected it outright. He said that he was in favor of a
Federal Structure. The greatest defect of the 1956 Consit-
tution was that it provided two provinces. While a truly
Federal one would provide for at least three provinces. He
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was also in favor of a bicameral legislature. The creation
of on upper chamber was not merely to balance the popula—
ti°n representation from East Pakistan. It was the basic
requirement of the principle of equality of federated states.
Bhutto registered his strong opposition to the system of
parity as embodied in the One Unit Scheme. He said that
he was in favour of voting on the constitution by a simple
majority. This was the exact antithesis of his later stance
demanding a two third majority vote. Bhutto probably did
not anticipate the landslide victory that Mujibur Rehman
emerged with. Mu jib would have carried a simple majority,
and Bhutto would have had to be content with playing second
fiddle. The Bangla Desh debacle, fortunately for Bhutto,
averted such a state of affairs from coming to pass.
Foreign policy figured prominently in the election
campaign; and foreign policy was Bhutto's forte. Here he
was in his elements. His earlier assignment as Foreign
Minister proved to be both a liability and an asset in 1970.
His opponents alluded to his erstwhile position to demon-
strate that Bhutto was once a trusted lieutenant of Ayub,
and being a political opportunist was now merely clipping
his sails according to the breeze. His brilliance, however,
in the realm of foreign policy could not be denied. Foreign
^These views were expressed by Bhutto on Jan. 7, at
a Karachi Bar Association meeting and Jan. 19, March 26,
at Peshawar and Hyderabad.
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policy debate afforded fertile ground for him to strike
the stance of confrontation — a role which he relished
and in which he excelled.
Several parties demanded Pakistan's withdrawal from
SEATO and CENTO, but this was flogging a dead horse, since
Pakistan had been entering only a token presence at the
meetings of these organizations since 1956. The mood was
in favour of a bold but practical slant in foreign policy.
The public sentiment was definitely anti American. The
PPP went all out to capitalize on the prevailing mood.
Bhutto reminded the people, that he had been the uncompro-
mising, undaunted champion of an "independent foreign policy."
At a public meeting in Khairpur, on May 18, giving
an account of his accomplishments as foreign minister, Bhutto
said, that he gave Pakistan an independent foreign policy
and "maintained on an equal footing, relations with other
countries." Due to this policy, he claimed, the Indian
government was compelled to elect a Muslim Head of State.
Bhutto offered the assurance that if his party came
to power, it would never let Pakistan get inveigled into
imperialist clutches. It would also make every effort to
safeguard Pakistan's internal policies from foreign inter-
ference. At a large public meeting at Lyallpur on Jan. 31,
Bhutto had asserted that previous governments had taken
directions from the U.S. and nothing was done to promote
relations with the Soviet Union, China, and African and
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Asian countries, with the result that Pakistan's prestige
abroad had suffered. As Pakistan's foreign minister he had
raised Pakistan's status in the comity of other nations to
the highest level. Bhutto was also arguing in favor of
closer links with Muslim countries.
China was brought into the campaign by Sarfaraz Khan
of the PDP. He claimed that Bhutto was making irrespon-
sible and jingoistic statements at China's behest, and
charged the Chinese with making lavish use of money to in-
fluence Pakistani political developments. There were coun-
ter accusations that the United States embassy was supply-
ing funds to certain rightist parties. The charge became
briefly an election issue with the PPP
,
the Hazarvi group
of the Ulema, and the NAP (Wali) demanding the recall of
the U.S. ambassador.
Vis a vis India, the Awami League, and the two NAPs
in essence expressed interest in a peaceful and just solu-
tion of the Kashmir dispute. Other parties were in favor
of continuing confrontation with India. Daultana argued
that the concept of Pakistan was incomplete without the
freedom of Kashmir. Qayyum Khan took a more hawkish posi-
tion declaring that his party would strive for the libera-
tion of Jammu and Kashmir, by all possible means. The
Jamaat—e— I si ami ' s stand was relatively bland. It argued
that Kashmir, Farakka barrage and the persecution of Indian
Muslims were outstanding disputes which had to be solved
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before normalized relations with India could be
resumed.
The most strident stance was Bhutto's. He interjected
a good deal of rhetoric against India, and it was Bhutto's
posture on these issues that made the strongest impression
on the electorate. The voters were aware of his record as
a consistent and fiery advocate of the policy of confronta-
tion. At a reception at the Karachi Bar Association on Jan.
7, 1970, Bhutto talked about India's "nefarious designs"
and reiterated that Pakistanis as a nation would not mind
fighting for 1,000 years. Yet, he cautioned the people of
Pakistan that the country could not secure the right of
self determination for "oppressed Kashmiri brethren" or
protect suffering Muslims in India until it was strong in-
ternally. This was possible only when fundamental changes
had been made in the economy to banish feudalism and capi-
talism from the society. "We will not allow the Kashmir
issue to be forgotten," he said at a public meeting in
Jhelum on Jan. 21, 1970.
Bhutto blamed Pakistan's failure to secure Kashmir
on Ayub Khan's inability to take bold action. He took the stand
that during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, Pakistan had
let slip an opportunity of liberating Jammu and Kashmir,
which according to him, was almost vacated by the Indian
army. If something had been done then, Bhutto said, the
world would have said that the right of a people had been
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restored. Cynically referring to Ayub, he said
our Shahsavar (equestrian) was sitting in Hunza
at the time of the Sino-Indian conflict and later
said that if Pakistan liberated.Kashmir
,
world
opinion would turn against her.
Bhutto said, he was ready to "own" the charge that he
"engineered" the war with India in 1965 after making sure
of China's political support. Mr. Bhutto accused Field
Marshal Ayub Khan of accepting a cease fire in the Rann of
Kutch "under foreign pressure" on the plea that there should
not be a fight for a piece of desert.
A retired Air Marshal, Nur Khan, who had entered
politics and was contesting elections under the CML banner
disputed Bhutto's claims. He stated "It was we [military
leaders] who wanted the war in 1965.] He accused Bhutto
of supporting Ayub in his decision to restrain the military
when India was locked in battle with China across the
Himalayas in 1962.
Bhutto focused public attention on his role in bring-
ing about a beneficial friendship with China, claiming that
it gave a realistic angle to Pakistan's foreign policy.
This was no hollow boast. Bhutto was the first to articu-
late publicly in 1968 that neither the USA nor the Soviet
Union was really interested in helping Pakistan to secure
satisfaction from India. "The People's Republic of China
^At a public meeting in Rawalpindi on January 11, 1970.
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is the only country," he said, "which will be sympathetic
to Pakistan's real requirements. This is because that
country's interests in the subcontinent coincide with those
of Pakistan." 50
The Tashkent Declaration, next to Islamic Socialism,
seemed to be a central theme of Bhutto's campaign. It
figured in many of the public meetings he addressed, es-
pecially those in the Punjab. In answer to critics who
viewed with cynicism Bhutto's "newly found" opposition to
the Tashkent Declaration, he claimed that he had offered
his resignation on three occasions after Tashkent, but was
told not to desert Pakistan at a time of serious crisis.
This was why he held back until mid-June. This claim has
been upheld by independent observers like Nevil Maxwell, 5 "*"
who points out that there was growing divergence between
Ayub Khan and his erstwhile protege, Bhutto, over foreign
policy. Whatever reservations Bhutto may have had about
the outcome of Tashkent he defended it at the time and
claimed that it did not detract one iota from Pakistan's
resolve to seek a just solution of the Kashmir dispute. How-
ever, he had reportedly leaked it out to the press that he
and Ayub were at odds over Tashkent. After resigning from
Ayub's cabinet, he threatened that he would disclose the
50 See Mukherjee, op. cit .
,
p. 53.
51 See The Times
,
London, 14 November, 1968.
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Tashkent secrets
,
implying that Ayub had made a secret deal
with Shastri. In 1970, Bhutto claimed at a public meeting
in Khairpur on May 18:
If we had any lust for power, we would not have
quit the government. I did so when Ayub betrayed
the interests of Pakistan at Tashkent.
Again, at various public meetings, he announced that he was
bent upon exposing to the people "the story of the Tashkent
Declaration." If there were such secrets, they never came
into the open in 1970. At one such meeting at Peshawar on
January 19, when the crowds demanded that he disclose the
"Tashkent secret," Bhutto suggested that he was under gov-
ernmental pressure to remain silent. "Why are we being
gagged," he pleaded, "in spite of our solemn promise not
to reveal anything contrary to national interest... The
people of Pakistan have a right to know how they were be-
trayed." These Bhuttonian tactics, impregnated as they
were, with a flair for the dramatic, attracted crowds to
PPP public meetings.
Bhutto claimed that in 1965, the then President had
promised the United States not to send him to the United
Nations, where the Indo-Pakistan conflict was being dis-
cussed. However, he had flown to the U.N., although India
had sent men to kill him and despite serious odds, he
(Bhutto) had spoken his mind and the hearts of all those
present went out to Pakistan. The anti India theme, was
thus heavily stressed. Bhutto went to great lengths to
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suggest that Mrs. Gandhi had often registered her disa-
pproval of him. The reason being, that he was a threat to
India's nefarious designs.
Favorite Slogans of the PPP Campaign
Party slogans are an inescapable part of campaigning.
They appear conspicuously painted on billboards and even
walls of public buildings. They are woven into the speeches
of party members. In South Asia, they are chanted by party
enthusiasts and supporters moving in a procession and when
emotions are high are even shouted into microphones. In
South Asia, probably more than anywhere else, they are
viewed as the essentials that infuse a party campaign with
life and vigor.
The slogans used by the PPP were numerous and we shall
discuss them here.
The PPP promise of " Roti Kapra Makan , (food, clothing
and shelter) was louder than that of any other party, and
was perhaps the most often repeated slogan.
Another slogan often used by the PPP was that it
would launch a Jehad (a Holy War in Muslim polemics) against
capitalism and the agents of exploitation. PPP members
argued that the polls were only part of a bigger struggle
launched by the party for the uplift of the poor masses.
While addressing a public meeting in a relatively backward
area (SWAT) in the NWFP , on Sept 10, Bhutto said:
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Islam enjoins every Musalmaan to wage a jehad
against all forms of aggression and injustice.
He asked all the people to join hands with his party in
this Jehad.
Another related slogan of the PPP was that political
freedom was meaningless without economic freedom
.
Bhutto never ceased telling the people that he con-
sidered no sacrifice too great for the glory of Pakistan
.
and that PPP members were willing to shed the last drop of
blood for the country. Jingoistic slogans are still di-
gested well almost all the world over; the difference being
one of degree. While a Nixon would defend American Honor,
the political culture of Pakistan demanded a more dramatic
and vociferous expression of patriotism. The committment
to a thousand years of war with India over Kashmir was
another slogan in this category, that the PPP employed.
As a retaliatory stance to undermine the Islam Pasands
expressed disquiet over Islamic socialism in their Islam
in Danger slogan, the PPP used the Capitalism in Danger
slogan. Islam, it claimed, was always safe in Pakistan
since it was a Muslim State.
As an alternative to Islam Pasand, the PPP declared
itself as an Awam-Pasand (people loving) party. The PPP
popularity demonstrated that political symbols in themselves,
without necessarily being qualified by Islamic connotations
were beginning to register with a greater section of the
people. Islamic qualifications were desirable — but not
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indispensible
.
Another favorite slogan of the PPP was that nothing
but people 1 s politics will triumph in Pakistan
. The party
decried what it described as the "Drawing room politics" in
which its opponents indulged. While this discredited some
older politicians by branding them as behind—the—scene
manipulators, it gave to the PPP image an aura of openness
in its dealings.
One of the most popular refrains of the PPP was its
party credo:
Islam is our Faith, Democracy is our Polity,
Socialism our Economy, and All Power to the
People
.
It can be said that all PPP slogans grew as offshoots of
this essential theme.
The Campaign Style of the PPP
Sensationalism was an important tool of the PPP cam-
paign style. It proved to be that extra element that sus-
tains the interest of all sections of the audience at a
political meeting. Integral to this style was the conspiracy
theme that the People's Party emphasized. Party leaders,
notably Bhutto, claimed that "sinister plots were being
hatched to impede people's movements launched under the
PPP banner." Bhutto claimed that "capitalists and imper-
ialists had created a conspiracy" to defeat him in the
forthcoming elections.
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At other times he suggested that India had conspired
with Super powers to try and keep him out of office. He
claimed that certain countries were trying to influence
the elections in Pakistan, and were being aided and abetted
by parties that were against the creation of Pakistan (an
inference to the Jamaat e Islami, and its chief, Maulara
Maudoodi ) . The only other party that stressed the con-
spiracy theme was the Qayyum Muslim League — but it was
to a much lesser extent.
Another manifestation of the sensationalist style of
the PPP campaign was the exaggeration and dramatization of
incidents involving the party. March 30, 1970, witnessed
a serious clash between the followers of the Pir of Paqaro
(a popular divine) and PPP processionists, at Sanghar, the
stronghold of the Pir. A PPP member was killed but Bhutto
escaped without any injuries. At a public meeting in
Hyderabad on April 1, Bhutto said "the attack was pre-
meditated, pre-planned, and cold blooded to murder me."
He claimed that the events had proven beyond doubt that it
was a massive deep rooted conspiracy to eliminate him and
his friends. Never before had he escaped death as closely
as he did at Sanghar.
Bhutto saw an imperialist plot behind the tragic in-
cident in November 1970 in which an employee of Pakistan
Internation Airlines (PIA), shouting "Death to the Commu-
nists" deliberately charged his truck into a VIP reception
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line killing Zygfrid Wolniak, Poland's Deputy Foreign
Minister, then on a visit to Pakistan. The Pakistan Inter-
national Airlines (PIA) was at the time dominated by Jamaat-
e-Islami supporters — perenial critics of Bhutto.
He claimed that during the three years of his politi-
cal wilderness his "enemies — external and internal —
hatched conspiracies" against him and even tried to elimi-
nate him. The treatment meted out to him was a long story,
and he and his friends had suffered greatly.
The PPP used simple intelligible similies (identifying
democracy with "Jamhuriat" and socialism with "Musawat" ) to
make its platform comprehensible to the masses and to re-
late it with their aspirations. In addition to Islamic
symbols, the PPP identified itself with certain other poli-
tical symbols that had gained wide acceptance by the poli-
tical culture of Pakistan. Whenever the opportunity pre-
sented itself, PPP leaders invoked the Father of the Nation
— the Quaid-i-Azam, and a beloved Prime Minister, Liaqat
Ali Khan as the foremost champions of the socialism that
was embodied in the PPP manifesto.
As discussed earlier, Bhutto displayed a kind of
charisma that was new to Pakistani politics. The political
"elite" had traditionally followed the British-Indian
bureacratic and Sandhurst models. Bhutto's style embodied
the handshaking, back slapping, baby kissing techniques
that were reflected in certain American election campaigns.
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It also accomodated the religious sentiments of the people.
These were reflected in Bhutto's much publicized visits to
Jinnah's mausoleum and prayers during festivals like Id,
with a band of PPP workers and followers.
Another manifestation of the PPP style was an expres-
sion of confidence at times bordering on defiance. Bhutto
challenged his opponents like a swordsman challenges to a
duel. He defied M. A. Khuhro, a one time chief minister
of Sindh to contest the Larkana seat (a constituency that
has traditionally returned Khuhro), against him. He chal-
lenged the Islam Pasands to reveal their strength in terms
of influence vis-a-vis the People's Party. He warned the
agents of "imperialism and capitalism" to watch their step,
since the people now backed him and his party. Bhutto's
style related to the Pakistani mass value system. . For in-
stance, the challenge tactics incorporates the common man's
regard for "courage," "manliness," "fearlessness," and
other related "virtues."
Mudslinging
,
was employed by most parties in the
election campaign. The PPP, however, out did almost every
party to the point of being (what would be considered by
the 'sophisticated' elite) ruthless. Very few opponents
escaped the PPP insults and allegations. When some indi-
viduals associated with the Islam Pasand parties sought to
discredit Bhutto, he left it to his Mullah (priest) Kausar
Niazi, to dig up scandals about rival mullahs. (Niazi was
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a one time Jamaat-e-Islami member, but quit, following a
quarrel with its leadership.) Bhutto made the chief of the
Jamaat-e-Islami a frequent target of attack. He cast doubts
on Maudoodi's devotion to Pakistan, and claimed that he
was now trying to suppress the rights of the people by
being sympathetic to capitalists. Bhutto's ire was partly
due to the fact that Maudoodi had been in the forefront to
propogate the "Islam in Danger" slogans.
Others too became the target of Bhutto's attacks and
insinuations. Daultana, he said, was an avowed communist
in his early career, but had switched political allegiences
to suit his ends — a rather bold allegation, considering
that the title of "turncoat" would be more befitting to
Bhutto himself. Qayyum Khan, he claimed, was "chicken
hearted. He did not have the courage to oppose ex-presi-
dent Ayub's dictatorship and instead retired from political
life... He emerged to the political surface only after he
was sure that the people's struggle had shattered the dic-
5 2
tatorship." Of Asghar Khan, an ex-Air Marshall who had
entered politics, Bhutto commented that the former, had
been changing his views and platforms and was a "political
novice" without any convictions. "What was the need of
entering politics," Bhutto asked, "for a man whose services
were not needed in his own profession."
52At a public meeting in Karachi on Nov. 21, 1970.
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The comment is interesting in view of Asghar Khan's
political career. He had emerged on the political scene,
when Bhutto was arrested in 1967 and had cast his lot with
the anti Ayub forces and many at the time, saw him as a
far more serious challenge to Ayub than Bhutto.
Commenting on the trading of insults, a Pakistani
writer, Mushtaq Ahmad, commented:
Villification and abuse took the place of argu-
ment and discussion. Incitement and vituperation
were carried beyond the propriety of debate,
in which even loyalties to the state were ques-
tioned. It was a philosophy of h^e totally
alien to the spirit of democracy. J
This definitely reflects an elitist view of what should
constitute the "rules of the game." In this context, Pakis-
tani mass value orientations must not be forgotten. Mud-
slinging for example, caters to Pakistani ideas of personal
honor. The distinction between a "political opponent" and
an "enemy" has not been drawn in the minds of the masses,
yet. Charges of being unpatriotic relate to the Pakistani
political tradition since 1947, which branded opponents as
traitors and reflected a tendency to identify one's party
with the state. It also gives vent to Pakistan's perennial
insecurity vis-a-vis India. To be branded pro-India is
tantamount to political suicide in Pakistan. There is
another dimension to the phenomenon of mudslinging in the
53Quoted in Mukherjee, op. cit. p. 70.
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Pakistani context. Considering that the country had not
received the political education that successive elections
bring with them, such exchanges were inescapable. It is
also possible that the politician had been particularly
insensitive to a transition of attitudes that was taking
place in Pakistan i.e. that the masses were increasingly
beginning to relate to politics as issue oriented as opposed
to the traditional personality oriented form. It is also
conceivable that even though the politicians did sense the
change to some measure, they were unwilling to take any
chances. They could not draw on any previous election
trends for guidelines. No sample surveys were conducted
and few parties were willing to lose votes in order to
54 ...
carry on an "education function." The politicians saw
mudslinging as a requirement in soliciting votes and con-
verting the undecided, and used it sometimes, unsparingly.
The success of the PPP lay in the fact that while it paid
attention to the "personality angle," while criticizing
opponents, it placed primary emphasis in framing issues
that articulated the aspirations of the people.
54Some parties like the NAP(W) did recognize the need
for change. Wali complained that the leadership that
emerged in 1970 were stereotyped and used formulae that
were applicable 23 years back.
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The Reactions to the Campaign of the PPP
Starting around June of 1970, most parties began to
feel that Bhutto was a force to be contended with. They
observed how crowds flocked to hear him speak even in their
strongholds and were apprehensive. By November, almost all
parties were attacking Bhutto; but they did not go about it
in an organized manner. Their criticisms of Bhutto seemed
rather feeble and belated. In any event they were nowhere
near as vociferous as their opponent. The failure of the
Islam Pasands to unite against Bhutto also proved a definite
drawback. Most party campaigns had reached their peak a
little too early and seemed watered down as election day
neared. The PPP campaign was gruelling throughout. Had
the opponents of Bhutto concentrated more on areas that he
had partially neglected, things could have been different.
In any event they did register their disapproval and a
revelation will provide an insight into what the "opposite
camp" felt about the PPP and its leader. It will be inter-
esting to observe whether their attacks were merely person-
ality oriented or issue oriented.
We have tried to present a spectrum of reactions
and have attempted as far as possible to adhere to the
actual text.
Bhutto is neglecting the sacrifices of ten lakhs
(1 million) of Muslims in espousing the creation
of an unlslamic society. He is creating disunity
in the youth, by raising false and deceptive slo-
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gans. He remained the right hand of Ayub for
ten years, but never thought of giving land to
Haris and Kisans after snatching it from big
Zamindars. He is now duping them for his selfish
ends. Mr. Bhutto, everyday in his speeches be-
fools people about Tashkent but never dared to
expose the real drama played there... The society
advocated by Bhutto is entirely against Islamic
traditions. In India Mrs. Gandhi is shouting
slogans of socialism, while in Pakistan Mr. Bhutto
is raising the same slogans...
[Qayyum Khan, President Pakistan
Muslim League at a public meeting
at Multan, Sept. 10, 1970.]
Why did Mr. Bhutto who is now posing as the
saviour of students, keep quiet when students
who protested against Tashkent were fired at?
Shaukat Hayat ( CML ) at public
meeting at Muree
,
June 20.
Mr. Bhutto was the great exponent of autocratic
rule in the country and extended unquestioned
support to Ayub... the PPP stands for socialism
based on aethism.
M . A . Khuhro (CML) addressing
party workers in Larkana, July 9.
Bhutto... is making erratic and self contradic-
tory statements which are creating confusion in
the public mind, and his slogan of socialism is
another attempt to import alien ideologies into
Pakistan
.
Nasrullah Khan (PDP) at Hyderabad
June 19, 1970.
Socialist ideology will lead to disintegration
...Instead of giving the people their daily needs
as it says it will, socialism will snatch away
what they have. ...No sane person can call
socialism a system akin to Islam. . . we will launch
a movement against anti Islamic systems.
Mian Tufail Ahmad ( Jamaat-e-Islami
)
at Lahore, March 1, 1970.
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...Socialism is a fraudulent idea that has lost
its efficacy... and Islam is a potent force thet
has been giving a fight to one or the other "ism"
for over 1,400 years.
Maulana Thanvi (Jamiatul Ulema i
Pakistan) in Hyderabad, Jan. 6, 1970
Asghar Khan of the Tehaik i Istiqlal party, conveyed in
most speeches that there was no more than "complicity and
duplicity in the political life of Bhutto." He told a
press conference on Sept. 10 that Bhutto was actively
trying to create chaos and confusion "in a bid to come back
into power through the back door."
The leftist NAP(W) maintained a discreet silence
about Bhutto and the PPP. The Jamiatul Ulema i Islam
(Hazarvi group) while it was definitely a religion-oriented
party was the sole endorser of the PPP economic platform.
Mufti Mahmud, general secretary of the party said:
Socialism has a foreign ideology, but Islamic
socialism has stood^or Social justice based on
Islamic ideology...
A prominent section of the intelligensia
,
the lawyers,
however, viewed the Bhuttonian tactics and the PPP platform
and promises with growing disquiet and disdain. Another,
larger section of the intelligensia, the student, gave a
large part of their support to the PPP and the party was
happier for it. Students figured prominently in the PPP
processions and were actively involved in the door to door
canvassing in the last stages of the campaign.
55 See Dawn
,
January 4, 1970.
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Conclusion
This chapter has primarily been a detailed narrative
of the PPP election campaign, based on our observations.
An attempt has been made to interpret the motives behind
its formulation and manifestations.
The deeper theoretical considerations that arise from
the success of such a campaign and the socio- political
determinants that contributed to its formulation and success
will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. Any definition
or interpretation of the role of a party, in the process of
politicization of a society in transition — whatever the
nature of that role may be — must be based on empirical
evidence. This chapter attempts to provide such an evi-
dence .
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CHAPTER IV
THE ELECTORATE RESPONSE TO THE PPP
Introduction
The elections of 1970, in their actual conduct and
their results, proved beyond doubt that the people of
Pakistan were ready to participate in a democratic process,
thereby refuting the Ayubian dictum that democracy is not
suited to their "genius."
The elections were significant for they demonstrated
that the Pakistani "genius" had begun to look at political
processes differently. The people of Pakistan were saying
anew, through the voting process, that political life must
be maintained, not be accident or force, but by rational
judgement and free choice. They were saying anew, that
officials could not be self-appointed, but must be picked
by the people according to certain specified methods.
They were saying anew and effectively, that political power
does not dwell in perpetuity in a distinctive governing
group but is transmitted by the people for a term of years
to a provisional governing personnel. They were saying
anew that the authority transmitted to officials is not
boundless. In short, the elections demonstrated that a
period of public quiescence had come to a close in Pakistani
politics
.
What we wish to emphasize here is that political devel-
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opment strikes at the roots of the people's beliefs and
sentiments about politics and hence, the process of develop-
ment must be profoundly affected by the character of the
political culture 1 of a society. It is our contention that
the elections amply illustrate a process of evolution where-
by the political culture of Pakistan is changing complexion.
This does not involve the assumption that all of the com-
ponents of the previous political value structure are being
indiscriminately discarded. We mean to suggest that a pro-
cess of change is at work whereby, certain beliefs are
being increasingly de-emphasized and newer determinants are
being absorbed. The new values of political participation,
for example, will replace gradually the older attitudes
supporting political deference. The traditional Pakistani
attitude toward authority is worth mention here. The "older"
political values were reflections of essentially feudalistic
relationships. Power was deployed upon a patron-dependent
basis. In a village for example, the "lowly folk" would
approach one held in high esteem by the village when they
wished to undertake almost any transaction — perhaps in-
volving village sanction, the consent of the village leaders,
or a boon from the landlord. The patron assisted his depen-
1We subscribe here to Sidney Verba 's definition of
political culture, as the system of empirical beliefs, ex-
pressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in
in which political action takes place, and which provides
the subjective orientation to politics.
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dent in return for a specific "douceur," but also in order
to maintain a fund of loyalty so that in any dispute or
struggle for power, he would be able to mobilize a following
which would demonstrate his ascendancy. This tradition of
loyalty and unquestioned obedience in the client-patron
relationship, when translated into the political sphere,
contributed to a viewing of government as a dome of absolute
authority suspended high above "ordinary folk." Thus, while
there existed an implicit expectation that rulers should be
just, it was compromised by the idea that rulers know their
business best — resulting in an overall absence of the
value of public accountability. However, with the politi-
cization that took place during the independence movement
on the Indian sub-continent, more specific expectations of
government began to evolve. Although, the patron-client
relationship was not totally discarded, the idea began to
take shape that the patron too had certain obligations
towards his client, in return for loyalty and obedience.
The political culture of a nation derives among other
things, from the experiences that individuals have had with
the political process. While this is not the sole deter-
minant, it is an important variable that affects political
culture. The attitudes towards governmental output — the
expectations that exist, and the satisfaction derived from
it — will obviously be affected by what output the govern-
ment produces. It is in this context that "handling of
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the crises discussed in the first chapter becomes relevant.
That they have greatly contributed to the current change
in the political culture of Pakistan — particularly in the
attitudes towards political participation — is obvious.
Sidney Verba has suggested that the political sociali-
zation process is linked to the "learning experiences by
which a political culture is passed on from generation to
generation, and to situations under which political cultures
2
change." Such a trend is discernible in Pakistan. While
we do not deny the importance of other political, economic
and social variables that affected the election outcome, our
emphasis on political culture leads to a new perspective on
the political history of Pakistan. We have kept in mind
the mutually dependent relationship between modernization
and this evolution in political culture. At the same time
it must be remembered that Pakistan's mode of development
is one in which traditional and modernist orientations have
been welded together. It is possible to view Pakistan's
modernization as a response to the challenge of systemic
change against the canvas of a continuing civilization.
The victory of the People's Party in West Pakistan
can be understood in the context of this change. We view
the PPP as a beneficiary of the changing pattern of beliefs.
2See Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political
Development and Political Culture , Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965, p. 515.
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By playing an essentially adaptive role 3 the PPP kept pace
with the evolving political ethos, and its success demon-
strates this fact.
The East And West Social Structure — Contrasted
The results of the election both at the national and
provincial levels, showed a sweeping victory for the Awami
League in East Pakistan and a substantial majority for the
People's Party in West Pakistan. While the East Pakistan
outcome was not unexpected, except perhaps in its magni-
tude, the voters of West Pakistan, did not follow the
conventional judgement of the prognosticators who
had predicted that the traditional leaders — the
so called 'old Guard' — would resume the politi-
cal leadership they had exercised before Iskander
Mirza.and Ayub instituted martial law in October
1958.
The elections in the East had virtually become a referendum
on the Six Points of the Awami League. The East had voted
as one unit against the "hegemony of the West" and for an
3A term borrowed from Weiner and LaPalombara. They
define an adaptive party, as one whose primary concern is
its adaptation to the attitudes of the public in its quest
for electoral support. See Joseph LaPalombara and Myron
Weiner, eds.
,
Political P art i es and Pol itical Development ,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 424-426.
^See Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes," Asian Survey ,
Vol . XI, No. 3, March 1971, p. 198.
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inward looking Bengali ethnocentrism. The Awami League
had echoed the feelings of the not much differentiated
population of East Bengal. The East Pakistani society com-
prised a miniscule number of upper middleclass industria-
lists and traders (quite a few of them non Bengalis) form-
ing an apex, while a huge sub-stratum of peasants, workers
and newly emerging urban dwellers rested massively below.
The social situation in the west, is much more complex and
differentiated, and defies such simplification. Since our
chief concern is with the People's Party, and since it
operated as a West based party, our primary emphasis while
examining the results will be on West Pakistan.
Until quite recently, West Pakistani society was
dominated by an aristocracy comprising the wealthy echelon
which was essentially "westernized" in its socio-political
orientation. It provided all the elites in politics, the
professions, the services and in large scale commerce and
industry. Only a few from the lower classes climbed to
competing positions. After independence, for instance,
middle class competitors got into the higher bureacracy — the
Civil Service of Pakistan — but since their numbers were
small, they soon internalized the ethic of the larger group.
5The voters had united behind a single party, and
gave the Awami League its extraordinary 167 out of 169
seats to the National Assembly and all of the 288 seats
to the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan. It did not
win a single seat in West Pakistan.
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The old ICS aristocratic, British oriented ethos, thus con-
tinued to be dominant. The lower classes continued to be
deprived of any active voice in the political process.
The Hindu exodus at independence had its consequences:
landlords had a vacuum to fill, and they did it by becoming
money lenders, contractors, wholesalers and small indus-
trialists. In the earlier years large scale industry and
commerce was monopolized by Muslim immigrants from India,
mostly concentrated in Karachi's metropolis. With the ex-
ception of a few big cities, most areas of West Pakistan
continued to have strong feudal loyalties. There were
differences in degree — Punjab and Baluchistan being on
two opposite ends of a continuum. The vehicle of aristo-
cratic politics in post independence West Pakistan was the
Muslim League, and its theoretical equipment was the mysti-
que of Islam.
From the mid 'fifties things began to change. Con-
stant inflationary pressures, high prices of consumer goods,
transfer of wealth from peasant to landlord, from the
countryside to the urban sector, and within the urban sector
to the "haves" through fiscal and monetary policies, rising
unemployment, increasing urbanization and the 'transistor
revolution," tended to break up traditional, chiefly feudal
patterns of social living in West Pakistan. These changes,
6 See M. B. Nagvi
,
"West Pakistan's Struggle for
Power," South Asian Review , Vol. 4, No. 3, April 1971.
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albeit gradual, are by degrees affecting all the provinces
of West Pakistan. In Punjab and Sindh, they are more dis—
cernably manifest. The PPP victories were in areas that
have been most influenced by the modernization process, and
the resulting change in attitudes towards politics. It
would not be innacurate to assume then, that there is a
definite correllation between the success of the party, and
the transforming political culture. This theme will be
developed in the course of the chapter.
The Election Results Described
When the results came in, it was seen that 63 percent
of the 56.94 million registered voters had turned out to
exercise their franchise in the Western wing, compared to
57 percent in East Pakistan. Punjab led with a turnout of
about 69 percent. Sindh came next with 60 percent voter
turnout. In NWFP 48 percent of registered voters had cast
7their vote and in Baluchistan around 40 percent. These
figures suggest a correllation between voter turnout and
levels of development. Table III indicates that of a total
of twenty five parties, eighteen contested elections in the
West wing. There was a surfeit of candidates too. For
example, for the 82 seats to the National Assembly from
7Figures from Sharif A1 Mujahid, "Pakistan's First
General Elections," Asian Survey , Vol. XI, No. 2, Feb.
1971, p. 169.
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Punjab, there were 463 contestants; 171 contestants for the
27 seats from Sind; 152 for the 25 seats in the Frontier,
and 25 for the 4 seats in Baluchistan. Of the total candi-
dates as many as 1,229 belonged to major political parties,
and about 320 were contesting as independents I
In the West, the PPP bagged 81 seats (see Table IV)
almost three-fifths of a total of 138 seats filled by direct
elections. In the National Assembly it secured only 37.7
percent of the aggregate vote in West Pakistan (see Table
VI). Relatively speaking, it was still impressive, since
the CML polling the second largest number of votes, secured
only 10.3 percent. It put up its best performance in Sindh,
where it took 44.9 percent of the vote, and two thirds of
the seats. In Punjab, its share was 41.6 percent of the
votes, but the fragmentation of support among its numerous
rivals gave it three fourths of the seats.
In NWFP
,
the PPP secured only one seat in Mardan out
of the 18 contested National Assembly seats (no
party nominated any candidates for the 7 centrally adminis-
tered tribal areas). In terms of votes, it polled 14.2
percent in the Frontier. Considering that the NAP(W)
secured only 18.3 percent in its home ground (see Table VII)
the PPP performance in terms of votes was not bad. It is
significant that even in the NWFP, the People's Party polled
a greater percentage of votes , than did any other party , in
the Punjab and Sindh where the PPP was victorious.
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In Baluchistan, the PPP hardly made an impression;
it claimed only 2.3 percent of the vote, too few to win any
seat
.
The Provincial elections, were marked by candidate
withdrawals on party, as well as individual bases, and the
regrouping of parties in several places following the set-
backs suffered by a majority of the parties in the National
QAssembly elections. Even so, the 579 seats for which
polling was held on December 17, 1970, were being contested
by over 4,100 candidates of whom 1,600 were independents.
The province wide break up of the candidates were: 1744 from
East Pakistan, 1,322 from Punjab, 575 from Sindh, 320 from
NWFP
,
and 164 from Baluchistan.
The National Assembly election results had demonstrated
that the independents had polled the third highest percen-
tage of votes (10.04%). The PPP therefore set out to support
a larger number of independents more openly in the Provin-
cial Assembly elections.
The PPP showing, in these elections was less impres-
sive than in the national poll; local factors were bound to
play a larger part in the smaller provincial constituencies.
In Punjab, the PPP received a minor setback, for it claimed
®The purpose of these withdrawals was to weaken the
PPP by presenting a united opposition to it, and limiting
the number of opposing contestants. The CML and the Islam
Pasands (particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami ) were in the fore-
front of this move.
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63 percent of the seats, as opposed to the 75.6 percent in
the National Assembly election. The PPP took 113 of the
180 seats. It gained six of the women's seats later.
On December 19th, 1970 Dawn reported that the party
position would further improve, as out of the 28 success-
ful independents, about 15 candidates, most of whom won the
contest through PPP support would join the Assembly party.
This would take the PPP strength as the ruling party in
Punjab to a proximity of 130 members. The PPP strength is
further enhanced by the fact that the CML emerged second
with only 15 seats. The other party positions are seen in
Table V.
In the elections, Bhutto's party failed to get a
majority in Sindh, but came close to it by taking 28 of
the 60 seats filled by direct elections. With the two
women's seats taken later, the PPP strength was enhanced
to 30 in a house of 62. The party had openly supported
four independents, and more independents were reported by
Dawn (December 19, 1970) as joining the party, reportedly
bringing the total strength to 40.
The only flaw in Bhutto's success in Sindh was his
inability to carry the settlers from India, especially in
the National Assembly elections. The refugees concentrated
9
in Karachi, preferred the religious parties, which won
^The Jamaat Ahle Sunnat, and the Jamaat-e Islami,
won two seats each.
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four of the seats in the National Assembly, while another
went to an independent supported by them. This left the
PPP with only two seats, and that too from the more suburban
and affluent areas.
The party position in Karachi, improved considerably
in the provincial election, where it took 8 out of the total
15 seats. This was probably a "snowballing" reaction to
the overall PPP success at the national polls, emerging
from the psychology of supporting the winning horse. In
the remaining seven seats, Markazi Jamiat-e-Ulema-e Pakistan
won four, the Council Muslim League two, and the Jamaat e
Islami one. The PPP performance here was also partly due
to the fact that in the provincial elections, it fielded
refugee candidates.
The PPP performance in Karachi is significant because
prominent Karachi veterans were defeated by relatively young
PPP candidates. For example, Mr. Mobinul Haq Siddiqui, a
former speaker of the now-defunct West Pakistan assembly
lost to PPP Mohammad Ali Gabole. Mr. Gaffar Pasha, a former
West Pakistan minister, was defeated at the hands of a
former student leader Syed Saeed Hasan, contesting on a
PPP ticket.
In the NWFP
,
the PPP fared badly, but there was some
satisfaction for it in the fact that no other party had got
a clear majority. It managed only 3 out of a total of 40
The PPP in the Frontier was greatly handi-contested seats.
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capped by the lack of leadership. The Frontier PPP chief,
Sherpao, was a political novice, and could not match tactics
with seasoned politicians like Qayyum Khan. Dawn reported
(on December 11th 1970) that mishandling had been the root
cause of the PPP 1 s drawbacks, and its poor performance in
the National Assembly elections. For example, it was re-
ported that the PPP had no organization for women's polling
and the QML polled 2,000 votes, mostly of women. However,
poor organization was by no means the sole cause of the PPP
defeat, and we shall elaborate the other causes later in
this chapter.
The PPP, moved toward a close alliance with NAP(W) in
the provincial elections against Qayyum Khan, who at the
time was viewed as a common enemy. A key contest was be-
tween Hayat Khan Sherpao and Qayyum Khan in the PW1
Peshawar constituency. Sherpao ' s victory was largely due
to the official NAP(W) support for the PPP. The PPP took
two other seats, one in Mardan, and the other in Malakand
protected area. Wali Khan's NAP secured 13 out of 40
seats, while its ally, the Hazarvi group of the "leftist"
Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, got 4. Including the two women's
seats taken by the NAP
,
the final position along with its
ally was 19 seats out of 42. Qayyum Khan's PML took 10
seats
.
The PPP was nowhere in the picture in Baluchistan.
The NAP combine had only 11 seats to start with (including
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the Pakhtoonkhawa
' s one seat, NAP's 8 and the 3 of the
Hazarvi group). The NAP since won the women's seat, and
its total strength is now 12. The QML took three seats,
independents 5, and the Baluchistan United Front took one.
Although 62 votes out of a 100 cast in West Pakistan
went against the PPP
,
it did gain a pivotal position in
the political process. The PPP victory is significant be-
cause it focuses the success of a socialistic program in
what was considered to be essentially a feudal set up.
Again, no other individual party could claim the magnitude
of success that was bestowed on the PPP in West Pakistan.
However, in an overall sense, the Council Muslim League,
did not fare badly in Punjab and Baluchistan, while the
Qayyum faction proved that it had significant support in
the NWFP
,
and some in Sindh and Baluchistan. The Conven-
tion Muslim League, in spite of the legacy inherited from
Ayub Khan, did better than the Jamaat-e-Islami in Punjab.
Among the religious groups Jamiat-e-Ulema e Pakistan
or the Sialvi group, put in a better performance than its
peers in terms of the aggregate West Pakistan vote. The
Hazarvi group JUI(H) however, secured for itself an important
role in the NWFP and Baluchistan assemblies. Baluchistan's
major support went to the National Awami Party (Wall).
Surprise Victories for the PPP
A great many veteran and influential politicians were
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dislodged by relatively unknown PPP candidates, indicating
that in substantial areas of West Pakistan, the votes were
cast for ideology in preference to local personalities.
While this might or might not be viewed as an index of
political development, it certainly does indicate that the
old order was beginning to change in Pakistan.
In the eyes of the man in the street the measure of
the PPP ' s success was (to use a phrase borrowed from
Mukherjee) the tally of heads which rolled in the dust. One
unexpected outcome was the defeat of Air Marshall (retd)
Asghar Khan, at the hands of a relatively unknown PPP can-
didate Khursheed Hasan Mir from the Rawalpindi NW-2& con-
stituency. (Asghar Khan had been a much idolized hero,
during the anti Ayub agitation, and had been mentioned in
political circles as a prospective successor after the Field
Marshall's ouster). Another PPP candidate defeated Rafiq
Saigol a leading industrialist who was seeking election from
his hometown, Lyallpur, on a Jamaat-e-Islami ticket. In a
Karachi suburb (Lyari) too, Syeed Haroon a leading business-
man found that his erstwhile stronghold was now in PPP
hands. Mian Tufail Ahmad, a firebrand speaker and a prom-
inent member of the Jamaat-e—Islami was beaten in a Lahore
constituency, by PPP member, Sheikh Mohammed Rashid. In
Muzzaffargarh II, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a prominent PDP
hopeful lost to Mustapha Khar of the PPP. Several other
creditable, but unexpected, PPP victories stand out like
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those scored against a retired major general
,
Umraokhan of
the Jamaat e Islami, in Sahiwal and members of the prosperous
and influential Gilani and Qizilbash families in Punjab.
Mr. Bhutto himself won five out of the six seats he
contested (two in Punjab and three in Sindh) losing only-
one seat in D. I Khan constituency in the Frontier to JUI(H)
General Secretary Mufti Mahmood. The Sindh victories were
in Hyderabad, Thatta and Larkana, Mr. Bhutto's hometown;
and his Punjab gains were registered in Lahore and Multan.
The most prestigious victories were in Larkana, where he
defeated the man once regarded as the "uncrowned king of
Sindh," former Chief Minister M.A. Khuhro
,
and in Lahore,
(Punjab) where he defeated CML ' s Javed Iqbal and PDP '
s
Maj-Gen. (retd) Sarfaraz Khan, by substantial margins.
An interesting fact that emerges from the elections
is that in areas where the PPP secured victories, particu-
larly to the National Assembly, it did so with wide margins.
On an overall basis, the differences in votes was not as
great in constituencies in Punjab and Sindh, where the PPP
lost. The highest number of votes in the elections was
polled by a PPP candidate, Maqsood Ahmad, in the NW74
Sialkot constituency. He polled 605,499 votes. Of the nine
other candidates who secured the highest number of votes,
seven belonged to the Peoples Party.
^They are M. Mohammad Ataullah (92,001), Sultan
Ahmad (91,252), Ghulam Hyder Cheema (90,962), Maulana
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The PPP could also claim that it enjoyed the privelege
of conducting the cheapest possible campaign albeit on a
single constituency basis. Dawn of December 11, 1970 re-
ported that the Thatta constituency, in which Bhutto emerged
victorious, witnessed the least expensive campaign in the
political history of the area. Bhutto won the election re-
portedly without spending anything in terms of money; his
two day tour of the area having generated sufficient enthu-
siasm in favour of his party to enable it to sweep the polls
in the National Assembly elections.
Patterns in the PPP Victories — and Reversals
We have seen that the PPP did not fare equally well
in all areas in West Pakistan, although its landslide vic-
tories in Punjab and Sindh elevated it to the position of
the dominant party. However, even in Punjab, the vote for
the PPP did show distinct regional patterns. Craig Baxter,
a political observer surmised that the party did well in
the relatively prosperous areas of Lahore Division, eastern
Multan Division and along the Grand Trunk Road as far as
Rawalpindi, areas where industrial development has taken
place and agriculturists are moderately prosperous land-
owners. Along the Indus River Valley, traditional factors
continued to operate as representatives of the Islam
Kausar Niazi (95,201), Malik Mehraj Khalid (84,421),
Abbas Hussein Shah (87,064) and Mubashir Hasan (85,601).
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Pasands won many national and provincial seats."'"''"
This observation can be generally applied to the whole
of West Pakistan to explain the PPPs marked victories and
losses: on a province wide scale, the PPP made a far better
showing in the more prosperous and modernized Punjab and
Sindh than it did in NWFP
,
and backward Baluchistan.
A more detailed survey will necessitate the differen-
tiation between the greater and lesser developed areas in
West Pakistan. We have based our analysis on the results
1
2
computed by S. J. Burki in a recent article. Burki has
constructed an index of modernization based on a weighing
in equal proportions of three characteristics: urbaniza-
tion, industrialization and education. Urbanization was
defined in terms of the proportions of each district in the
total urban population; similarly industrialization and
education in terms of industrial output and literate popu-
lation for the entire region. Although Burki ' s data is far
from exhaustive for our purposes (not having accounted for
all possible variables of modernization, and not having in-
cluded all areas of Pakistan) it is still a valuable index.
On the basis of this combined index of modernization,
the advanced parts of West Pakistan included eleven districts
''’See Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes, 1970," Asian
Survey
,
Vol. XI, No. 3, March 1971, p. 213.
1
2
See Shahid Javed Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-
Economic Explanation," Asian Survey , Vol. XII, No. 3,
March 1972, pp. 201-212.
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in Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat, Sialkot, Gujranwala,
Lahore, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Sargodha, Multan and Sahiwal),
one in the North West Frontier Province (Peshawar) and two
in Sindh (Karachi and Hyderabad) . Twenty three districts
were grouped together to constitute the intermediate region
on the scale of modernization — eight in Punjab, nine in
14 1C rSindh, five in North West Frontier and one in Baluchistan10
and NWFP fell in the backward region category.
1
7
A look at the election returns will indicate that,
in Sindh and Punjab and NWFP, the PPP did best in the more
advanced regions, within the context of its performance in
individual states. Even within areas that the PPP did not
win any seats, a distinction can be made, for it polled more
votes in those that were on the advanced side of the advanced-
backward continuum. Within the Punjab, the PPP suffered
reverses at Jhang, D.G. Khan, Mianwali, Muzzafargarh and
other less developed areas. In Sindh too the less developed
areas of Sukkur and Sanghar, rejected the Peoples
13Campbellpur
,
Jhang, Mianwali, D.G. Khan, Muzzafargarh,
Bahawalpur, Bhawalnagar, and Rahim Yar Khan.
14Thatta, Dadu
,
Larkana, Nawabshah, Khairpur, Tharpar-
kar, Jacobabad, Sanghar and Sukkur.
15 Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Mardan, Kohat and Hazara.
16
- 4.4.Quetta.
47For details of election returns, see Dawn , December
9, 10, 11, 19 and 20, 1970.
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Party. Successes registered in the advanced district of
Hyderabad were greater in magnitude than victories in the
"intermediate regions" (to use Burki ' s classification) of
Larkana and Khairpur, although these did emerge as important
PPP strongholds. Karachi's unique position as predominantly
refugee settlement has been discussed earlier. This could
in part explain the PPP, provincial election victory in
Peshawar and Mardan within NWFP
,
although its alliance with
the NAP, was the greater contributory factor.
Where Bhutto Lost to Mufti Mahmood
Mr. Bhutto's solitary defeat to Mufti Mahmud in the
D. I. Khan constituency of the NWFP can also be understood
in this context. D. I. Khan falls in the "intermediate
region" of advancement which would register as a relatively
developed region within the Frontier. This constituency
did not reject Bhutto outright, as it did the NAP or the
Awami League. Mr. Bhutto scored second in the race polling;
32,976 votes to Mahmood 's 45,340. D. I. Khan, although an
advanced region within NWFP, is still greatly influenced by
religious and traditional values. Mahmud's party, the JUI
(Hazarui ) in addition to standing slightly left of centre
on matters economic, retained a religious character which
18Sukkur was one district in which the PPP failed to
get even one out of six seats to the Provincial Assembly.
It managed one out of three to the National Assembly. The
party did not claim a single seat in Sanghar.
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appealed to this constituency more than that the PPP had to
offer in terms of Islamic socialism.
What the Election Results Demonstrated
The election results made it clear that at least in
Punjab, the old order had changed, that the politicization
of the countryside had progressed much farther than expected,
and that many an urban dweller was willing to seek what
seemed radical solutions to his problems. One significance
of the PPP ' s overwhelming victory in Punjab was that the
refusal of the right-wing elements to deviate from the status
quo rendered their own destruction.
Bhutto's victory proved that the influence of the
landed gentry was no more the dominant factor in Punjab
politics and the "baradari" (brotherhood) of caste and clan
connections had broken down in this province. As noted
earlier, the PPP did have allies among the landlords, but
the more prosperous and influential of them were aligned to
the Council Muslim League or Qayyum Khan's rival faction.
It became apparent that an effective appeal could be made
to the voter over the heads of the maliks, nawabs and
sardars. The classic example is that of Multan in Punjab,
where it was felt, "the scales would be tipped by feudal
lords." Dawn reporting on Dec. 6, 1970 commented:
.... This area is dominated by feudal lords
(Makhdooms and Nawabs) who are uncrowned kings
in their respective areas, having absolute power
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over the poor people. Nothing can be done with-
out their approval There are rival groups
which are important — one is the Gilari group
and the other is the Qureshi group...
Contrary to speculation in political circles, scions
of both these groups were defeated by the PPP candidates.
Alamder Hussain Gilani who was a former provincial minister
was defeated from the NW80 constituency of Multan by rela-
tively unknown Sadiq Hussain. A similar fate befell
Makhdoom Sajjad Hussain Qureshi in the Provincial Assembly
election, when he was floored by Mukhtar Ahmad, polling 85
votes to the latter's 19,115. Maulana Hamid Ali Khan, of
the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (nominated by the Islamic
Muitehada Mahaz of Multan), who was defeated by Bhutto in
another Multan constituency during the National Assembly
elections, drew the majority of his supporters from the
Qureshi Baradari
;
but that did not alter his fate. Dawn
,
reporting on December 13, 1970, changed its earlier assump-
tions, saying:
. . .
The general reaction of the residents of
Multan city and Cantonment areas is now against
feudal lords, and such politicians who have been
in power for considerable periods, but did nothing
to solve the problems of the town.
The newspaper quoted the labor class in particular as saying
that they would not be misled by feudal lords and politi-
cians who did not care for the improvement of the economic
condition of this section. The case of Multan is not a
solitary one. Families that had been represented in
legislative bodies — Qizilbash, Gilani, Noon, Shah Jiwana —
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were defeated. Only in rare cases did feudal influences
bring success; the Mianwali seat remained as always with
the Kalabagh family, while a member of the old ruling family
of Bahawalpur met with success in a constituency falling
within the former state.
Those who foresaw a revival of the "Old Guard" in
Punjab, and a result along tribal clan and feudal leader-
ship were surprized. Perhaps the biggest surprise was the
reduction of the CML which was generally expected to fare
better in Punjab. In the changing mileu, therefore, the
plethora of rightist parties sustained by the priveleged
classes to maintain and protect their position was rejected
by the masses. One inference that can be drawn from the
returns in Punjab is that the province has ushered itself
into a post aristocratic, or in Marxian terms a bourgeois
19democratic, stage of development. There seemed to be an
indication that people voted for parties in preference to
personalities, but where the two factors combined (as they
did in the case of Bhutto and the PPP ) a happy medium was
struck from the voters' point of view.
In Sindh, the pattern of support for the PPP differed
from that of Punjab. Outside Karachi, the party was able
to enlist many of the wadera and pir type of traditional
leaders on its side. However, it was the younger and less
19 See M. B. Naqvi
,
op. cit .
,
p. 221.
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conservative members of the families who looked to the PPP
as a political vehicle, for they were also attracted to the
dynamic Sindhi personality who attained such popularity
throughout the West wing. More conservative traditional
leaders went to the various Muslim Leagues and (with one
exception) were defeated in the National Assembly contests
and did relatively poorly in provincial contests. Although
the Sindhi face of the PPP has feudal elements, it enlisted
a new type of landlord who is anxious to mechanize, to im-
prove his lands, and to invest his income without impairing
middle class interests.
As if to support the comment that the districts of
the Indus Valley showed stronger traditional voting paterns
,
the Westward expansion of this area into the Frontier Pro-
vince also showed similar tendencies. The PPP could not
influence the average voter who still lives in a largely
tribal society. Old feuds are seldom forgotten; the battles
of 1947 are still being fought, as is demonstrated in the
bitter rivalry between the Pakhtoon oriented NAP (Wali) and
the Qayyum faction of the Muslim League. The NAP
leadership is not landlord dominated and is (as far as the
NWFP is concerned) a middle class movement. The QML is
supported by subsidy receiving tribal leaders and the tradi-
tional class of contractors and bigger landlords. The NWFP
did not return a clear majority of seats for any party at
either the national or provincial level. This could mean,
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among other things, that there exists some kind of a con-
flict between traditional forces and middle class interests.
That the latter force might be emerging to the surface, is
in itself significant.
While Baluchistan (which had never before witnessed
an election) did not seem ready for the more radical solu-
tion of the socialist PPP
,
the traditional leadership of
the Baluchistan States Union was giving way. The cracks
were beginning to appear as the younger generation suc-
ceeded in minimizing the influence of the tribal chiefs and
20leaders. For example, the defeat of the Prince of Kalat
at the hands of Mir Baksh Bizenjo of the NAP, from the
Mekran-cum-Karan-cum Lasbela, indicates this trend. Another
significant victory was that of Mr. Hayee Baluch, President
of the Baluch Students Organization. The son of a peasant,
he defeated the son of the Khan of Kalat, Prince Yahya, a
candidate of the QML . Even in Baluchistan, deference to
feudal authority is being gradually replaced by other
loyalties
.
By and large in the West, voters were disinclined to
return candidates who had served in public or military
office in the 1965-69 period. Several former MNAs , parti-
cularly in Sindh, overcame the onus of association with the
Ayub regime, and allied themselves with the People's Party.
20 See Dawn, December 6, 1970.
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Only 44 out of the 64 who then supported the government
contested. Of the 39 who contested at the National elec-
tions, only ten won; one as an independent and nine as PPP
candidates
.
Some of the pre-1958 politicians who had been made
subject to the EBDO restrictions campaigned in the 1970
elections. As few as four EBDOnians won National Assembly
seats, and three made it in the provincial contest. The
losers were more numerous, and included such former high
office holders as Abid Hussain in Punjab, Qaze Akbar
,
Pirzada Abdus Sattar in Sindh and Colonel Amir Muhammad
Khan of Hoti in the Frontier.
The election results tend to indicate that the
Ulema groups of the religious oriented parties do not have
much of a future in Pakistan. It seems that the public
have begun to draw the distinction between eccleciastical
realms and secular and political realms. While Islam still
remains a powerful force, no religious group can hope to
carry the day, unless it identifies itself with the hank-
21
ering for change. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the
religious groups will unite successfully to meet what they
consider "the challenge" of Bhutto. The dissensions among
the ulema derive from abstruse theological disputes, and the
adversity of elections has only aggravated mutual bitterness.
^The relative success of the Hazarvi group of the
Ulema, can be understood in this context.
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The PPP rode to victory chiefly on the basis of its
overwhelming influence among newly mobilized groups that
are increasingly politicized. Though the successful PPP
deputies come from a broad enough social spectrum, ranging
from lower middle class to scions of old aristocratic
houses, a big majority of them are from the middle class.
The extent to which it is composed of small town profession-
als and urban middle class professionals indicates that the
People's Party has become the vehicle of the involvement of
these middle sector groups in Pakistani politics.
This is not to say that the traditional political
elite (landlords, soldiers, civilian bureacrats)
and economic elite are out; rather their role
has become reduced, at least temporarily and the
lower (middle
)
2 ^
1 asses have achieved some measure
of prominence.
Causes of the PPP Victory
In the preceeding pages we have dealt with the implica-
tions of the PPP victory at the macro level and the economic
and political and social inferences that can be made. It is
also important to know, at the micro level, within the con-
text of the election, what made the PPP victory possible.
Some of these factors have already been discussed in Chapter
III, and we shall touch upon the others here.
The PPP benefited immensely from the disunity that
22Robert LaPorte, Jr. "Pakistan in 1972: Picking up
the Pieces," Asian Survey , Vol. XIII, No. 2, February 1973,
p. 196.
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prevailed within the rightist elements like the Muslim
Leagues and the religious oriented parties. Not only were
they unable to form a united front against Bhutto, but their
internal conflicts reduced valuable campaigning time. The
factions of the Muslim League found it impossible to cooper-
ate with each other. Even within the leftist NAP(W) the
Achakzai faction with its demands of Baluchi separatism, con-
stantly warred against the Khair Baksh Marri faction.
Large scale defections took place within the Muslim
Leagues, while the PPP generally increased the number of
its supporters. For example, when Sadiq Ali Memon, a for-
mer member of the National Assembly from Thatta joined the
PPP, several of his supporters followed suit. Another
classic case was the defection of Raja Amir Anwar Hussain
(a National Assembly candidate from Rawalpindi) from the
Jamiat Ulema i Islam (Thanvi) to the People's Party.
Throughout the campaigning period newspapers reported de-
fections from the QML to the Convention Muslim League
(Nawabzada Azmat Ali), from the Convention League to the
CML
,
from the Qayuum League to the Awami League, ad infinitum.
The Qayyum Muslim League faced the most serious rifts within,
owing to factional strifes.
The PPP also benefitted from the chaotic assignment
of rightist candidates for various contests. Out of the 82
seats to the National Assembly from Punjab, to cite an
example, there were as many as fourteen constituencies where
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none of the three factions of the leagues contested, while
in three constituencies all of them nominated one candidate
each. It is possible that the near uniformity of the party
platforms of the Leagues rendered them indistinguishable,
making the choice difficult for the voter. The PPP plat-
form stood refreshingly different from that of the rightist
parties, and also from those who were credited to be left
of centre. This could have been a contributory factor in
the PPP success.
Part of the PPP success is explained by the fact
that in areas where it was not strong enough, it supported
Independent candidates, rather than adding to the list of
party casualties. Notable among these was the support it
gave Ali Hasan Manghi
,
for the National Assembly elections
from a Sukkur constituency. Some of these independents
later joined the party, like one Zafarullah Choudhury a
National Assembly elect from Jehanian.
As a corollary, the PPP, unlike other parties, was
successful in securing the retirement of certain indepen-
dent candidates to strengthen the position of its own con-
testants. Notable among these was the retirement of
Ghulam Nabi Memon, a former Law Minister from Hyderabad,
in favor of Mr. Lai Mohammed, a PPP nominee.
The PPP also steered clear of cumbersome alliances,
the forging of which took up a great deal of the time of
These alliances were mostly dissolvedrightist parties.
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later, and in the event that they endured proved to be
rather effete. Prominent among these ad hoc arrangements
was the Sindh Muhajir Punjabi Pathan United Front support
for Qayyum (which was withdrawn on October 31), the support
of the Sheikh Baradari for the Jamaat-e-Islami in Sahiwal,
the alliance between the Jamaat and the Pir of Paqaro for
elections in select constituencies of Sindh. These allian-
ces were entered between a dominant rightist party and a
small religious or region oriented group. The collapse of
the Islamic United Front demonstrates that few dominant
rightist parties were able to work in unison. However, the
PPP proved far more adept at forging a beneficial alliance
than any of its rightist opponents. The PPP successfully
turned the Wali-Qayuum rivalry to its advantage in the
Provincial contest by entering into a well timed alliance
with the NAP.
By keeping aloof from such alliances, the PPP also
steered clear of conflicts that emerged as a result. The
wastefulness of such internecine quarrels as took place
between the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islamic Front over the
support of candidates* and between M. A. Khuhro and the
Convention Muslim League, and among the Leagues, was pru-
dently avoided by the PPP.
The last minute withdrawals from the polls of some
rightist parties, left their allies in a quandry, and the
The PPP on the other hand benefitted,voters in confusion.
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as it faced the electorate as one unified party with no
demoralizing in the ranks to ebb its strength. In the
wake of the PPP success in the National Assembly elections,
several parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami
,
in particular with-
drew some if its candidates in the P. A. elections in a
last minute bid to put up a common candidate of right wing
parties. This belated and desperate attempt failed miserably.
While its opponents were involved in bickering and
compromises, the PPP maintained an even tempo in its cam-
paign. After the suspension of active canvassing (as re-
quired by the election rules ) Bhutto continued to address
press conferences in an attempt to keep in touch with the
voters till the last possible hour.
We have thus seen how the PPP profited where its
opponents floundered. The other — the positive and active
dimensions of the PPP victory have been highlighted in an
earlier chapter dealing with the party's election campaign;
however, some factors need to be reiterated in perspective.
Aspirations, Charisma, Culture and the PPP
We mentioned earlier that the People's Party is the
beneficiary of a change in political culture that is under-
way in Pakistan. The role of the PPP, as we have seen, was
by no means a passive one. It accomplished the realigning
of the electorate in its favor by a shrewd assesment of the
situation, and an intelligent response to it.
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Charisma does not grow in isolation. Social, economic,
political and not least, cultural factors mould it and
dictate its direction. While it is conceivable that with-
out Bhutto, the agitation that built up during the anti
Ayub period would not have gained the momentum required to
dislodge the regime; it is conceivable that without the
social and economic deprivations that arose during the rule
of Ayub, the Bhutto phenomenon, despite its charisma would
not have become the social and political force it did in
1968, and again during the elections in 1970.
We are tempted, here, to draw from Ruth Ann Winner's
brilliant study on charisma. She says of the charismatic
leader, that more than other aspirant or available leaders,
he is capable of combining the grievances of a variety of
socially and psychologically disoriented individuals and
groups into a collective grievance and a common political
goal. More than other aspirant or available leaders, he is
able to formulate or elaborate a compelling doctrine that
embodies the private dreams and desires of many different
people and that elevates these into a public and frequently
23
millenial vision. Bhutto did just this. By absorbing
the largely economic priorities of the large masses into
his program for action (as opposed to the priorities of the
23Ruth Ann Willner, Charismatic Political Leadership :
A Theory
,
Center of International Studies, Princeton
University, May 1968, p. 72.
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priveleged political and economic elite) he kept apace with
the changing political milieu.
It is conceivable that the phenomenon of charismatic
political leadership can emerge in a society only if some-
how sanctioned by the culture of the society. It is con-
ceivable that such leadership cannot be generated in a
society whose cultural definition of leader-follower rela-
tions precludes strong personal authority and impassioned
personal loyalties to a leader. Thus while it would seem
that in modern Britain zealous adulation of a leader is
"bad form," no such limitations exist in the Pakistani
context
.
It must also be remembered that perceptions of an
action vary from culture to culture. The dominant value
orientations in one culture may rank modes of action indi-
cating forcefulness and strength higher than those indica-
ting subtlety and persuasion; in another, the opposite
ranking might constitute "propriety."
Bhutto's strength lay in that he catered to the
values and proprieties of the masses of Pakistan in his
election style. His charisma was directed to the public
( from where the bulk of the votes came ) and thus was in-
different to the British oriented and acquired proprieties
of the numerically miniscule elite. In the challenges
that he threw to opponents, as if in combat, in the stances
of emotional indignation that he betrayed, he was seen by
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the masses as a "lion among men." Those who understand
the significance of the concept of "sher" (lion) and the
related values of courage and bravery in the Pakistani
context, will realize the political saqacity of the Bhutto-
nian stand.
Among the strategies of invocation employed by charis-
matic political leaders have been acts and symbols designed
to tap the various values of the important segments of their
pluralistic societies, and to project their images as men
who have not lost the common touch. For those people, to
whom certain aspects of tradition and continuity may be
reassuring in a changing world, Bhutto invoked Islamic and
traditional symbols. The use of the "sword" as the elec-
tion symbol of the PPP was in response to such sentiments.
To those whom the vision and proclamation of a new and
different order constitute part of the basis for charis-
matic appeal, Bhutto offered the eqalitarian ideas of a
socialistic program. His emphasis on people's politics and
"Awami" constitution registered the participatory priori-
ties of the changing political culture of Pakistan.
Successful political leaders tend to be
particularly sensitive and responsive to the
dominant values in their societies relevant to
political strategies. Those leaders who become
charismatic tend to exhibit an extraordinary
sensitivity and responsiveness to them, espec-
ially in the initial stage of their leadership
trajectory before their capacity to re—orient
values is clearly manifested. Moreover, they are
probably more aware than their less successful
competitors of the areas in which some of these
valu?| are susceptible to change and manipula-tion
Willner, op. cit .
,
p. 80 .
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CHAPTER V
A FUTURE ROLE FOR THE PPP
IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTAN
Introduction
Political parties can be viewed not only as pro-
ducts of their environment, but also as instruments of or-
ganized action for affecting that environment.
In previous chapters, we have sought to relate the
emergence and the subsequent success of the People's Party
to a process of political development that is taking place
in Pakistan. In our introductory chapter we have attempted
to delineate the important variables that, in our estimate,
are fashioning this process. We have found the populace is
increasingly defining a new set of priorities (chiefly
economic) that political authority must respond to; that
traditional views with regard to authority are being affec-
ted substantially; that the participatory urges of citizens
are increasingly seeking gratification and above all, that
the masses are beginning to emerge with new confidence in
the belief that they can effectively fashion their political,
economic and social environment. Our observation has been
that the PPP success lay in a prudent recognition of the
direction in which these changes were taking place and its
deference to them. We have noted the incorporation of the
mass political culture in the PPP platform, and also a
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reflection in its stances of sensitivity to areas where
this culture is changing and where it is not. The PPP
the process of establishing itself and especially
within the election framework was primarily on the adaptive
end of an adaptive-mobilist continuum. Such a role seemed
prudent and inescapable in the PPP quest for electoral
support as a stepping stone to power.
After the election and the subsequent Bangla Desh
debacle, the PPP has emerged as the ruling party of the
new Pakistan. Will there then be a transformation of its
adaptive role in the face of the new realities confronting
Pakistan? If so, in what direction will the change take
place and what will be the variables affecting the party's
future role? This chapter will attempt a speculative
analysis of possible future trends.
The results of an election are explicitly or impli-
citly manifested in a party's future role definition —
although elections are only one in a list of variables that
shape role patterns. The magnitude of electoral support
that a party receives determines in some measure its future
assertiveness or timidity, its confidence or vaccilation.
The nature of the constituency that figured most promin-
ently as a support base, will influence the kind of policy
adopted and the party's program for action. In the parti-
cular case of a ruling party, the nature of the electorate
responsible for its victory (and the expectations of this
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electorate) will determine whether the party will play a
predominantly subservient role, or whether it will be more
active in moulding the perceptions of this electorate.
Future Role of the PPP — Prospects for Mobilization?
The manner in which the PPP deals with the tasks and
crises that confront Pakistan will define its role; and the
role that the exigencies of the Pakistani situation and
mass aspirations carve for it, will in turn, decide the
manner in which crises are tackled. In effect, a cyclical
relationship exists here.
The political problems of Pakistan in the post 1971
period and especially those of the PPP, seem to be (to
mention a few broad issues) the materialization of national
integration, the meeting of the aspirations of the in-
creasingly politicized masses, the development of politi-
cal rules of the game, relations between the Centre and
provinces (political and economic) and a redefinition of
the roles of political parties, the military and the
bureacracy
.
In essence it is the case of political redevelop-
ment or political readjustment to a rather start-
ling set of events such as those usually associ-
ated with the post World War II colonial inde-
pendence movements, to which £he 'birth' of
Bangladesh might be compared.
1 See Robert La Porte, Jr., "Pakistan in 1972: Picking
up the Pieces," Asian Survey , February 1973, Vol. XIII, No.
2, p. 188.
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It is a truism that in economically "developing"
societies the balance between economic and political freedom
is difficult to maintain, and the PPP 1 s task, becomes all
the more complex. If the PPP is to successfully deliver
its election promise of bringing distributive justice to
Pakistan, it will have to strengthen its own position and
secure itself in power. During the elections it had pro-
mised not merely slight incremental change, but a recon-
struction of society on the basis of Islamic socialism,
giving priority to the economic field. If, indeed, this
social reconstruction is to be undertaken by the PPP then
. . . 2
"mobilization" seems to be a possible tool for enhancing
support, and getting recalcitrants to see the party's point
of view. Although the existence of opposition parties
might limit a purely mobilist role, the PPP has access to
the state's repressive powers, if it desires to use them.
In an overall sense, the PPP has done exceedingly
well in the elections, but it would be a mistake to over-
look the fact that 62 out of 100 votes cast in West Pakistan
went against it. It would thus be in the interests of the
PPP to arouse a sense of public participation, not directly
^For a fuller discussion of the distinction between
adaptive and mobilist parties, and techniques of mobiliza-
tion employed by party governments, see M. Weiner and J.
LaPalombar a , Political P arties and Political Development
,
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966,
p. 400-427.
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in decision making, but in carrying out the goals for which
its constituency lent support. Thus, in order to effect a
nationwide attitudinal change, it is conceivable that the
PPP will gradually move toward the mobilist end of the con-
tinuum, The regime may be concerned with developing a sub-
jective sense of participation.
The benefits of mobilization, however, are not too
easily available to the People's Party. The use of the
coercive powers of the State, alone, may not carry the day.
Ayub's fall can definitely be a pointer in this direction.
The PPP will have to maintain credibility among the popu-
lace; and find some basis for legitimizing its new authority
in order to win popular support not only for the new govern-
ment, but for the system of government that it formulates.
During the early phases of party development it is common
for pre-existing political groups — a landed aristocracy
or a military elite or religious groups — to continue to
exercise, or attempt to exercise, an emotional hold on
certain sections of the populace. This is especially common
in political systems in which parties are the outgrowth of
changes in urban areas, are based primarily on urban sup-
port, and are confronted by some rural interests supporting
3
the military or a landed oligarchy. The PPP must therefore
attempt to gain wide acceptance throughout the society for
^Ibid
.
,
p. 408
.
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the political rules of the game that it establishes.
How then, can this be achieved? Our analysis seems
to indicate that while the process of political develop-
ment has sharpened the participatory urges of the people,
the urge for distributive justice seems even stronger. The
desire for social justice, in the form of a more equitable
distribution of the society's wealth and more consumer as
opposed to capital goods and a demand for greater social
and economic opportunities are becoming increasingly mani-
fest. This is happening before substantial economic growth
has occurred in Pakistan. The margin of growth which made
it possible for some countries, like the United States, to
satisfy the demands of the working classes is absent in
Pakistan. The PPP might, therefore, have to engage itself
in reducing the economic gap if it is to mobilize support
and demonstrate by its actions that it will redeem its
pledge. It seems unlikely that the majority of the people
of Pakistan will extend their support to or tolerate in
office any government that seems hesitant to alter the
economic status quo. The mood in Pakistan, does not warrant
self aggrandizement or exploitative authoritarianism. The
trend seems to indicate that a bureacratic or a military
authoritarianism might not be tolerated, at least at present,
in Pakistan. Ayub Khan's government lost legitimacy with
the Pakistani people mainly because they perceived it as
the ally of the exploiting groups in society. Political
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repression undoubtedly added fuel to the fire, but it seems
unlikely that it existed as the isolated cause of discon-
tent. If a case can be made for the return of authori-
tarianism in Pakistan, it must take note of the fact that
the present mood there, the only authoritarianism
that seems likely to survive is one that is ideologically
oriented and left of centre.
While it is conceivable, therefore, that the PPP will
attempt to become a mobilist party, it is equally conceiv-
able, that mass aspirations and expectations will force
the PPP to move further leftward and, as a tactic of sur-
vival, this will be the direction in which the PPP will
mobilize
.
This concern with distribution in developing socie-
ties emerges from the fact that among the broad range of
concerns that may lead to political demands, many are indeed
material. Even if we consider the crisis of participation
or the central value of equality cited in James Coleman's
4
"development syndrome," it is seen that the
demand to participate, to achieve equality as a
citizen, may be and often is motivated by a
great range and complexity of aspirations, from
the calculated desire to exercise power in one's
own material interest to the moral insistence
that each citizen be accorded one vote in the
4See James Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: Differ-
entiation - Equality - Capacity," in Crises and Sequences
in Political Development
,
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1971, pp. 73-100.
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selection of those who will govern. 5
The desire for equality implies redistribution, and aims at
more or less profound changes in systems of stratification.
For the developing nation, the responses to distribution
demands, greatly escalated by mass participation, will
determine the nature in which legitimacy problems may be
resolved. In these circumstances, the pressure to resort
to coercion or mobilization ideologies may be overwhelming.
We might speculate then that this could be the case with
Pakistan
.
Experienced in activism (during the anti-Ayub move-
ment) and having felt a sense of personal efficacy in
affecting their environment, the present generation of
Pakistanis are not likely to lapse into quiescence. If econ-
omic aspirations are not met, the recourse to extra legal
activity by the masses seems conceivable. It is unlikely
that the masses will abdicate both their participatory urges and
economic aspirations at the same time .
The initial years in office for the PPP
,
thus seem
the most challenging. If it does not wish to risk tumult
and expressed discontent before the benefits of promised
economic distribution becomes manifest, the party must
5LaPalombara, Joseph, "Distribution: A Crisis of
Resource Management," in Crises and Sequences in Political
Development
,
op. cit
.
,
p. 234.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 282.
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mobilize support and create at least a subjective sense
of participation. At the same time it must demonstrate
effectively that steps are being taken in the direction of
Islamic socialism.
The direction in which the PPP travels is also deeply
tied up with the actions of Mr. Bhutto as President. We
shall now attempt to review some post-election stances of
President Bhutto, to give substantiveness to our specula-
tions .
Activities of the PPP Regime
1 . Domestic Political Activities of Bhutto
. Bhutto '
s
first series of political moves were made to indicate to
the people and to prospective opponents that the old regime
was out and that he was in command of the situation. He
proceeded to dispense with those groups that the masses
considered as "agents of exploitation." Bhutto moved
against ex-President Yahya Khan and Army Chief of Staff,
General Abdul Hamid Khan, and appointed a Commission of
Enquiry to investigate the military crackdown in East
Pakistan. By arresting the chief representatives of the
old regime, he indicated to Pakistanis that the situation
had changed — a subtle political move designed to estab-
lish control without eroding popular support.
Bhutto also sought to eliminate potential rivals
long before they had the opportunity to "plot" against him.
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This involved "demoting" those individuals who had helped
in effecting the transfer of power from Yahya to Bhutto.
The removal of Lt. General Gul Hasan, acting C-in-C since
December 1971, and Air Marshal Rahim Khan along with six
other military leaders was undertaken according to Presi-
dent Bhutto, "to prevent professional soldiers from becoming
7professional politicians." Hasan and Rahim Khan were
placated with ambassadorial positions. Bhutto replaced
Hasan with Tikka Khan, the senior most field officer. His
important qualification, from Bhutto's point of view, is
his political non-involvement and his reputation for sever-
ity established in putting down an uprising in Baluchistan
in 1962-63, and later in operations in East Pakistan.
Bhutto may have intended through his appointment, to serve
warning to potential trouble makers in Baluchistan and
NWFP. Air Marshall Zafar A. Chaudhry, a quiet industrious
officer from the minority Qadiani sect, replaced Rahim Khan.
In addition to the military shakeup, Bhutto dismissed
1,300 civil servants under Martial Law Order 114, to demon-
strate that he would not permit obstructions to his policy
^The disorders that rocked Pakistan in January -
February 1972, highlighted by the strike of policemen in
Hyderabad, Lahore and Peshawar, prompted these military
leaders to indulge in the speculation that the armed forces
might soon have to take over the country. This wishful
thinking appears to have alarmed Bhutto. Another report
indicated that Gul Hasan had had a series of private meet-
ings with Wali Khan (leader of NAP in the NWFP) and had
refused to inform President Bhutto of the nature of these
discussions
.
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and program. By April 1972, real, potential or imaginary
opponents in the civil service and the military had been
dismissed or replaced with individuals more to Bhutto’s
liking. Bhutto has gone further than anyone before him in
curbing the power of the Army and the bureacracy. In fact,
the constitution promulgated in 1973, does not provide the
guarantees of tenure and status to higher civil servants
that the earlier constitutions had. Bhutto wishes to demon-
strate that the Civil Service is no more the formidable
power centre it used to be.
In the initial phase, Bhutto's principal objective
has been to maintain his own power and authority in the
country. At the same time, he has demonstrated extreme un-
willingness to tolerate opposition even from within his
Q
own official family. The resignation of Mahmud Ali Kasuri
,
as Minister of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, and the sub-
sequent harassment of this leader by PPP politicians
(especially Governor Mustapha Khar of Punjab) in October 1972
points to this fact. Kasuri was later expelled from the
party in March 1973.
The new Pakistan is more compact and homogeneous than
The resignation is reported to have been the result
of irreconcillable differences between Bhutto and Kasuri
over the powers of the executive as embodied in the Draft
constitution. Kasuri is said to have a deep commitment to
Parliamentary democracy with legislative checks on the
executive
.
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the old, but the economic and political preponderence of
Punjab is now even greater. Sind has benefited from indus-
trial and commercial development, and has less reason for
resentment against a Punjabi dominated centre than NWFP or
Baluchistan
. But even Sind has lately been eager to assert
its separate identity as reflected in the demands for the
use of Sindi as the language of administration in the pro-
vince. However, in Sind and Punjab the PPP controls the
government. Bhutto's cousin, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, is the
Chief Minister of Sind and long standing supporter Khar is
Governor of Punjab. Both are considered to be strong men
in their respective provinces. In the crucial issue of
centre-State relations, Bhutto's largest problem lies in
the NWFP and Baluchistan. In both these provinces the
National Awami Party, and the hand picked men of Wali Khan
were in control. Bhutto's strategy seemed to be one of
circumscribing the NAP's ability to govern with the goal of
replacing NAP governments in both provinces. Robert La-
Porte , an observer of Pakistani politics has observed that
political harassment by PPP officials in both provinces, a
fair amount of "touring" by PPP central government officials
in both provinces, coupled with accusations by PPP officials
of "plotting" and "disloyalty to Pakistan" on the part of
the NAP and Wali Khan, are some of the tactics which have
been employed. 9 Bhutto's concern has been how to maintain
9 See Robert La Porte, Jr., op. cit . , p. 191.
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both provinces within the Pakistan Union without compro-
mising his own authority and that of his party. A fragile
peace that had been worked out in 1972 with the opposition
NAP, was threatened by Bhutto's actions in late February
'73. In a bid to strengthen his hold, he ousted Governor
Bizenjo and Chief Minister Ataullah Khan Mengal of Balu-
chistan and NWFP Governor Arbab Sikander Khan Khalil, all
popularly elected leaders of the NAP. In their place he
appointed the more sympathetic Akbar Khan Bugti and Aslam
Khattak as the respective governors of Baluchistan and
NWFP.^0 Bhutto also sent troops into Baluchistan, under
Tikka Khan, to put down tribesmen sympathetic to the ousted
governor. The discovery of large stocks of arms in the
Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, prompted Bhutto to claim that
the arms had been smuggled in to aid a civilian coup against
him and suggest that the NAP was involved in the incident.
The alleged plot led to the ouster of the Iraqi ambassador,
the sack of the two governors and the dispatch of additional
troops into Baluchistan — although the demands of the
Azad (Free) Baluchistan and Pushtunistan (Pathan Nation)
10President ' s rule was established in the two pro-
vinces till mid April, following which a three man cabinet
headed by Jam Ghulam Qadir (QML) and including Yusuf Magsi
(PPP) and Maulvi Hasan (JUI) was formed in Baluchistan.
Governor Bugti claimed he had called on Qadir because he
was convinced that Qadir had a majority in the provincial
Assembly. In NWFP a cabinet headed by I. K. Gandapur in a
PML ( Q ) United Front — PPP combine was instituted. See
Pakistan Times
,
April 28 and 30, 1973.
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groups probably had a great deal to do with it. 11
Bhutto's strategy in Baluchistan and NWFP
,
however,
is not one of simple repression — it is that of playing
one group against the other. In these areas he is aligning
himself with the power centres opposed to, or willing to
oppose the NAP. Baluchistan, outside of Quetta City and
perhaps Kalat, is still a tribal society. Bugti is the
head of a tribe and commands the following of some other
tribes hostile to the Mengal and Bizenjo tribes. Bugti was
once with NAP, but Bhutto has lured him away. In NWFP,
Bhutto has aligned himself with Qayyum Khan, in 1972 who
enjoys a considerable following in the province.
However, with regard to certain Bhuttonian tactics,
cracks were beginning to appear, even within the party.
The governor of Sindh, Mir Rasul Baksh Talpur, resigned in
protest against what he called "a wicked power hungry
clique. 1,1 ^
The PPP is still far from a national party. Its
main support comes from Punjab and Sind. Given Bhutto's
preference for a strong centre, the differences over centre-
state relations may yet prove difficult and divisive. The
task of establishing a sense of legitimacy in a competitive
11
"Under the Velvet Glove," Time, March 5, 1973,
pp. 24-28.
1 ^Ibid
.
,
p. 24
.
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party system, would involve for the PPP — mobilizing
popular support and maintaining cohesion within the party.
Although its predominent complexion is middle class, the
PPP is still a coalition in as much as it consists of
middle class professionals, Sind and Punjab landlords,
industrial workers, students, agrarian proletariat and few
selected landlords. In order to carry out the socialistic
program for which it was primarily elected, the party will
have to evolve a resistance to possible pulls in diverse
directions as a result of this coalition. The extent to
which Bhutto is able to restrain the regional tendencies
of his predominantly Sindi and Punjabi membership, will
determine the continued cohesiveness of the PPP. Although
86 of the total 144 seats of the National Assembly are held
by members of the PPP
,
some observers have noted that the
actual opposition to Bhutto within the Assembly might be
larger, totaling as much as 88 (the 58 non-PPP members,
1
3
along with a dissident group of 30 PPP members.) How-
ever, with a view to strengthening the party, and possibly
developing secondary leadership, it was decided by the PPP
( particulary Mr. Bhutto) early in 1973 that no individual
14
could hold party office and public office simultaneously.
1
3
See Werner Adam, "Pakistan in Search of a New Iden-
tity," Swiss Review of World Affairs , November 1972, p. 10.
140n the basis of information given by Sajjad Naseer,
a Pakistani political scientist, who was on a recent visit
conducting research in Pakistan.
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The building of credibility for the PPP depends to
a great extent on the delivering of the economic promises
it made during the election. The first year of Bhutto's
presidency was marked by seemingly "bold" economic reforms.
These gave him a chance to strike the right radical note
by making a show of force against "agents of exploitation."
This had never happened before, on such a scale, and it
enhanced its impact on the people.
2 . Internal Economic Activities of Bhutto — a Delivering
of Promises?
(a) The twenty two families: Bhutto put the rich in
the dock by demanding the return of funds taken out of
Pakistan by them. Passports of some 200 persons — belong-
ing mostly to the notoriously rich "22 families" — were
impounded, to convey the message that the government in-
tended to back up its threat by action. Some arrests were
also made, both of businessmen and of top officials in key
15 .
economic assignments. These included General Habibullah,
Ahmed Dawood
,
and Fakhruddin Valika — all of them from the
roster of the 22 families. The two officials sent to jail
were S. U. Durrani, Managing Director of the State Bank of
Pakistan, and Rear Admiral U. A. Sayeed, Chairman of
National Shipping corporation.
1
5
Bhutto released all his "economic prisoners" in
late January 1972.
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(b) Takeover of industry: In the economic arena, one
of Bhutto s first moves was the seizure of the management
of 20 private firms, with assets of at least $200 million. 16
Eleven more companies were placed under government supervi-
sion, later in the month. The industries that were taken
over fell into ten categories among them iron and steel,
heavy engineering, heavy electricals, assembly and manufac-
ture of motor vehicles and tractors, petrochemicals, cement
and public utilities. This move did not affect foreign
owned firms or investment and in fact, was not a "pure"
form of nationalization, since only the management of the
firms was affected and not ownership. In addition, cotton
textile manufacturing, the largest single industrial group
in Pakistan, and also the larger foreign exchange earner,
was not affected. The managing agency institution was
abolished. Although the agency was intended to provide
local management services, it led to increased economic
concentration as well as many abuses. Agencies often
skimmed profits from the managed firms to the detriment of
individual shareholders by manipulating selling or buying
1 7
arrangements. The only industry to be completely nation-
16 See "Bhutto Seizes Industry," The Washington Post ,
January 3, 1972.
17For a comprehensive discussion of the operations
of the Managing Agency, see Delip Mukherjee, _Z. A. Bhutto :
Quest for Power
,
Delhi: Vikas, 1972, pp. 191-194.
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alized under Bhutto was insurance.
At the same time, Bhutto's government has offered
repeated assurances to businessmen and industrialists and
to the creative and humane landowner. 11 The message being
circulated is that although some changes had to be made,
the Bhutto Government is neither anti-foreign investment,
nor anti—capitalism per say, but this might be mere specu-
lation. In May 1972, Bhutto told a group of Karachi
businessmen
:
You are at liberty to make reasonable profits as
a reward for hard work and efficient use of tal-
ent and resources... We have no intention of
curbing the freedom of the individual to pursue
his vocation. We accept that private enterprise
has a role t^play in the economic progress of
Pakistan.
. .
.
(c) Land reforms. On March 1, 1972, Bhutto announced
his land reforms, in which he lowered the maximum limit
on individual ownership of land from 500 to 150 irrigated
acres, and from 1,000 to 300 non-irrigated acres. On April
23, the upper limit of permissible land holdings was re-
19 . .duced to 240 acres. Along with the ceiling Bhutto de-
creed several changes in the landlord-tenant relationship
to restrain eviction and prohibit "begar" or free labor,
required by landlords. It was laid down that landlords
18See"Bhutto Follows a Capitalistic Path," The New
York Times
,
June 4, 1972.
19For a fuller discussion of Bhutto's economic re-
forms see Delip Mukherjee, op. cit . , pp. 177-206.
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would henceforth be responsible for providing seed, while
the cost of the remaining inputs would be shared equally.
Liability for payment of water rates and other agricultural
taxes was shifted from tenants to landlords throughout the
country. Although time alone can prove the economic impact
of these changes, Bhutto deserves credit for having made
the effort to cut down in size the feudal elements in the
country. However, the land reforms effected to date does
not measure up to his pre-office promise of 12 acres to
each Pakistani peasant.
(d) Labour policy. Along with dealing with business-
men in early January 1972, Bhutto, proclaiming a "new labor
20policy," offered to raise the workers' share in the annual
profits of the undertaking from two percent fixed by Ayub in
1968 to four percent. If workers improved their produc-
tivity, they would be entitled to a share of 10 percent in
the increased profits. Bhutto stipulated that employers
would have to give reasons explicitly in writing before
terminating the services of an employee. Workers partici-
pation in management "to the extent of 20 percent at the
factory level." The role of work councils was enlarged to
serve as a forum for discussion of collective disputes.
Employers were made responsible for providing free education
20The labour policy was outlined in a broadcast made
on February 10, 1972. The text was issued by the Press
Information Department, Government of Pakistan.
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up to the school leaving stage for one child of each worker.
A promise was made to provide old age pensions and compul-
sory group insurance
,
while the two percent of wages, con-
tributed by workers towards medicinal benefits was waived.
At the same time a warning was issued to strikers and demon-
strators against "unruly and rowdy practices."
In addition, Bhutto introduced substantial education
reforms, with a view to making the system more socialistic.
Private schools were nationalized and education made free
up to the eighth class.
Although Bhutto's economic reforms to date are not as
sweeping as his "capitalistic" critics suspected or his
socialist supporters hoped, the fact that he has made a
bold attempt at bringing about economic change cannot be
denied. It must be kept in mind that the PPP is faced with
dual task of delivering its economic promises and at the
same time consolidating its position.
In his political activity, Bhutto has sought a bal-
ance between political freedom and political repression. A
possible tendency for authoritarianism in the PPP can be
discerned. (One wonders whether the party is likely to
apply to its future opponents similar standards and patterns
of repression to which it was subjected.) Ironically, the
government has come down with rather a heavy hand, to deal
with the forces that its cry for distributive justice and
political freedom has unleashed. After Bhutto s taking
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peasants had pitched battles with landlords in
NWFP, and occupied their land, workers seized a rayon fac-
tory in Lahore, industrial workers went on strike in Karachi,
paralyzing industry. The government balanced these tactics
by police and military action. An early move on the part
of the regime was to lift press and other media controls.
Soon after, however, (as has been mentioned in an earlier
chapter) several leading editors, publishers and newsmen
were arrested displaying Bhutto's lack of inhibition in
settling old scores.
Another disconcerting element that has appeared on
the scene, are the paramilitary forces that political par-
ties have raised. Bhutto's "People's Guards," headed by
his advisor on national security, Major General Akbar Khan
(retd.), is 12,000 strong, and is a cause of anxiety to
PPP ' s rivals. Wali Khan is quoted as saying that the guards
remind him of Hitler's stormtroopers . Wali Khan, too, has
his own "Zalme Pakhtoon" volunteers. These two party
militias have been known to freely settle political argu-
ments in Peshawar and other towns of NWFP. The PPP mani-
festo had posited the formation of a "people's army," to
22
act as an agent of national defence. The rationale given
for the People's Guard is that it performs service functions
21 See Illustrated Weekly of India, February 18, 1973,
p. 39
.
22 See Election Manifesto of PPP, 1970, p. 50.
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— as it did during a strike of policemen in Lahore in
early 1973. However, the People's Guard has been engaging
in considerable violence and intimidation of political rivals.
One wonders whether these are merely outbursts of over-
enthusiastic PPP activists, or whether the purpose is fas-
cist with the Guard acting as an agent of coercion for the
government
.
The PPP also seems intent upon involving the masses
in confrontations it has with its rivals. One has heard
about opposition parties mobilizing support and organizing
processions (in democratic countries) against the govern-
ment of the day. In Pakistan the reverse also seems to
happen. The ruling party is taking a stance of "confronta-
tion," and political opponents are being declared enemies
of the people. A recent incident involving Asghar Khan is
23
worth mentioning to illustrate these government tactics.
The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal chief at a press conference on April
27, 1973 at Lahore, alleged that democratic means of ex-
pressing political views had practically come to an end.
Asghar Khan claimed that when Tehrik workers gathered at
Kamoke (in Punjab) to attend a scheduled meeting, which was
to be addressed by him, they were apprehended by a large
number of people, who resorted to firing and manhandling.
A jeep carrying nine Tehrik supporters was stopped by PPP
^
^The incident involving Asghar Khan and the reaction
of government has been given coverage in Pakistan Times
,
April 28 - 30, 1973.
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workers patrolling the area and the workers were abducted.
The Air Marshall called Bhutto a "sick man," "thoroughly
evil," "insane," and a "dictator" and said that once the
politics of bullets was resorted to by the party in power,
"why did they forget that a bullet could also turn towards
the Head of the State."
The government response to this outburst is interes-
ting and indicative of the tactics of the ruling party.
Several PPP dignitaries, including Miraj Khalid, Chief
Minister of Punjab, and Iftikhar Ahmad Tari
,
Punjab minis-
ter for communications and works, exhorted the people and
PPP workers to take out a procession to protest Asghar
Khan's statement. Strong threats were used. Said Khaled,
if anyone hurls abuse at the President, he will
have to incur the wrath of the people.
The people of Lahore have complete faith in the
Quaid i Awam, Z.A. Bhutto, and the procession
would be another manifestation of the same faith.
... We will not allow Mr. Asghar to use such
undemocratic methods, and from now on he will
not be able to hold any public meeting anywhere
in Punjab,
said Ahmad Tari. A massive rally was held by PPP workers
in Lahore in which the effigy of Asghar Khan was burnt, and
thousands shouted "Down with Asghar, the traitor." The
rally was addressed by various ministers of Punjab, in which
they warned the delinquent of the consequences of the vio-
lence he preached. Newspapers, too carried editorials admon-
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ishing Asghar Khan for going "berserk." 24 Mobilizing mass
support for what are obviously repressive measures against
threatening elements, is a tactic in which the government
has so far met with success. It also seems possible that
while these tactics may intimidate some opponents, a growing
fear of Bhutto's authoritarian propensities might create
25factions within the party and strengthen the opposition.
At any rate it is interesting to note that the PPP, in its
role as the ruling party at the centre, is acting like a
party of pressure and confrontation, and not so much like
a party of consensus.
Again, those familiar with Pakistani newspapers since
the PPP took over, will notice the free use of Marxian
dialect and rhetoric in the speeches of PPP leaders, openly
calling for a "class struggle." The words "reactionary,"
"feudalistic, " "exploitative" are freely used to describe
moneyed landowners. At the same time industrialists and
businessmen are being urged to go in for such ventures
which would help generate more production and employment
24See Pakistan Times , April 29, 1973.
25A rebel group of the PPP was opening consultations
with Asghar Khan, relating to "ways to promote mutual co-
operation for carrying on a united struggle for complete
democracy in the country. This group comprises Mahmud Ali
Kasuri, Mir Rasul Baksh Talpur, Mir Ahmed Talpur, Anwar All
Noon, Manzoor Dhadra, Ahmad Raza Qasuri. See Pakistan
Times
,
April 28, 1973.
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opportunities. The celebration of May Day for the first
time in 1973, and the declaration of a public holiday, are
indicative of the PPP move to initiate the masses into some
symbolic essentials of socialist practice. 27
In spite of all these tactics, it goes to the credit
of the PPP (and particularly Bhutto) that it was able (after
lengthy negotiations) to elicit support of all other poli-
tical parties for the Draft Constitution. It was adopted
by an absolute majority, with only two members of the
National Assembly abstaining. The major task before the
elected body has been successfully accomplished. The support
that the PPP was able to gather is all the more surprising,
since the constitution contains clauses that will make
Bhutto's position stronger, and continue his rule for
another fifteen years. The "constitution," however, guaran-
tees a federal, parliamentary and democratic form of govern-
ment. The spirit of (Islamic) socialism pervades, and for
the first time in the history of Pakistan, the Preamble of
the Constitution emphasizes economic justice in the follow-
ing enunciation:
26See Finance Minister, Mubashir Hasan's address to
industrialists and businessmen, Pakistan Times, April 29,
1973.
27 Several rallies were organized and processions
attended by the PPP workers and labourers and trade union-
ists all over Pakistan. Bhutto, in a May Day message,
pledged the government to secure a "better deal" for indus-
trial and agricultural labor.
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The State shall ensure the elimination of all
forms of exploitation and the gradual fulfill-
ment of the fundamental principle of, from each
according to
2
gis ability, and to each according
to his work.
Conclusion
The "crises" that the Pakistani polity faced contri-
buted to a desire for change in the minds of the people.
Since industrialization and social mobilization had altered
in some measure, the traditional bonds of society, there
was a redefinition of priorities on the part of the masses
— stressing the equality factor in the development syndrome.
The appeal of the PPP in the 1970 election seemed
irresistable
,
because it emphasized the equality factor in
its strategy for eliciting support. Its program of Islamic
Socialism seemed the correct answer to the crisis of distri-
bution and legitimacy. It is still to be seen how the PPP
29grapples with the problem of penetration. The experience
of East Pakistan seccesion has demonstrated that the imposi-
tion of unpopular processes is no dependable remedy. It
goes to the credit of the PPP that the new constitution
28Quoted in Pakistan Times , April 29, 1973. Robert
La Porte has enunciated some salient points of power alloca-
tion in the Draft Constitution in "Pakistan in 1972: Pick-
ing up the Pieces," Asian Survey , February 1973, p. 192.
28To an extent the disinclination on the part of the
PPP to compromise its power precipitated the crisis which
eventually led to the break up of Pakistan.
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gives more power to the provinces than any previously for-
mulated constitution. However, in addition, other politi-
cal, economic and social processes need to be instituted to
forge a sense of national identity and unity.
The PPP success seems to depend to a large extent on
a continual internalizing of mass aspirations and priori-
ties. Any political system in which the governing group
hcis to display continual sensitivity to mass priorities in
order to survive, says something for the political maturity
of its citizenry.
Our observations in this chapter, being futuristic,
are necessarily tentative. The PPP and Bhutto have been
in power for less than two years, and some severe problems
with India and Bangla Desh (like the POW question) remain
to be solved. If and when these are solved, Bhutto will be
more free to push policies and programs on the domestic
front with greater vigor. The next few years will show
more fully which direction Pakistan's political develop-
ment is going to take.
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